

# **Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan**



November 2013

## **Report to Congress**

In accordance with sections 1230 and 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181), as amended; to include reports in response to section 1221 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 (P.L. 112-81), and sections 1212, 1223, and 1531(d) of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 (P.L. 112-239)

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## Executive Summary<sup>1</sup>

Afghan security forces are now successfully providing security for their own people, fighting their own battles, and holding the gains made by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in the last decade. This is a fundamental shift in the course of the conflict. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have seen their capabilities expand rapidly since 2009, while insurgent territorial influence and kinetic capabilities have remained static. During the 2012 fighting season, ISAF led the fight against the insurgency, helping to put the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) firmly in control of all of Afghanistan's major cities and 34 provincial capitals. During the 2013 fighting season, the ANSF led the fight, and have consolidated GIROA's control of Afghanistan's urban areas. The fact that the ANSF – a force in its infancy five years ago – can now maintain the gains made by a coalition of 50 nations with the best trained and equipped forces in the world is a significant accomplishment.

The ANSF now conduct 95 percent of conventional operations and 98 percent of special operations in Afghanistan. The only unilateral operations that ISAF continues to conduct are ISAF force protection, route clearance, and redeployment. A number of violence indicators are lower in this reporting period than they were during the corresponding period last year, including a six percent drop in enemy initiated attacks (EIAs), a 12 percent drop in security incidents, and a 22 percent drop in improvised explosive device (IED) events.<sup>2</sup> However, this success did not come without costs, and the ANSF still face many challenges.

ANSF casualties have increased by 79 percent this reporting period compared to the same period last year, while ISAF casualties have dropped by 59 percent. The insurgency has also consolidated gains in some of the rural areas in which it has traditionally held power. ISAF continues to provide the ANSF with significant advising and enabling support, such as airlift and close air support (CAS). This enabling support will decline through 2014, and will be difficult for the ANSF to fully replace. ANSF capabilities are not yet fully self-sustainable, and considerable effort will be required to make progress permanent. After 2014, ANSF sustainability will be at high risk without continued aid from the international community and continued Coalition force assistance including institutional advising. With assistance, however, the ANSF will remain on a path towards an enduring ability to overmatch the Taliban.

However, military progress alone will not lead to success in Afghanistan. In addition to uncertainties about ANSF sustainability and challenges to security outside of urban areas,

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<sup>1</sup> This report is submitted consistent with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended. It includes a description of the comprehensive strategy of the United States for security and stability in Afghanistan. This report is the eleventh in a series of reports required every 180 days through fiscal year 2014 and has been prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Agriculture. This assessment complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress; however, it is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan. The information contained in this report reflects information through September 30, 2013. **This is a historical document that covers progress in Afghanistan from April 1, 2013, to September 30, 2013, although some more recent updates of key events are included. The next report will include an analysis of progress toward security and stability from October 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014.**

<sup>2</sup> These figures compare data from April 1, 2013 through September 15, 2013 with data from April 1, 2012 through September 15, 2012.




challenges with the economy and governance continue to foster uncertainty about long-term prospects for stability. This causes hedging behavior by actors in many sectors, which exacerbates existing instability. Afghanistan has made significant economic progress over the past decade, but it remains one of the poorest countries in the world, and will continue to depend heavily on international aid. The Afghan government is increasingly able to execute parts of its budget and to deliver very basic goods and services. However, the government must continue to work towards reducing corruption and effectively extend governance to many rural areas.

Although problems remain, many of which are detailed in this report, ANSF progress means that the biggest uncertainties facing Afghanistan are no longer primarily military. Assessing whether the gains to date will be sustainable is now more dependent upon the size and structure of the post-2014 U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) presence, the Afghan election in 2014, the level of international support provided to Afghanistan after 2014, and whether Afghanistan can put in place the legal and other structures needed to attract investment and promote growth.

### **ANSF in the Lead**

ISAF's main effort is to assist ANSF development to the point where it can assume full security responsibility for Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Of all lines of effort, this showed the most progress during the reporting period, culminating in the ANSF successfully assuming the lead for security across the country and holding the gains made by ISAF over the past three years. As seen in Figure 1 below, the percentage of security incidents involving only ANSF forces has grown dramatically in the last two years, while the percentage of incidents involving ISAF has correspondingly diminished.

**Figure 1: Percentage of Security Incidents Involving ANSF and ISAF Forces**



GIRoA and ISAF made a deliberate decision several years ago to focus on rapid ANSF growth, followed by the development of enablers and the professionalization of the force. This decision was made with a full understanding that the ANSF, once built to size, would need to develop the more complex institutional capabilities necessary to make the force self-sustainable. In light of this, ISAF now bases its assistance to the ANSF on the five operational pillars deemed key to long-term sustainability: leadership, command and control (C2), sustainment and logistics, combined arms integration, and training. Improving ANSF capability across these functions is now the main focus of the ANSF development effort. As Afghan capabilities in these areas are still limited, the ANSF continues to require ISAF intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), airlift, resupply, medical, route clearance, and CAS assistance.

The ANSF has nearly doubled in size since 2009. As of August 2013, ANSF force strength has reached 344,602, which is 98 percent of its 352,000 authorized end strength. Including its 24,169 Afghan Local Police (ALP) Guardians, GIRoA had 368,771 uniformed troops and police. Almost all ANSF unit and major equipment fielding will be complete by December 2013. Development of ANSF airpower is more technologically complex, and lags behind the other elements, with some capabilities not fully operational until 2017.

The ANSF will be challenged to close a number of capability gaps in areas where ISAF currently provides support. Afghanistan's security ministries, despite substantial progress, still require substantive improvements in planning, programming, budgeting, and acquisition. In the fielded force, the Afghan Air Force (AAF), counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) units, intelligence, fires, medical, and combined arms integration are all areas of focus. Continuing problems with literacy, corruption, leadership, Afghan National Army (ANA) attrition, and manning inhibit ANSF progress. The single most important challenge facing the ANSF, however, is in developing an effective logistics and sustainment system. A lack of trained

maintenance technicians and spare parts, and a logistics system that struggles to resupply units in the field, adversely affects every branch of the ANSF.

Despite these challenges, with additional equipment fielding and continued ISAF training and advising, the ANSF are on-track to transition to full sovereign responsibility for security on January 1, 2015. However, beyond 2014, the ANSF will still require substantial Train, Advise and Assist (TAA) mentoring—as well as financial support—to address ongoing shortcomings.

The ANSF has also continued to increase its capability to plan, conduct, and sustain large-scale joint operations. One example was Operation SEMOURGH in Regional Command-East (RC-E). This multi-week, large-scale operation involved coordination among all the components of the ANSF from within the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and Ministry of Defense (MOD) forces to include the AAF and Afghan Special Operations Forces. The ANSF planned and led the operation; Afghan-managed logistics and supply channels supported it. The objectives of the operation were to clear a valley of insurgents and secure a district center so that humanitarian supplies and voter registration materials could be delivered. After three weeks of fighting with insurgents and facing complications due to inclement weather that hampered air and ground movement, the ANSF accomplished its objectives. More importantly, after clearing the valley, the ANSF left behind a police force sufficient to consolidate the operations' gains and to provide long-term security.

The number of insider attacks against ISAF and coalition forces has declined sharply compared to last year. Thus far, these attacks have not significantly affected the strong relationship between coalition and ANSF personnel, particularly in the field, where they face a common enemy every day. ISAF is cautiously optimistic that the mitigation measures applied over the previous year are working. These measures have reduced, but not eliminated, the inherent threat of insider attacks.

### **Insurgent Narrative Undermined**

The insurgency failed to achieve its stated campaign objectives during the reporting period and its ability to strike at major population centers is under pressure. The enemy is now less popular than in 2012.<sup>3</sup> Nonetheless, insurgents maintained influence in many rural areas that serve as platforms to attack urban areas, and were able to carry out attacks with roughly the same frequency as in 2012. The insurgency maintained an operational tempo this year similar to the previous three years, and the geographic distribution of attacks also remained roughly consistent. The insurgency can mount attacks but generally cannot capture or destroy well-defended targets, and are unable to hold significant territory in the face of numerically superior ANSF. While tactically ineffective, these insurgent efforts potentially allow them to reap significant publicity gains. Insurgents continue to seek to conduct high profile attacks (HPAs) against people in population centers as well as against remote outposts to garner media attention, to project an exaggerated image of their capabilities, and to expand perceptions of insecurity.

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<sup>3</sup> Results from the ISAF Joint Command BINNA survey wave #14 (July/August 2013).

During the reporting period, sustained counterterrorism (CT) operations exerted pressure on AQ personnel and networks, and eliminated dozens of al Qaeda (AQ) operatives and facilitators, restricting AQ movements to isolated areas within northeastern Afghanistan. ISAF estimates that the number of AQ fighters in Afghanistan remains very low, but the AQ relationship with local Afghan Taliban formations remains intact.

Insurgent groups' main propaganda theme for the past 11 years has been that they are fighting a foreign "occupation." As the ANSF take over almost all operations and coalition forces transition from a combat to a primarily advisory role, this message increasingly lacks credibility. This is particularly true because insurgent actions continue to cause the vast majority of civilian casualties in Afghanistan, mostly as a result of insurgents' indiscriminate emplacement of IEDs. Survey data shows an increased belief by the Afghan public that the Taliban is responsible for this rise in civilian casualties.<sup>4</sup> As the insurgency finds itself increasingly fighting Afghans—and as even more of the victims of their attacks are fellow Afghans – insurgent propaganda will become less credible. At the same time, a meaningful U.S. enduring presence as part of NATO's RESOLUTE SUPPORT mission will contradict the insurgent narrative that coalition forces are abandoning Afghanistan.

## **Transition on Track**

On June 18, 2013, ISAF and GIRoA announced Milestone 2013, which marked the ANSF's assumption of the lead for security across the country. The transition process is on track for completion by the end of 2014, and most districts are making steady progress. Districts in transition pass through several stages that gradually increase the level of Afghan control. Areas that reach the final stage of transition remain at that stage until December 2014 when all provinces and districts in Afghanistan will graduate from transition, regardless of what stage they have achieved. The ANSF has taken the lead in transitioned areas and is helping to expand Afghan governance. This is most apparent in Regional Command–North (RC-N), where ISAF has substantially reduced its coverage.

Transition is a dynamic and uneven process, with some areas progressing quickly and others moving slowly or even regressing. Notably, some areas of Badakshan Province saw increased insurgent attacks, with the ANSF taking significant casualties. In response, the ANSF independently planned and executed several clearing operations in the province, though insurgents were able to use the rugged and remote terrain to avoid getting pinned down, and thus retained the ability to carry out attacks. The fighting in Badakshan was episodic throughout the reporting period.

## **Improved Cooperation with Pakistan**

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<sup>4</sup> Results from the ISAF FOGHORN survey data wave 16 (Aug 2013).

Pakistan and Afghanistan acknowledge that stability in their respective countries is inter-related. The Afghan insurgency maintains sanctuaries in Pakistan, which is a major factor preventing their decisive defeat in the near term. Furthermore, a significant portion of the materials which perpetuate the conflict emanate from or transit through Pakistan. Relations between the two nations began to improve in September when President Karzai visited Prime Minister Sharif. Additionally, the military-to-military relationship between the nations improved incrementally; senior Pakistani, Afghan, and ISAF leaders took part in tripartite discussions, with similar meetings held at lower levels. Tactical level military-to-military coordination continues to be problematic without a politically endorsed, diplomatically supported bilateral border management strategy. As a result, cooperation along the border remains uneven. Some Pakistani insurgents have fled into Afghanistan and then staged attacks into Pakistan. Pakistan has conducted counterinsurgency operations against Pakistan-focused militants located along the border with Afghanistan, which in some cases have restricted the operating space and resources of Afghan-focused insurgents. Pakistan has made clear that it supports an Afghan-led reconciliation process.

The United States and other coalition nations increased the transport of materiel into and out of Afghanistan through the Pakistan ground lines of communication (GLOCs), greatly reducing transportation time and cost. As of the end of the reporting period, Pakistani GLOCs were capable of handling the vast majority of the cargo headed into and out of Afghanistan.

## **U.S. – Afghan Relations**

As agreed in the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) signed by Presidents Obama and Karzai in May 2012, the United States and Afghanistan are negotiating a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). The BSA would supersede the 2003 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Afghanistan and provide the legal framework for the presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014. The BSA would also set parameters for future defense cooperation activities between the two countries, confirm and codify this enduring defense partnership, and send a clear message that the United States will not abandon Afghanistan. The BSA will be concluded as an executive agreement, not a mutual defense treaty.

BSA negotiations began in November 2012, with a goal to conclude within one year. The BSA text is now largely complete and negotiations have moved to Kabul for policy level decisions and conclusion. The BSA, if concluded, would enter into force on January 1, 2015. The BSA will serve as a blueprint for the NATO-Afghanistan SOFA. Following completion of the BSA, NATO working groups would negotiate a new SOFA with Afghanistan for the NATO post-2014 RESOLUTE SUPPORT mission.

On June 18, 2013, the Taliban opened a political office in Doha, Qatar, to facilitate peace talks with the GIROA. At the official opening ceremony, widely covered by the media, the Taliban displayed a flag and name plaque identifying them as the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,” the same name taken by the Taliban government that ruled Afghanistan until 2001. Qatari authorities clarified that the name of the office was the “Political Office of the Afghan Taliban” and

removed the flag and plaque; the office was subsequently closed. On June 19, 2013, President Karzai suspended BSA negotiations with the United States, but they have since resumed.

## **Afghan Governance and Development Challenges Continue**

Effective governance, rule of law, and sustainable economic development are all necessary for long-term stability in Afghanistan. However, these are hindered by multiple factors, including widespread corruption, limited formal education and skills, illiteracy, minimal access by officials to rural areas, lack of coordination between the central government and the Afghan provinces and districts, and uneven distribution of power among the branches of the Afghan government.

GIRoA capacity to provide stable, representative, transparent, and responsive governance for the citizens of Afghanistan continues to develop, although progress is slow and uneven. Revenue generation, including tax collection at the municipal level, has improved in recent years, but has decreased this year compared to the last. Additionally, execution of the development budget remains a concern.

The Afghan government is highly centralized, with revenue, budgeting, spending, and service delivery authority residing with the central ministries in Kabul. This level of centralization limits the efficiency of service delivery at the provincial and district levels. Development of capacity at local levels is slowed by limited human capital as well as by delays in enactment of structural reforms by the central government. There are some parts of the government that do have relatively effective service delivery, such as the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development.

The July 2012 Tokyo Conference recognized many of these issues, and the resulting Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) included explicit commitments by the Afghans to address some of the major weaknesses in sub-national governance. Some progress was made in meeting TMAF commitments during the reporting period: adoption of electoral legislation, implementation of an Independent Election Commission (IEC) voter registration plan, and drafting of the Independent Election Commission operational plan. Budget transparency increased, and World Trade Organization (WTO) accession is on track. To enhance accountability for Tokyo deliverables, the U.S. government announced in July an incentive program that set aside \$175 million in planned funding over two fiscal years, to be released when adequate progress is made on benchmarks agreed with GIRoA in the TMAF, including points on elections, anti-corruption, women's rights, and revenue generation.

Economic growth and development in Afghanistan will continue to be led through 2014 by investments in construction and by private consumption driven largely by donor contributions and ISAF spending. The ongoing reduction of ISAF personnel is likely to have a negative effect on economic growth. Donor funding commitments made in Tokyo provided an important signal from the international community that there will be continued funding after 2014 to support the Afghan economy and mitigate the effects of transition, particularly because the economy does not yet have a basis for sustained growth. The non-opium agricultural sector comprises about 20 percent of total gross domestic product (GDP), and about 80 percent of the work force is

involved in agriculture. Opium production, however, remains a substantial portion of overall agriculture output and will continue to fuel corruption and fund the insurgency. Mining accounts for a marginal share of GDP but has the potential to expand if the government implements pending legislation to modernize the rules and regulations governing this sector. The information technology sector, particularly telecommunications, is one area of Afghanistan's economy that is showing continued growth.

Sustaining governance, development, and security gains beyond 2014 will depend in large part upon a successful presidential election, a smooth transfer of power, and the political will to tackle needed reforms. The Afghan government committed in the U.S.-Afghan SPA and the TMAF to promote free, fair, inclusive, and transparent elections. U.S. assistance is designed to help the Afghans meet that goal. The U.S. government has provided substantial support for election reform and preparations including technical advice and funding for Afghanistan's independent election institutions and capacity building for civil society.

Challenges in governance and sustainable economic development continue to slow the reinforcement and consolidation of security gains. Ongoing insurgent activity and influence in some parts of the country continue to inhibit economic development and improvements in governance. Unqualified and corrupt political officials in parts of the central government undermine government efficacy and credibility, threatening the long-term stability of Afghanistan. During the reporting period, the Afghan government's counter-corruption efforts have shown no substantial progress, apart from the public acknowledgement that large-scale corruption exists.

Despite these challenges, the Afghan population continues to benefit from the vast improvements in social development made over the past decade, particularly in health and education. In the past decade, Afghanistan has made the largest percentage gain of any country in the world in basic health and development indicators. In 2000, Afghanistan had 1.2 million students enrolled in school, whereas now it has over 10 million. In 2000, male life expectancy was 37 years, whereas now it is 56. In 2000, fewer than five percent of Afghans had cellular phones, whereas now in excess of 60 percent do, including 48 percent of women. Cell service coverage has now expanded by 80 percent. Few but the privileged had internet connectivity in 2000, whereas now an estimated that 65 percent of the population has access to internet connections. In 2000, Afghanistan had only two international airlines servicing Kabul; now there are 12 international airlines servicing most of Afghanistan's major cities.

In the 1990s, Taliban ideology and control depended, in part, upon the low education level and isolation of poor Afghans. The rapid progress of the last decade has altered Afghan society and made Afghans richer, less isolated, and better educated. The old Afghanistan—which the Taliban claim to represent and hope to rule—is rapidly disappearing.

## **SECTION 1 – SECURITY**

### **1.1: U.S. MISSION**

The goal of the United States is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat AQ and to prevent Afghanistan from being a safe haven for international terrorism. Specific U.S. objectives in Afghanistan are to deny safe haven to AQ and deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow GIRoA. To accomplish these objectives, U.S. and coalition forces will continue to degrade the Taliban-led insurgency in order to provide time and space for ANSF and GIRoA to increase capacity, so they can assume full responsibility for Afghanistan's security by the end of 2014. These are necessary conditions to enable Afghanistan to achieve a level of internal stability that will ensure it no longer represents a threat to regional stability or international security.

Diplomatic efforts continue to complement military operations. The United States and the international community support Afghan reconciliation efforts with the Taliban as a means to a political solution to the conflict.

### **1.2: ISAF CAMPAIGN STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES**

ISAF has begun to integrate the Security Force Assistance (SFA) model, implement a comprehensive border strategy effort with the Afghans, transition security responsibility to Afghan lead, develop and field the ANSF to end strength, and refine those tasks that can be accomplished before the end of 2014. The ISAF plan also integrates the transition to the post-ISAF mission, the evolution of C2 structures, base closures, as well as realignment and retrograde operations, all without adversely degrading campaign momentum.

This summer marked a significant transition point in the campaign. On June 18, at the Milestone 2013 ceremony, the ANSF assumed lead responsibility for security nationwide. ISAF is now in a supporting role for the ANSF. A clear shift has taken place from coalition forces in the lead, to coalition forces partnered with Afghan forces, to the current SFA construct. Since the completion of the security transition, the only unilateral operations that ISAF continues to conduct are for coalition security, route clearance to maintain freedom of movement, and redeployment.

The initial planning for the NATO post-2014 mission in Afghanistan, or RESOLUTE SUPPORT, focuses on mission objectives and the development of a new concept of operations. As the ISAF mission comes to an end and mission transition becomes the focus, ISAF is coordinating national efforts to redeploy forces and retrograde equipment to ensure NATO and Troop Contributing Nation (TCN) resources match campaign requirements and to mitigate any adverse effects to both the NATO and the U.S.-only missions.



## **Disposition of ISAF Tasks**

ISAF has reviewed the current set of ISAF tasks and developed three appropriate options for those tasks moving forward: continue them in the post-2014 RESOLUTE SUPPORT mission, transfer them to the GIRoA or other international community organizations, or terminate them, or. The transfer of relevant ISAF tasks to GIRoA is a necessary step towards transitioning full responsibility and sovereignty into Afghan hands. The NATO-Afghanistan Transformation Task Force (NATTF) was charged with this mission and worked in close cooperation with NATO, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), GIRoA, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and the international community. Together, these organizations established the processes, coordination mechanisms, milestones, and timelines to be used; and identified priorities, critical issues, and the recommended disposition of tasks. NATTF identified approximately 400 tasks for the Master Task List and identified potential capability gaps for discussion within NATO and across the international community. Examples of potential capability gap areas include civil airspace management, communications infrastructure, counter narcotics efforts, counter corruption efforts, and rule of law.

Planning for the post-2014 mission was bolstered by approval of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Strategic Concept of Operations (CONOPS) at the NATO Defense Ministers meeting on June 5, 2013. SHAPE is currently drafting a plan for the post-2014 NATO-led RESOLUTE SUPPORT mission with the expectation that it will be approved in the coming months. Individual Allies and partners have made informal personnel and capability pledges to the RESOLUTE SUPPORT mission and some have announced their plans for bilateral military engagement with Afghanistan.

## **Base Closures and Redeployment Operations**

The closure of bases is having an effect on the ISAF mission due to the strain on logistic resupply lines and challenges related to operational reach. Operational reach will continue to diminish over time; however, ISAF will focus on key terrain, especially in support of the election, as well as other high-risk areas. To mitigate some of this risk, co-use agreements of Afghan bases are being developed.

During the reporting period, the focus has been on the refinement and execution of TCN redeployment plans under ISAF and NATO command, coordination, and synchronization. Redeployment and cargo flows along GLOCs were disrupted earlier in this reporting period as a consequence of a dispute with GIRoA concerning outstanding fines for Afghan transit documents which authorize cargo to proceed through Afghanistan. The loss of freedom of movement affected cargo redeployment at the border crossing points for approximately six weeks. Once the issue was resolved, cargo throughput rapidly resumed. Redeployment remains on track for all TCNs.

For this reporting period, TCNs redeployed approximately 7,000 pieces of rolling stock, and approximately 11,000 twenty-foot equivalent containers of non-rolling stock. The current assessment is that ISAF is adequately postured in terms of retrograde timelines, but that there

must be continued focus to ensure that retrograde progresses within the context of transition, RESOLUTE SUPPORT planning, and the ISAF campaign plan.

As of September 15, 2013, NATO/ISAF Joint Command (IJC) had closed or transferred 728 of 812, or 89 percent, of its bases. The IJC basing footprint now consists of 84 strategic, operational, and tactical bases. As of September 15, 2013 IJC had transferred 455 bases to GIRoA, including 248 to the MOD, 181 to the MOI, and 26 to other ministries, and had closed 273. Additionally, ISAF Special Operations Forces (SOF) operate fewer than 40 bases that are also closing or transferring on a similar timeline.

During this reporting period, U.S. redeployment and retrograde consisted of 57,829 U.S. personnel<sup>5</sup>, 5,558 containers, and 8,354 pieces of rolling stock. For non-rolling stock, or containers, 14 percent travelled via the Pakistan GLOCs, 85 percent travelled via the air lines of communication (ALOCs), and 1 percent via the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). For rolling stock, 28 percent travelled via the Pakistan GLOCs and 72 percent travelled via the ALOCs.

The following are the recent metrics measuring ISAF's retrograde from Afghanistan:

**Basing**: In January 2012, there were a total of 349 U.S. bases; since then, 290 bases have closed/transferred, a reduction of 83 percent. There are now 59 bases and 14 assistance platforms remaining in theater. Because the process of safely turning over bases to GIRoA is time consuming, ISAF may not complete the transfer of all bases by the end of 2014.

**Rolling Stock**: In January 2012, there were approximately 46,000 pieces of rolling stock; that has been reduced by more than 48 percent.

**Non-Rolling Stock**: In January 2012, there were just over 9,000 containers of non-rolling stock on hand. This has been reduced by over 46 percent, and there are fewer than 5,000 containers left.

**Materiel Reduction**: Since January 2012, the theater has transferred commercial equipment and supplies with a fair market value of \$198.6 million, thereby saving over \$655.7 million in retrograde transportation costs. To date, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has disposed of over 33,345 containers of scrap and demilitarized over 2,357 vehicles, with excess capacity to demilitarize more.

**Contractor Reduction**: In December 2012, there were 78,000 U.S. and other country nationals contractors and has since decreased by 31 percent to fewer than 54,000.

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<sup>5</sup> This does not mean that U.S. military personnel numbers declined by 57,829, as personnel were also rotated into the country during the reporting period.

The Pakistan GLOCs are functioning adequately, with losses from pilferage and attacks remaining close to historical averages. Of the backlog of cargo that had been held up during the closure of the Pakistan GLOC last year, all but a few have since been transported into Afghanistan.

Considerable effort is being made within the NATO chain of command to increase the speed and efficiency of the NDN in order to diversify the range of options available for retrograde. Generally, Headquarters (HQ) NATO has been marginally successful in gaining support from the Central Asian states and Russia for coalition use of the NDN, and arrangements are in place for reverse transit, including the movement of armored vehicles. Uzbekistan, in particular, has shown reluctance in allowing shipments through its country, resulting in delays. However, the NDN has a number of drawbacks: limitation on the types of cargo allowed on the route, the length of time it takes for transit, and multiple border crossings which incur additional customs processing.

There is sufficient strategic capacity in the ALOCs, including airports in Afghanistan, to enable retrograde. Many nations continue to favor the use of ALOCs, which are required for shipments that are more sensitive or ones that require expedited movement. Nevertheless, it is expected that increasing confidence in the effectiveness of less expensive surface and multi-modal options should lead to a reduction in reliance upon the ALOCs by coalition forces.

The key strategic vulnerability to redeployment continues to be incidents or actions that constrain ISAF freedom of movement. The most common issues seen are compliance with the military technical agreements, route security, commercial contract disputes, and problems with movement through transit nations outside of Afghanistan.

### **1.3: ISAF COMMAND AND CONTROL**

There have been several changes to the C2 structure during the reporting period. Due to the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) progress with ANSF fielding, ISAF is now focused on developing sustainable Afghan security institutions. This includes placing greater emphasis on the development of the Afghan MOD and MOI. To this end, the Commander, ISAF (COMISAF) requested realignment and integration of NTM-A functions within the existing ISAF structure, specifically:

- SOF institutional training will integrate with NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (NSOCC-A);
- NATO Air Commander – Afghanistan will incorporate air institutional training
- Ministerial Advisor Groups (MAGs) will realign with Headquarters ISAF (HQ ISAF);
- Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) functions will physically move to HQ ISAF; and
- Institutional training will shift under IJC in order to focus on development of fielded forces and sustainment activities.

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) supported this proposal and forwarded it to the NATO North Atlantic Council (NAC) for decision. As of the end of the reporting period, this proposal had yet to be approved by the NAC.

#### **1.4: NATO-ISAF FORCE LEVELS AND PLEDGES**

On April 1, 2013, the commencement of the reporting period, the total number of ISAF troops in Afghanistan was 86,888, of which 49,803 were U.S. service men and women, and 37,085 were from partner nations.<sup>6</sup> U.S. personnel comprised 57 percent and international partners made up the remaining 43 percent of the troops.

On September 30, 2013, the total number of ISAF troops in Afghanistan had declined to 65,222, a 25 percent drop during the reporting period. The U.S. contribution as of September 30, 2013, was 39,253 while international partners contributed 26,269. U.S. personnel made up 60 percent of the total.

The ISAF coalition consists of all 28 NATO Allies plus 22 partner nations. Coalition forces are deployed at all HQ NATO in Afghanistan, including IJC and NTM-A. NATO Allies command three of the six Regional Commands in Afghanistan: RC-North (Germany), RC-West (Italy), and RC-Capital (Turkey).

Most of the 28 NATO nations continue to await political decisions before making any final announcements for contributions to the post-2014 NATO RESOLUTE SUPPORT mission. Germany, as the Northern Framework Nation, committed 600-800 forces to RESOLUTE SUPPORT. Italy, as the Western Framework Nation, committed up to 800 forces. Turkey announced its commitment as the Capitol Region Framework Nation but has provided no additional clarity on personnel commitments. Furthermore, Georgia indicated potential contributions of up to 750 forces, Australia up to 450 forces, and Romania up to 250 forces. NATO is expected to finalize their request for forces at a Force Management Conference in spring 2014. It is premature to speculate on final troop commitments until the RESOLUTE SUPPORT mission plan is published, and nations are formally asked to contribute.

Eleven Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have handed over their responsibilities to the Afghan government. The 17 remaining PRTs will be phased out and closed by the end of 2014.

#### **Bilateral Security Agreement**

As agreed in the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) signed by Presidents Obama and Karzai in May 2012, the United States and Afghanistan are negotiating a Bilateral Security Agreement

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<sup>6</sup> All ISAF coalition partners in Afghanistan operate according to the ISAF Rules of Engagement. Individual coalition partners invoke national caveats to ensure their forces operate in accordance with respective national laws and policies.

(BSA). The agreement will provide the legal framework for the presence of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan after 2014. The BSA will also set parameters for future defense cooperation activities between the two countries, confirm their enduring partnership, and send a clear message that the United States will not abandon Afghanistan.

The BSA will not specify the number of forces that would remain in Afghanistan. Instead, as agreed in the SPA, the BSA will authorize the activities that U.S. forces can undertake in Afghanistan after 2014, including CT operations against AQ and its affiliates and participation in the NATO-led TAA mission, as well as authorize access to and use of Afghan facilities by U.S. forces to conduct those missions. The United States does not seek permanent military bases in Afghanistan and would only operate from Afghan bases with the consent of and at the invitation of the Afghan government.

BSA negotiations began in November 2012, with a goal to conclude within one year. Negotiations have produced a largely completed text, and discussions were moved to Kabul in late July for final-stage negotiations and conclusion. The BSA, if concluded, would enter into force on January 1, 2015. Separately, NATO intends to negotiate a new SOFA with Afghanistan for its post-2014 RESOLUTE SUPPORT mission.

## **1.5: THE INSURGENCY**

Afghanistan continues to face challenges from both the Afghan insurgency and extremist networks. AQ maintains a limited presence in the remote areas of eastern Afghanistan such as Kunar and Nuristan, and maintains a seasonal presence in other provinces. Although national estimates place the numbers of operatives of these groups in the dozens, their presence continues to demonstrate their intent to maintain the region as an alternate safe haven to their sanctuaries in Pakistan. Groups like the Haqqani Network (HQN) remain potent forces with the ability to conduct HPAs, directed at both Afghan and ISAF targets, particularly in Kabul. The numerous insurgent and terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan often facilitate and support one another, though their ideologies may differ. The Taliban continues to contest GIROA control over some sparsely populated areas, particularly in the south and east, and along portions of Highway 1 and other main facilitation routes. However, ANSF have proven to be a resilient and capable force, and have largely been able to defend against direct insurgent attacks during the fighting season. Despite the performance of the ANSF, entrenched criminal networks maintain freedom of movement throughout the country, constituting a threat to the long-term stability of Afghanistan.

The Taliban have been unable to regain enduring control of lost ground. Taliban efforts to build legitimacy among the international community are currently stalled, as its leadership ceased all further political outreach after the Doha office closed in June 2013. Internal skepticism over the office continues, contributing to latent Taliban competition over resources, leadership divisions, and divergent operational priorities.

Although localized in nature, the insurgency has focused on maintaining pressure on ISAF and ANSF through the use of IEDs, infiltration and co-option, intimidation, assassinations, and HPAs in major population centers. In addition, Taliban leaders have increased focus on non-kinetic

means of influencing the local population, including intimidation and propaganda, and are improving relationships with influential local leaders and elders. Insurgents are intentionally increasing the targeting of ANSF and Afghan officials throughout the country, and have assassinated a number of key provincial leaders.

The Taliban retain access to critical resources and maintain the freedom of action essential to their continued survival and ability to threaten GIROA; most of the materials required to continue the conflict emanate from or transit through neighboring Pakistan. IEDs, which are responsible for more coalition, Afghan, and Pakistani casualties than any other weapon, are made primarily from fertilizer and military or commercial grade explosives produced in, or imported through, Pakistan.

During the reporting period, Pakistan continued to take significant steps to develop the legal, regulatory, and law enforcement framework necessary to stem the illicit flow of precursors and IEDs into Afghanistan. Underscoring these efforts, Pakistan's security forces on August 20, 2013 raided a warehouse and seized over 100 tons of explosives from Quetta city in Baluchistan province -- one of the largest seizures in its history. Forces recovered over 100,000 kg of explosive materials and at least 10 suspected militants. The explosive material included potassium chloride, aluminum chloride, improvised explosive devices, detonators, circuit wires and other arms and ammunition. Pakistan also passed legislation in March which will increase its ability to prosecute traffickers and seize assets of terrorists, increasing its capacity to act against the illicit IED supply network.

In May 2013, Pakistan hosted an International C-IED Symposium bringing together Pakistani civilian and military leaders, regional governments, industry, the U.S. and other international Allies (including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Australia, Canada, China, Russia and Afghanistan). Moreover, the Pakistani government has partnered with the fertilizer industry to stop the legal distribution of Calcium Ammonium Nitrate fertilizer in the provinces of Baluchistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, which border Afghanistan, pulling existing stock from 228 dealers. Pakistan and the U.S. are also cooperating with industry on distinctively coloring bags of the fertilizer to help customs officials stop smuggling into Afghanistan.

The Taliban maintain an adaptive propaganda apparatus, which they have successfully leveraged to promote portions of their narrative. However, they have struggled to address the ANSF's assumption of lead security and to perpetuate the portrayal of ISAF as an occupying force. The Taliban do hold influence in limited areas in southern and eastern Afghanistan and have attempted to increase their influence through the provision of select government services, primarily dispute resolution. Despite some level of Afghan acceptance of Taliban dispute resolution, the majority of Afghans continue to hold a negative view of the insurgency and do not want the Taliban to return to power.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Results from the ISAF Joint Command BINNA survey wave #14 (July/August 2013).

As ISAF draws down, some communities and security sector elements are adapting to the changed environment by establishing accommodations between insurgents and elements of the ANSF. These accommodations are localized, often personality-driven, and largely influenced by tribal dynamics. Thus far, most of these accommodations are in the Pashtun-dominated rural areas in southern Afghanistan, particularly in northern Helmand Province. In some areas, these accommodations stem from ANSF fears of being isolated and overwhelmed by what they perceive as a superior insurgent force. The Taliban may use these agreements as a mechanism to promote the perception of ANSF weakness, and attempt to regain lost areas, expand influence, or project violence into neighboring areas. However, some local insurgent commanders may also be entering into agreements in recognition of ANSF strength and capability. The impact of such agreements is highly localized. ISAF does not anticipate that these agreements will have a broad effect on the campaign through 2014.

A number of local anti-Taliban movements continue to exist, particularly in eastern Afghanistan, though few of these movements have demonstrated resilience or expanding popular support outside Ghazni Province, and will likely remain small. There is evidence of new anti-Taliban movements emerging in Helmand and Kandahar, but ISAF lacks fidelity regarding their size, viability, or prospects for expansion. ISAF is unable to assess the overall effect these movements are having on the security situation; however, these movements distract Taliban leaders and divert their attention and resources away from other objectives. GIRoA support helps some movements sustain themselves, but ultimately, the emergence of a widespread anti-Taliban movement remains unlikely. Localized movements will become more prevalent where villages are exposed to harsh Taliban treatment, particularly if the government demonstrates willingness to support local resistance to the insurgency. GIRoA will likely seek to capitalize on them by converting amenable anti-Taliban movements into the Afghan Local Police (ALP).

The convergence of insurgent, terrorist, and criminal networks is pervasive and constitutes a threat to Afghanistan's stability. Revenue from opium trafficking continues to contribute to the insurgency and Afghan criminal networks. Additionally, some areas of Afghanistan have seen a recent increase in extortion and kidnappings by low-level criminal networks. Expanding criminal networks have undercut security and governance gains in several ways. Criminal networks, insurgent groups, and corrupt government officials are often interlinked via multi-layered connections, making ties between the officials and the criminal activity difficult to prove and prosecute. These factors all contribute to popular disaffection with the government and create opportunities for the insurgency.

## **1.6: REPORTING PERIOD SECURITY OVERVIEW**

The ANSF have for the first time assumed the lead during the fighting season, and have proven capable of effectively securing the Afghan people in major urban areas. However, the vast majority of insurgent violence takes place away from major urban centers. The ANSF are increasingly willing and able to conduct security operations and commanders are improving their integration of combined arms. The layered security concept employed by the ANSF has prevented the insurgency from permanently gaining control of key terrain this fighting season, though acts of violence occur in all provinces.

The ANSF are able to seize terrain, despite localized increases in violence and persistent insurgent influence in portions of Afghanistan. The ANSF has had some difficulty holding terrain decisively after clearing it in rural areas and along the highways. As an example, ANSF battlefield successes in the Warduj Valley, located in the remote northeastern province of Badakshan, have not resulted in securing that area due to the lack of ANSF forces to hold the gains. The ANSF have been taking the brunt of the insurgency's efforts this fighting season, but the insurgency has been unsuccessful in weakening the ANSF. In most cases where ANSF checkpoints were overrun, the ANSF has subsequently recaptured the positions.

The insurgency also made a focused effort to attack the ALP, which suffered a disproportionate share of casualties this fighting season. The difference between the quality of training and equipping of the ANA and ANP (especially the ALP) is significant. This gap is a major challenge for the further development of the ANSF security structure.

**Figure 2: Nationwide Security Metrics,  
April 1 – September 15, 2012 vs. April 1 – Sept 15, 2013.**

Metric	EIAs	HPA	Direct Fire	IED Events	IED/Mine Explosions	Complex/ Coordinated Attack	IDF
% YoY Change	-6%	1%	-1%	-22%	-5%	5%	-18%


EIAs have decreased by six percent from April 1 through September 15, 2013, as compared to the same period last year. The majority of attacks were comprised of direct fire attacks and IED attacks. Additionally, insurgents continue to conduct high profile and complex attacks against influential individuals, population centers, and remote outposts. The insurgency conducted 10 HPAs in Kabul this reporting period and assassinated a number of influential GIRoA officials. While the resulting media coverage has promoted local and international perceptions of insecurity, such attacks have not generated operational or strategic momentum for the insurgency.

Violence remains highly concentrated. From April 1 through September 15, 2013, 80 percent of nationwide EIAs occurred where only 24 percent of the population lives. As seen in Figure 3, the 10 most violent districts account for 3.1 percent of the population, but over 30 percent of the violence nationwide.



**Figure 3: Ten most violent Districts in Afghanistan**

Top 10 Districts (01 Apr 2013 to 15 Sep 2013)					
	Top 10 Districts in EIA	Province	RC	% of Total Population	% of National EIA in Date Range
1	Nahr-e Saraj	Helmand	RC-SW	0.4%	4%
2	Sangin	Helmand	RC-SW	0.2%	4%
3	Nad 'Ali	Helmand	RC-SW	0.3%	4%
4	Musa Qal'ah	Helmand	RC-SW	0.2%	4%
5	Panjwa'i	Kandahar	RC-S	0.3%	3%
6	Sayyidabad	Wardak	RC-E	0.4%	3%
7	Now Zad	Helmand	RC-SW	0.2%	2%
8	Maiwand	Kandahar	RC-S	0.2%	2%
9	Pul-e 'Alam	Logar	RC-E	0.4%	2%
10	Darah-ye Pech	Kunar	RC-E	0.2%	2%
Date range: 01 Apr 2013 to 15 Sep 2013				Total:	3.1%
					31%



In some areas within the country, the security environment continues to test the growing capability of the ANSF. In districts along Highway 1 in Wardak, the level of insurgent activity increased over the reporting period. In Zabul province, the insurgency has managed to hinder GIRoA freedom of movement and influence in three districts along Highway 1. Security also remains contested in Paktiya and Khost provinces and the contest flows over into Paktika due to the insurgents need to retain their support network across the Afghan border with Pakistan. Farah Province has not seen its security situation improve over the reporting period, predominantly due to limited ANSF capacity in such a large geographical area.

The situation in Farah continues to affect the southern district of Shindand in Herat Province and, combined with a number of changes in provincial leadership, has slowed security progress across the region. In remote provinces such as Nuristan and Badakshan, ANSF progress towards consolidating control continues to be slow due to the poor road networks and inaccessibility to many parts of the province.

The most significant operation of the reporting period was Operation SEMOURGH in Azrah District, Logar Province. This was a multi-week, large-scale operation that was planned, resourced, and executed solely by ANSF.<sup>8</sup> The objectives of the operation were to clear the valley of insurgents and secure the Azrah district center so that humanitarian supplies and voter registration materials could be delivered to the Afghan citizens in the valley. This was the first such operation since the announcement of Milestone 2013 on June 18, 2013. All the pillars of the ANSF were involved in this operation, including the AAF and Afghan SOF. In addition, this operation was conducted during Ramadan, a period of religious fasting and typically lower activity level for the ANSF.

This operation was unique in that elements of several corps conducted complementary operations along the corps' boundaries to limit the insurgents' ability to escape and ensure success. The operation began with the largest air assault of Afghan forces in recent history into blocking positions on the northeastern side of the Azrah Valley. This was planned and executed by the AAF and involved multiple lifts of ANA soldiers in Mi-17s, which were escorted by Afghan Mi-35 gunships, to the objective area. Ground forces then conducted a two-pronged attack into the valley towards the district center while units from the Capital Division conducted disruption operations on the northwestern side of Logar Province. This combined arms maneuver by the Afghans allowed the ground forces to advance with minimal casualties.

After three weeks of fighting with insurgents, battling daily thunderstorms that hampered air and ground operations, and securing the mountainous terrain in the Azrah Valley, the ANSF successfully accomplished their objectives. After the insurgents were cleared from the valley, two large convoys of humanitarian assistance and voter registration materials were delivered to the area. In addition, new trucks, weapons, and logistical supplies were delivered in order to assist the ALP in holding the gains that the operation accomplished.

## **1.7: TRANSITION**

During the reporting period, all remaining provinces, districts, and cities entered into the security transition process. During the transition process, staff functions are steadily transferred to the ANSF as their capability increases. ISAF retains military assets in or near transitioning areas, and when required engages in combat operations alongside the ANSF. As the ANSF takes the lead for security and becomes capable of more independent operations, ISAF support is reduced,

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<sup>8</sup> ISAF participation in the ANSF operation was limited to the provision of CAS, ISR, and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) enabling support.

and approval authority for providing additional support migrates upwards to the Commander IJC (COMIJC) and eventually to the COMISAF.

Areas proceed through transition stages on different timelines based upon demonstrated improvements in security, governance, rule of law, and ANSF capabilities. Transition is a dynamic process, with some areas progressing quickly and others moving slowly or even regressing. Security considerations have become the predominant factor in determining progress through transition stages. Provinces are not required to transition through all stages to complete the transition process. A district in the final stage of transition will remain in transition until December 2014, when all districts, including districts that have not reached the final stage, will exit transition to full security control under Afghan authority.


### **Current State of Transition**

ISAF assesses provinces as being in one of four stages of progress of the transition process: Stage 1 – Local Support; Stage 2 – Tactical Support; Stage 3 – Operational Support; and Stage 4 – Strategic Support.<sup>9</sup> The assessments are dependent on the level of competency and progress achieved by the ANSF, GIRA proficiency, and support for and to the local population. Each province is given an overall rating based on the ISAF commander's professional military judgement, which takes into account the status of the security environment, ANSF capability, and level of ISAF assistance required.

During the reporting period, ISAF ended its permanent presence in nine provinces, making a detailed assessment of the situation in these provinces difficult. In the previous report Faryab province was identified as a potentially problematic province due to the increase in insurgent activity experienced after the withdrawal of the permanent ISAF presence. Although the ANSF has been unable to significantly reduce insurgent activity, it remains restricted to the western districts of the province, away from its main population centers. By isolating insurgent activity to this area, the provincial government, through cooperation with the ANSF, has allowed more service and public freedom of movement in the remainder of the province.

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<sup>9</sup> The *Stages* of transition are different than the *Tranches* of transition. Districts and provinces entered transition in a series of five Tranches, the last of which began transition in the summer of 2013. Once in transition, each district and province then moves through the four stages of transition, as seen in Figure 4.

**Figure 4: Transition Stages, March - August 2013\***

\* On June 18, 2013, GIRoA announced the fifth and last tranche of areas entering into the Transition process. The lower map shows the transition stage conditions assessments at August 2013

As shown in Figure 4 above, the 11 provinces of Tranche 5 entered the transition process on June 18, 2013. During the reporting period, 16 provinces advanced in their overall stage rating. In addition, the majority of provinces advanced in one or more areas while remaining at the same overall stage.

No province regressed in its overall stage rating, although Badakshan, in northern Afghanistan, saw limited setbacks related to the security environment. Badakshan remains a moderately contested province, particularly along established facilitation routes through the Warduj Valley, and its border with Pakistan makes it a hub for insurgent and criminal involvement in narcotics production and smuggling. In addition, the remoteness of its location makes it difficult for the ANSF to sustain gains they periodically make there.

Badakshan's Warduj Valley has long been an insurgent stronghold and remains a high threat area, with about 350 to 400 active insurgents from various factions. Insurgent attacks during the spring of 2013 led the ANSF to send reinforcements into the area. Although the reinforced

ANSF forces – which included elements of the ANA, ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC), Afghan Border Police (ABP), ALP, Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), and Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) supported by the AAF – cleared the Warduj and Jurm Valleys on two occasions, the insurgents returned to their stronghold within the province. The slight increase in violence Badakshan experienced this year was a direct result of these ANSF operations.

On September 26, 2013, approximately 100 to 150 insurgents attacked the Kiran Wa Munjan District Center (DC) in Badakshan Province. The insurgents gained control of the DC and burned several buildings in the surrounding area. The MOI and MOD ordered the immediate reinforcement of the MOI forces in the Kiran Wa Munjan Valley and the recapture of the DC. Less than 20 hours after the Munjan DC was attacked and burned, ANSF were able to project combat power by air, inserting 130 commandos. With limited ISAF ISR and CAS assistance, a ground convoy of 60 commandos deployed to retake the district center and secured the DC. Simultaneously, 300 forces from the 209<sup>th</sup> Corps attacked south through Jurm and Yagman districts in order to link up with the commandos in the valley and block a potential escape route for the insurgents.

In areas where the Taliban have had post-ISAF withdrawal successes, ISAF, the ANSF and GIRoA continue to review lessons learned. ISAF aims to avoid withdrawing too quickly from transitioning areas and ensure that enough ISAF personnel and enablers remain in Afghanistan to support the ANSF if required.

Governance and development progress on a different timeline than security. To ensure the irreversibility of transition, the Afghan government will need to reduce the lag between the start of transition in an area and the provision of effective governance, and address endemic corruption. The most significant threats to transition remain government ineffectiveness and endemic corruption.

Progress toward strengthening sub-national governance remained slow over the reporting period. The connection between provincial and district governments and the national government, particularly in the areas of budget support and policy implementation, remains weak and hampers local development. Local governments lack a systematic and proactive method for strategic planning, budget development, and sustainment processes. Many provincial governors criticize line ministries for a lack of cooperation and coordination, and complain that slow budget transfers hamper the implementation of projects. Local governments often lack the means to attract highly-qualified staff and have little authority in the hiring process. The absence of judges and prosecutors in some districts, and the lack of local administrative control over them, also hampers progress at the provincial level.

## **1.8: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES**

Civilian casualties (CIVCAS) continue to be of primary concern to the Department of Defense (DoD). The vast majority of CIVCAS during the reporting period were caused by insurgent actions, largely due to indiscriminate use of IEDs.

ISAF takes all appropriate measures to prevent CIVCAS while also seeking to minimize insurgent capabilities to cause them. The results of ISAF mitigation actions are evidenced in civilian casualty trends and statistics.<sup>10</sup> The data reflect that overall CIVCAS are up during the reporting period, but the percentage of CIVCAS for which ISAF and ANSF are responsible is comparatively small and decreasing.

As ISAF has reduced its personnel numbers and base locations, visibility of the number and nature of CIVCAS incidents has correspondingly decreased. In response to reduced situational awareness, in March 2013, additional Afghan-reported data for ANSF and insurgent-caused CIVCAS were added to the ISAF CIVCAS database. As a result, direct comparisons between this year and last for ANSF and insurgent-caused CIVCAS are not entirely accurate. However, reporting of ISAF-caused CIVCAS has remained consistent and CIVCAS caused by ISAF decreased by 75 percent when compared to the same period last year. During the reporting period, there were a total of 3,854 CIVCAS nationwide. Eighty-eight percent of these casualties were caused by insurgents, only one percent was caused by ISAF, and the remaining casualties were caused by either ANSF (three percent) or their origins are unknown (seven percent).

The Civilian Casualties Mitigation Team (CCMT) coordinates ISAF's CIVCAS avoidance and mitigation measures and provides COMISAF and other senior leaders with strategic assessments and recommendations on this issue. In addition to tracking all ISAF-reported CIVCAS in Afghanistan, the focus of the CCMT is to implement procedures for factual identification, review of post-incident management actions, assessment of causes, and identification of lessons learned, together with best practices for subsequent adoption.

ISAF continues to work closely with its Afghan counterparts to ensure rigorous and accurate reporting of CIVCAS caused by Afghan and coalition forces. An area of focus in the transition of security responsibilities to GIRoA is the ongoing transfer of ISAF CIVCAS avoidance and mitigation measures, procedures, and capabilities to the ANSF.

## **1.9: INSIDER ATTACKS<sup>11</sup>**

Insurgents' use of insider attacks as a tactic remains a risk to ISAF cohesion and trust between ISAF and the ANSF. In particular, insider attacks risk undermining international support for the mission and long-term support for the Afghan government, which could pose a threat to the

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<sup>10</sup> The ISAF CCMT methodology is based on internal and comprehensive reports provided by ISAF and ANSF forces within Afghanistan, and the activation of Joint Incident Assessment Teams comprised of Afghan government representatives as well as ISAF personnel to review evidence and conduct interviews. The amount of available information is related to ISAF involvement in the civilian casualty event, and therefore it is likely that ISAF statistics underestimate civilian casualties caused by events where ISAF was not present. Metrics presented do not include Road Traffic Accidents (RTAs).

<sup>11</sup> This section is submitted in fulfillment of requirements specified in section 1212 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.

transition process and stability beyond 2014. However, insider attacks have been considerably lower this year than in years past, and insurgents failed to achieve any successful insider attacks during Ramadan. ISAF assesses that insurgents are likely to continue promoting insider attacks and look to maximize media opportunities following these attacks for the remainder of the campaign.

Insider attacks continue to occur but at a much reduced rate from 2012. There have been nine insider attacks against ISAF thus far in 2013 compared to 35 during the same period in 2012. Between April 1 and September 15, 2013, there were four insider attacks against ISAF, down from 25 during the same period in 2012, or a decrease of 84 percent. Additionally, there were six ISAF personnel killed in action (KIA) and 14 ISAF personnel wounded in action (WIA), down from 30 ISAF KIA and 59 ISAF WIA during the same time frame last year. Between April 1 and September 30, 2013, there were 33 insider attacks against ANSF, up from 20 during the same timeframe in 2012, or an increase of 65 percent. Additionally, there were 71 ANSF KIA and 43 ANSF WIA, up from 38 ANSF KIA and 15 ANSF WIA last year.

The insurgency continues to attempt to infiltrate, co-opt, or coerce ANSF in an effort to strike at coalition cohesion and reduce cooperation between coalition and Afghan forces. However, ISAF is cautiously optimistic that the mitigation measures taken over the previous year have successfully reduced the threat of insider attacks.

Insider attacks continue to occur as a result of both insurgent action and personal motivations. Analysis conducted in early 2013 indicated that approximately half of the insider attacks that occurred in 2012 had some degree of insurgent ties. In 2013 only two attacks are assessed to have been linked to the insurgency. The trends in locations of attacks during 2012 and 2013 are consistent with those observed over the preceding five years. There appears to be little difference in the geographic distribution based on whether ISAF or ANSF are targeted. The pattern remains related to ISAF troop densities and the areas of heaviest insurgent activity in the Pashtun-dominated areas of the south and east of the country.

The mitigation measures adopted by ISAF and the ANSF since the surge in attacks during summer 2012 appear to be making a difference, and to date, the rate of attacks against ISAF is significantly reduced. That said, these mitigation measures continue to diminish ISAF resources and hamper movement, speed, and activity on the tactical level. Attacks against the ANSF continue to rise, however, and may continue to do so as the ANSF assume greater responsibility for the security of Afghanistan.

Efforts to prevent insider attacks include cultural awareness training, threat intelligence collection, force protection initiatives, and strategic communications. The ANSF continues its efforts to vet recruits prior to entering the force and to re-vet personnel upon their return from leave. Additionally, the ANSF now has cultural awareness courses and conducts extensive training for personnel who will serve as religious and cultural advisors.

## 1.10: REINTEGRATION

The Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) is an internationally funded, GIRoA-led initiative that encourages insurgents to renounce violence via honorable means, live within the laws of Afghanistan, and peaceably return to their communities as a productive part of Afghan society. APRP is a five-year program that will conclude in mid-2015. The U.S.-funded Afghan Reintegration Program (ARP) enables the U.S. military to provide critical support to the Afghan-led APRP program and strengthens the Afghan government's ability to peacefully remove insurgents from the battlefield.

APRP encourages regional and international cooperation and provides a mechanism for mid- to low-level insurgent foot soldiers and commanders to renounce violence and terrorism. The High Peace Council (HPC) and Joint Secretariat (JS) work with Provincial Peace Councils (PPCs) and Provincial Joint Secretariat Teams (PJSTs) in 33 of 34 provinces to execute the program at the provincial level. Successful execution of the APRP not only improves the security environment by bringing fighters and weapons in from the battlefield, but also promotes grievance resolution within communities, which keeps reintegrated individuals from returning to the insurgency. APRP strengthens governance by using provincial and district structures to deliver projects to communities and, as a result, increases the legitimacy of GIRoA. Additionally, APRP-funded Community Recovery projects provide benefit to former insurgents and their communities in the form of small infrastructure grants, "cash for work," vocational training, and agriculture development programs, all of which contribute to economic sustainability. Communities that accept reintegrees propose community recovery projects specific to the needs of their communities.

APRP policy is developed at the national level through the HPC and JS. The HPC advises the Afghan president on matters of APRP policy, directs the JS, and provides outreach to execute the program. The HPC organization is led by Chairman Salahuddin Rabbani and is comprised of 70 representative leaders; elders, politicians, and scholars, including nine women.

At the executive level, the JS coordinates all strands of the APRP, enabling technical implementation and financial support to the provincial and district levels of the program. The JS has operations, policy, finance, development, strategic communications, monitoring, and support departments. A special staff section containing legal, gender advisor, and provincial affairs advises the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). As an inter-agency body, the JS regularly works with participating security ministries (MOD, MOI, and the National Directorate of Security [NDS]) and ISAF, as required, in support of the security lines of operation within the program.

PPCs and PJSTs execute the APRP at the provincial level. District governors support communities through district reintegration *shuras* that use local elders and leaders, representatives of the ANP, ANA, NDS, and existing district government institutions to disseminate their message. PPCs, supported by PJSTs, implement the APRP and manage reintegration within the province. The PPCs coordinate among provincial representatives from GIRoA ministries and religious and tribal elders in support of the APRP. Each PJST has a staff of five to handle unit management, outreach support, demobilization, community recovery and



development, and administration and finance. ISAF has established partnering and mentoring relationships at every level of the APRP structure. The HQ ISAF Force Reintegration Cell (FRIC) works with the HPC and JS to support APRP. Headquarters International Joint Command's Regional Command Reintegration Cell personnel mentor PPC and PJST officials.

The JS has become largely self-sufficient in many areas including demobilization and enrollment of new reintegrees in the provinces. The FRIC continues to mentor the JS in community recovery program planning and oversight, financial planning and expenditure accounting, strategic communications, inter-ministerial communication, and internal communication between the JS and its provincial organizations. This \$1.7 million capacity development program addresses standardized training, skills and knowledge deficits directly related to the delivery and execution of services across all five position descriptions within the PJSTs. Moreover, the JS is in the process of finalizing project award for an interactive database module (APRP-funded) and an associated network backbone (ARP-funded) to streamline data sharing and communication between the PJSTs and the JS.

### **Social Outreach and Demobilization**


Thirty-three each of PPCs and PJSTs have been established and are operating in all provinces except Panjshayr province. During this reporting period, the JS conducted demobilization and reintegration missions in the following provinces: Herat, Ghor, Faryab, Sar-e-Pul, Samangan, Jowzjan, Balkh, Takhar, Badakshan, Baghlan, Ghazni, Kapisa, Laghman, Nuristan, Kunar, Nangarhar, Logar, Paktya, Paktika, Khost, Helmand, and Daykundi.


Since its inception, APRP has reintegrated 7,168 insurgents in over 230 districts in 32 provinces. A total of 805 of these reintegrations occurred during the reporting period. Notably, 307 (38.14 percent of all enrollments in 2013) occurred in RC-East, one of the country's most kinetic regions. The APRP complements other GIRoA, coalition, and international efforts to pressure and contain the insurgency while helping establish conditions for ANSF capability growth. Every fighter, enabler and weapon system taken off the battlefield through the reintegration process forces the insurgency to expend energy and capital to regenerate lost assets. The program additionally enhances GIRoA sub-national credibility. Quarterly ISAF Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR) and Foghorn surveys show that 68 percent of the population has a positive perception of GIRoA's reintegration effort, and 63 percent has specifically heard of the APRP. 2014 will be pivotal with both national elections and security transition affecting the geopolitical dynamic; therefore, a viable reintegration program must be in place to leverage GIRoA successes and to act as a "catch basin" and a credible incentive for insurgent fence-sitter groups who might decide to reconcile with the government en masse.

The summary below depicts reintegration by province and the cumulative growth over time. During this reporting period, 805 reintegrees enrolled per the following distribution:

RC-N:	325 (40.37 percent)
RC-E:	307 (38.14 percent)
RC-W:	115 (14.29 percent)
RC-SW:	22 (2.73 percent)
RC-C:	24 (2.98 percent)
RC-S:	12 (1.49 percent)

**Figure 5: Reintegration Enrollments by Province**



**Figure 6: Reintegree Enrollments as of September 11, 2013**

### Community Recovery, Finances and Policy

At program inception in July 2010, 12 countries pledged money to fund APRP for the duration of the five-year program. These donor countries have provided a total of \$176.2 million to date. Currently, \$107.1 million (60.8 percent) of the total trust fund has been expended, and spend-rate projections indicate that 75-80 percent will be expended or obligated by the end of 2013. Because the APRP program will run out of money no later than the second quarter of calendar year 2014, on August 20, 2013 the JS (with considerable FRIC assistance) presented a draft business case and associated budget for the 2014 to mid-2015 timeframe to international donor representatives. On September 5, 2013, the donor representatives asked for additional detail. The FRIC is working with the JS to develop a revised business case and budget request that will be presented to the international donor community in late October 2013.

Approximately 60 percent of APRP funds are devoted to community recovery activities delivered through small grant projects and line ministry programs. As of June 20, 2013, the JS and PJSTs were administering 164 approved activities, including 28 that were approved during the reporting period. These small grants directly affect 2,685 reintegrees and 183,959 beneficiaries, of whom an estimated 86,461 are female, across 80 districts countrywide. During the same period, 54 small grants were completed or closed in 12 provinces. The Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyred, and Disabled (MOLSAMD), Ministry of Public Works (MOPW), Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), and the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) support APRP-funded community recovery and development efforts. APRP cells embedded within these four ministries coordinate provincial and district program entities to deliver qualified, pertinent projects to communities participating in APRP. These non-security line ministries have executed 1,774 community recovery activities,

of which 608 are completed. These activities directly impact 5,086 reintegrees and 364,226 direct beneficiaries, of whom an estimated 173,908 are female, across 30 provinces countrywide. In total, line ministry activities are estimated to indirectly impact 3.9 million Afghans country wide.

APRP funding provided by the 12 international donors is divided into three separate funding windows. Window A is administered by the World Bank; contributors are Australia (\$5.9 million), Finland (\$2.5 million) and the United States (\$50 million). Window B is administered by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP); contributors are Denmark (\$8 million), Germany (\$26 million), Italy (\$5.7 million), Japan (\$52.1 million), Netherlands (\$2.5 million), South Korea (\$1 million) and Spain (\$6.7 million). Window C is administered by Standard Chartered Bank, to which Estonia (\$43 thousand) and the U.K. (\$15.9 million) contribute.

The U.S. contribution to APRP has been applied through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund administered by World Bank. To date \$37.4 million of the Window A trust has been expended, \$32 million of which is U.S. funding. The MRRD National Solidarity Program (NSP) III implements the Community Recovery Intensification and Prioritization (CRIP) program, which specifically supports APRP. Of a total 231 districts with reintegrees present, CRIP is being delivered in 18 prioritized districts across 15 provinces. Due to its unique focus in insecure districts, CRIP delivery is by nature indirect, limited, and unannounced, relying on the overall stabilization effect attributed to NSP III rather than direct programming of activities to APRP reintegrees or their communities.

Total Trust Fund Expenditures as of July 31, 2013:

Window	Spent to date	Balance
A	\$37.4 million	\$27.0 million
B	\$67.9 million	\$34.0 million
C	\$6.8 million	\$9.2 million

As of August 2013, DoD has obligated \$3.07 million of the \$35 million in available FY2013 ARP funding across 24 projects countrywide. APRP capacity is being bolstered in a variety of ways through ARP to include administrative support and capacity training, social outreach and public education, community targeted projects and vocational training opportunities.

ARP Commitments by Region and Value:

RC-W N/A

RC-S N/A

RC-SW 5 projects valued at \$147,380

RC-E 5 projects valued at \$219,140

RC-N 2 projects valued at \$44,120

CJIATF-435<sup>12</sup> 1 project valued at \$1,060

FRIC 9 projects valued at \$2,751,240

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<sup>12</sup> CJIATF-435 is responsible for U.S. detainee operations in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan.

The APRP continues to seek and promote women's involvement in all aspects of the program. Although these efforts are sometimes seen as symbolic, women are increasingly represented in the national and sub-national program structures. There are nine female members of the HPC, 72 female members on PPCs, and four female members of PJTS. In 2013, APRP facilitated conferences for the women of the HPC, PPCs, and PJTS in support of advocacy and peace building. Female HPC and PPC representatives also participated in regional conferences, taking an increasingly active role in reaching out to insurgents and promoting peace and stability within reintegree communities. On September 22, 2013, the JS hosted a one-day Women's Conference in Jalalabad during Peace and National Unity Week to demonstrate GIRoA's support for women's leadership roles in Afghan society.

The APRP is actively seeking to expand the role and inclusion of civil society, non-governmental and women's organizations in community recovery and development through its emerging opportunities initiative. The JS has reached agreement with a consortium of 65 organizations and has planned to enter into a formal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with these organizations during the 2013 Peace and National Unit Week observance. While the majority of reintegrees have successfully remained stayed in the APRP program, there are instances of reintegrees rejoining militias and insurgent groups.

## **1.11: ELECTION PREPARATION**

Senior NATO officials recognize the 2014 Afghan presidential and provincial council elections are the most critical event of the next 18 months in Afghanistan. The presidential election will mark the first peaceful transfer of power in Afghan history.

Representatives at the Tokyo Conference in July 2012 agreed that Afghanistan must establish, "a robust electoral architecture developed in a secure, participatory, and transparent manner to enable successful and timely elections." A joint parliamentary commission approved the Independent Election Commission (IEC) Structural Law and the Electoral Law on July 13, 2013 and July 15, 2013, respectively. President Karzai signed the IEC Structural Law on July 17, 2013, and the Electoral Law on July 20, 2013 after having vetoed previous versions of the law citing certain sections as unconstitutional. These laws spell out the regulations for the administration and organization of elections, both at the national and sub-national levels, and establish a list of electoral violations, the penalties they entail, and the authorities to adjudicate complaints. These laws also provide for the IEC to organize and administer elections and an Independent Electoral Complaint Commission (IECC) with ultimate authority to settle electoral disputes. The appointments to the IEC were finalized on July 30, 2013, and those to the IECC on September 16, 2013. The membership in both commissions reflects the ethnic and geographic diversity of Afghanistan. Three of the nine IEC members and one of the five IECC members are women. These developments increased confidence both in Afghanistan and the international community that the government would hold timely and credible elections as scheduled in 2014.

GIRoA will likely be challenged to implement its new electoral framework prior to elections, which may lead to procedural problems and the requirement for international assistance.

However, there remains the existing 2010 Electoral Decree as a backstop to address those aspects of the new Electoral Law if GIRoA is unable to implement them in a timely fashion.

The IEC and MOI lead planning efforts for the technical and security aspects of the elections. In partnership with MOD, NDS, UNDP, UNAMA, and ISAF, they are cooperating to ensure that election planning is timely, realistic, and complete. ISAF has assisted the Afghans in conducting security planning and has provided detailed geospatial weather mapping to highlight historical trends to assist the MOI in anticipating weather-related considerations. GIRoA continues to consult internally about the possibility of holding out-of-country voting with a focus on Afghan refugees residing in Iran and Pakistan.

With a little over six months remaining before the presidential and provincial council election, HQ ISAF assesses that Afghan security planning efforts are progressing steadily and are ahead of preparations in the run-up to the 2009 elections. On February 23, 2013, the Joint Election Security Directive (JESD) was signed, providing a joint operational concept that delineates the roles and responsibilities across the ANSF. The draft IEC Security CONOPS, published on March 31, 2013, reviews security considerations for the main components of the electoral process, communicates the general concept of security operations, and specifies key processes that support the IEC Security Operations Center mission. The final Operational Plan (OPLAN) for the 2014 presidential and provincial elections, dated July 28, 2013, provides a detailed overview of the processes that will ensure that all electoral activities and tasks are conducted in accordance with the legal framework currently in place. The MOI issued an order to the six Operational Coordination Centers – Regional (OCC-R) with specific guidance for each to develop a tactical implementation plan to support the elections. The OCCRs have 50 days to satisfy the requirement that will inform the MOI's comprehensive election support plan. To facilitate this endeavor, MOI and MOD will conduct briefs with each of the OCC-Rs to provide additional planning guidance to clarify the order.

After a one-month delay to address logistic and planning issues the IEC started the first phase of the voter registration (VR) campaign at the provincial level on May 26, 2013. The current VR campaign is an exercise targeted at those citizens who: will be 18 years of age by the election date; have recently returned to the country; have moved from one electoral constituency to another; have lost or damaged their VR card; or are eligible voters but have not obtained VR cards. Voter registration at the district level began on July 27, 2013, and produced a significant increase in the number of registered voters. From the beginning of the VR top-up exercise through September 29, 2013, 1.7 million voters have been registered. On May 28, 2013, 14 percent of total registrants were female; on September 29, 2013, this had reached 30.3 percent, exceeding the UNAMA goal of 30 percent. In an effort to increase VR participation, the IEC has extended the conduct of district level VR for 45 days and is implementing a mobile voter registration initiative.

In the 2009 election, the IEC and MOD were unable to recruit sufficient female security personnel for polling stations, and men filled approximately 25 percent of the female election security officer positions. With the MOI leading security for 2014, challenges remain in recruiting, training, and financing approximately 13,690 female security personnel. The UNDP,

acting as lead within the international community, is working with the IEC to find solutions to these challenges. Both the French Embassy and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have expressed interest in funding the recruiting and training proposal now being considered by MOI. The estimated total costs for the training and pay for female security personnel for the proposals being considered range from \$3 million to \$20 million.

The initial budget threshold the MOI set for female security personnel was \$10.5 million. Requests for ISAF support to the 2014 elections have been below anticipated levels and well under the amount of support requested during the 2009 presidential and provincial council elections. On April 9, 2013, the IEC asked ISAF for assistance with meteorological mapping to forecast weather impacts on voter turnout. On April 20, 2013, MOI asked ISAF for aerial logistic support to aid in the delivery of VR Phase I, or provincial-level, material. ISAF completed these deliveries on May 20, 2013. ISAF received requests for 58 deliveries to assist Phase II, or district-level, voter registration. Notably, of the 58 deliveries, ISAF conducted only seven. Following a combined effort during which ISAF and ANSF completed eight deliveries the ANA and AAF completed 42, with the remaining delivery awaiting further coordination. This demonstrates the ANSFs increased capacity and capability. To date, ISAF has also provided strategic communication media broadcast assistance and aided the MOI with the election threat assessment. ISAF intends to fulfill those support requests that it can while continuing to encourage the Afghans to plan for diminished ISAF support in the future. Potential support includes: logistics, medical support, intelligence support, route clearance, ISR, training and mentoring, and/or quick reaction forces for *in-extremis* support to the ANSF.

ISAF support for ANSF security planning is intended to mitigate security problems that could undermine Afghan confidence in the abilities of ANSF and GIRoA and affect election inclusivity by reducing voter turnout, particularly among Pashtuns and women. According to an MOI assessment, roughly half of 6,900 polling centers are in areas where security is not a concern, while the rest of the stations remain under some degree of threat. The MOI has conceded that 259 election centers in insurgent-controlled areas, primarily in predominantly-Pashtun parts of the southern and eastern provinces, will not open on the day of elections if the security situation remains unchanged. Most election stakeholders expect this number to rise. The ANSF are providing security for IEC electoral activities, including outreach efforts and movements. ISAF has played a limited role in accordance with the IEC Security Plan, which assumes ISAF backing only upon request from the MOI and for “information support, evacuation measures in extraordinary circumstances, and *in-extremis* support for emergencies.”

The elections are on track to be held, as scheduled, on April 5, 2014. If the elections are delayed or postponed for reasons that are perceived as illegitimate, it is likely that the prospects for a peaceful transfer of political power will be diminished and international confidence could erode.

The U.S. government does not support particular candidates or parties or interfering with the electoral process. U.S. assistance, technical advice, and logistic and security support is designed to support Afghan efforts to ensure that the elections are credible, transparent, inclusive, and unifying.

## SECTION 2 – AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATIONS<sup>13</sup>

### 2.1: ANSF SUMMARY

The “Milestone 2013” transition in June, 2103 marked the ANSF assumption of responsibility for security nationwide as coalition forces shifted to a TAA mission. The ANSF now conduct almost all operations independently, preventing insurgents from achieving their stated objectives this fighting season, reducing the number of security incidents from the previous year, and demonstrating tactical superiority over the Taliban. Public opinion surveys show that Afghans continue to have positive perceptions of the security situation in the country and of the ANSF.<sup>14</sup> At the end of this reporting period, it was clear that the Taliban was tactically overmatched by the ANSF.

The ANSF are slowly closing capability and capacity gaps. The fielding of additional equipment and continued, albeit declining, TAA mentoring over the next year will allow the ANSF to remain in the lead for security in 2014 and assume full responsibility for security on January 1, 2015.

The ANSF has nearly doubled in size since 2009. As of August 2013, ANSF personnel strength has reached 344,602, which is 98 percent of the authorized end-strength of 325,000. Including its 24,169 ALP Guardians, GIRoA has 368,771 uniformed personnel and police on duty and in the lead across Afghanistan. All ANA and ANP unit and major equipment fielding will be complete by December 2013, except for two Mobile Strike Force *kandaks* (MSFK) to be fielded in March and July of 2014. ISAF continues to provide combat support where there are remaining ANSF capability gaps. Notably, the AAF and Special Mission Wing (SMW) are not currently forecast to be fully fielded until after 2015, and the aerial fires capability is not currently forecast to be fully mature until after 2017.

GIRoA and ISAF made a deliberate decision several years ago to focus on the rapid growth of the ANSF, followed by the development of enablers and professionalization of the ranks. This decision was made with a full understanding that the ANSF, once built to size, would then need to develop logistics, personnel management, and leadership skills, among others. As such, the ANSF continues to require ISAF close air support, as well as airlift, logistics, medical, and ISR support. The lack of these enablers prevents many ANSF units from reaching the highest capability rating.

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<sup>13</sup> This section is submitted in fulfillment of requirements of section 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, as amended.

<sup>14</sup> Results from the ISAF Joint Command BINNA survey wave #14 (July/August 2013) and the ISAF FOGHORN survey data wave 16 (Aug 2013).



As force-generation of the ANSF is largely complete, ISAF now bases its assistance to the ANSF on five operational pillars, which are key to long-term sustainability: leadership, C2, sustainment, combined arms integration, and training. Improving ANSF capability across these functions is now the main focus of the ANSF development effort.

Despite the significant progress the ANSF has made in fielding effective combat forces, major challenges remain, particularly in the areas of logistics and sustainment (combat support and combat service support elements). ANSF capabilities are not yet sustainable, and the logistics system remains dependent upon ISAF in many areas. Much work remains to be done on the systems, processes and institutions necessary to make progress enduring. The ministries need significant improvement in planning, programming, budgeting, acquisition, and personnel management. Additionally, the AAF, C-IED, fires, and intelligence are particular focus areas for improvement.

The ANSF have made significant progress in reforming their pay systems. The majority of ANSF personnel are now getting paid via electric fund transfer. The Afghan National Police receive approximately 70% of their pay via electronic fund transfer (ETF direct deposit), 20% via mobile phone pay and approximately 10% pay is via a Trusted Agent (cash). The percentage of cash pay is due to the remote locations and lack of banking and internet/communications. The Afghan Local Police is 86% by Trusted Agent (cash) and 14% by Electronic Fund Transfer (EFT). The high percentage of cash pay to the ALP is due to the remote locations and lack of banking and internet/communications. While the exact percentage of ANA using EFT was not available as of the end of the reporting period, the majority of ANA personnel were also getting paid via EFT.

The slow pace of development of the Afghan MOD combat support and combat service support elements remains a challenge to achieving self-sufficiency. ISAF is addressing this by providing functional experts who work with Afghan colleagues to build ministerial capacity; a shift from the previous focus on advising individual officials. Although recruiting rates remain sufficient to maintain force levels and offset high attrition rates, attrition in the officer and non-commissioned officer (NCO) ranks hinders greater professionalization of the force.

There is a lack of synchronization between different entities within ANSF, particularly at the national and regional level. Units planning or conducting tactical operations are often not given clear and coordinated guidance from higher commands, leading to friction and decreased effectiveness. Problems areas include coordination of cross-boundary operations between the ANA and ANP, sustainment support of distant patrol stations, a shortage of trained and trusted personnel, and a general lack of codified, resourced, and rehearsed communications between ANSF elements. The MOD and MOI need to resource the Operational Coordination Centers (OCCs) to function as the intelligence, operations, and coordination nexus they were envisioned to become.

Synchronizing both C2 and sustainment remain major challenges for the ANSF. There are significant communication problems between national and sub-national units. Additionally, the MOD, MOI, and Ground Forces Command (GFC) need to harmonize operational objectives and

priorities. These communication problems are particularly significant because they hinder the prioritization and allocation of limited AAF assets. However, following an after action review at the mid-point of the fighting season, the Ministers of Defense and Interior and their senior staff began weekly inter-agency coordination meetings to discuss ongoing military actions as well as future staff planning.

## **2.2: SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE**

ISAF has refined its focus for delivering SFA across the ANSF. This will provide a coherent means of prioritizing and allocating resources in support of their mission. At the ministerial level, ISAF assistance is focused on planning, programming, budgeting, acquisition, and personnel management. At the corps level and below, there are five areas of focus: C2; combined arms integration; sustainment; collective training; and accountable, effective leadership.

ISAF is currently short 34 of 415 pledged Security Force Assistance Teams (SFATs); this represents about eight percent of the requirement and has impacted ISAF's ability to provide TAA across the ANSF. ISAF is managing these shortfalls by reducing the frequency of contact with some units. As of October 1, 2013, IJC will have 150 SFATs fielded, commanded by 11 Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs): five in RC-E, two in RC-S and one each in RC-SW, RC-W, RC-N, and RC-C. This is approximately 200 SFATs fewer than those fielded at the beginning of the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) 12.5 (July 1, 2013). This is in-line with the managed and deliberate draw down of SFATs as ANSF units are assessed as capable. As the need to engage directly with ANSF *kandaks* and AUP district centers declines, some SFATs have either redeployed or re-aligned in order to meet other SFA requirements. The remaining SFATs are focused on providing level one and two TAA with ANA Brigade/Corps, AUP Type A Headquarters, and Operations Coordination Center – Province and Region (OCC-P/R). A current shortcoming of the OCCs is the lack of synchronization and coordination between the different entities of the ANSF. To address this shortcoming, SFATs have increased the emphasis and training on staff coordination and processes within the OCCs.

Late fielding and developing *kandaks* also continue to receive level one and two SFAT coverage. Units such as the Mobile Strike Force and Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) brigades provide operational reach to the ANSF and are prioritized for SFAT level one and two coverage. Of the currently 150 SFATs, 93 are U.S.-fielded and the remainder are provided by other nations. Decreased frequency of contact between SFATs and ANSF reflects increased ANSF capability and a reduction in the operational reach of the coalition forces, with ISAF conducting a responsible reduction as the ANSF progresses to assume full security responsibility.

As IJC moves towards CJSOR 13.0, commencing January 1, 2014, it will continue to reduce the number of SFATs according to ANSF progress. SFA coverage will be focused on the brigade/province level and above until after the national elections. It will be critical for TCNs to provide CJSOR 13.0 with the required numbers of appropriately skilled personnel to sustain the

initial gains within the ANSF in areas such as leadership, C2, combined arms integration, sustainment, and training.

### **2.3: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING AND ASSESSMENT**

With ANSF fielding well advanced, ISAF has redirected its focus to ministerial development. The GIRoA security ministries continue to improve in several areas. Afghan ministerial leadership has demonstrated a greater commitment to a collective approach for developing a professional bureaucracy focused on planning and problem solving. Both the MOD and the MOI have published strategic planning documents over the past year, which demonstrates a coherent vision for the development and employment of ANSF. The next step is to link their planning guidance to budget decisions.

Centralized decision-making in the Afghan MOD and MOI impedes the development of a professional bureaucracy able to conduct long-term planning, resulting in a focus on short-term needs. While Afghans are increasingly capable of solving near-term issues, they still lack a systematic and proactive planning method for strategic planning, budget development, and sustainment processes. A major obstacle to long-term planning within the MOD and MOI is the absence of national direction or planning guidance. MOD actions are often focused on execution of General Staff functions, which results in minimal focus on developing long-term plans, perpetuating the cycle of near-term reactions. Similar issues are prevalent within the MOI.

Despite some progress implementing counter-corruption policies, historical reliance on patronage networks and systemic corruption hinder inter- and intra-ministerial cooperation. This is exacerbated by shortfalls in both the quantity and quality of human capital. While progress continues to be made within the ministries, this progress is isolated and non-enduring. Major challenges remain in executing end-to-end processes that generate enduring capability. Government fiscal processes are immature and multi-year budgeting is non-existent.

Recently, coordination between the MOD, MOI, and NDS has improved. In addition to inaugurating the OCCs at the regional and provincial level, there is now enhanced coordination between security and non-security entities, with greater emphasis on governance.

During the reporting period, ISAF developed the ANSF Sustainability Framework, which is essential to better refine the ANSF development effort. This framework focuses on logistics, acquisition, and resource management; inspector general/transparency, accountability, and oversight (IG/TAO); strategy, plans, and policy (SP&P); and human resource management (HRM).

The reporting period also saw the first steps towards functionally aligned ministerial advising, with focus on the Sustainability Framework's strategic pillars and enabling functions. Specifically, the Commander of NTM-A/CSTC-A appointed Executive Directors at the Senior Executive Service level to provide guidance within the pillars and integrate functional initiatives across the ASI. Both the MOD and MOI MAGs began a reorganization along functional lines

and an evolution from providing guidance on general operations to a model focused on developing specific capabilities.

As of the time of this report, MOI is experiencing a political transition and consequently has no common direction on counter corruption. Additionally, MOI made several cuts to the inspector general staff, which is the main focus of ISAF counter-corruption activity. The positive progress made six months ago at MOI has slowed or in some cases stalled.

## **Assessment of the Ministry of Defense**

The MOD continues to be effective in solving short-term problems, but long-term planning, programming, multi-year budgeting, execution, and justification and prioritization of requirements still need further development. There are some signs that the MOD's ability to plan on a longer-term basis is improving. The signing of a National Military Strategy (which looks out to 2017), ongoing work on general staff planning guidance (with a similar timeframe) and a growing realization of the need to plan against a reducing resource pool all suggest that the MOD is maturing as an institution.

The MOD built its first budget and requirements package for Solar Year (SY) 1393, submitted to the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in August 2013. This is a significant achievement, showing progress in its ability to build yearly budgets with limited coalition support and submit them on time. Work is still required, however, on developing multi-year budgets.

The MOD C2 assessment is on-going. Areas of focus include logistics, training, and the newly-operational GFC. The OPLAN for SY1392 (OQAB 1392) was disseminated earlier than in previous years, marking an improvement in operational planning.

The MOD is making progress towards civilianization in accordance with the 2008 Afghan Pay and Grade law; this is a key TMAF deliverable. The first 23 civilian employees have been hired and the conversion of positions from military to civilian is ongoing.

Basic literacy hinders at all levels of career development. Delays in the scheduled retirements of general officers have also continued to hamper progress in a number of areas. Corruption at all levels, coupled with institutional weakness in the MOD Inspector General (IG) office, further impedes professionalization efforts.

MOD leadership assessment remains a work in progress. The Leadership Commission, led by the Director of General Staff, completed its assessment work and provided recommendations to Minister of Defense. The Commission recommended 60 changes to the current structure, intended to reduce organizational redundancy and inefficiency, and free up personnel to contribute to the fight.

Procurement, sustainment, and allocation of resources remain concerns at the MOD. ISAF advisors continue to focus on initiatives designed to improve the Afghan ability to identify and police against corruption, and to formulate and execute defense policy. MOD has made progress

in these areas, including through the recent decentralization of budgetary and commercial approval responsibilities, improved logistics support at the corps level and below, and a concerted effort by the Assistant Minister of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AMOD AT&L) staff to improve the contracting process.

MOD continues to work to address issues related to corruption at all levels, although progress has been slow and uneven. The Minister of Defense and Chief of General Staff emphasize transparency and accountability as a primary concern during all of their battlefield circulations. MOD established transparency and accountability cells across all corps commands and developed policy and procedures to document and track complaints. To ensure top-level oversight of corruption cases and inform policy decisions, MOD established Counter Corruption Review Panels (CCRP) and a Senior Level Counter Corruption Panel (SLCCP). MOD also adopted ISAF's recommendations to track corruption cases with a unified management system and to create a case review structure to provide oversight of cases from initiation through recommended action. The review structure now includes three levels of integrated oversight. Notwithstanding, the MOD continues to be challenged with allegations of corruption at all levels.

The Afghan version of the Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution System (PPBES) still needs to be further development and documentation. The determination of budget requirements at the corps level, although accomplished, still needs more attention and training. At this time the projected MOD budget execution is 66 percent, and the current actual executed budget is only at 43 percent.

**Figure 7: MOD Capability Milestone Ratings (as of July 31, 2013)**

LOO #1: Support to Operations		
AMoD Intel Policy	CM4	Post 2014
AMoD Reserve Affairs	CM2B	3Q, 14
AMoD Dir Disaster Response	CM2A	3Q, 13
MoD Chief Health Affairs*	CM2B	4Q, 14
MoD Chf Cnstr & Prop Mgmt Div (CPMD)	CM2B	1Q, 14
GS G2 Intelligence	CM2B	2Q, 14
GS G3 Operations	CM2A	3Q, 13
GS G5 Policy & Planning	CM1B	Achieved
GS G6 Communications	CM2A	4Q, 13
GS G6 Comm Support Unit	CM1B	Achieved
GS G7 Force Struc, Training & Doctrine	CM2A	3Q, 13
GS Inspector General	CM2A	3Q, 13
GS Legal Department	CM2A	3Q, 13
Ground Forces Command (GFC)	CM2B	2Q, 14
ANA Special Ops Command (ASOC)	CM3	3Q, 14
Afghan Air Force Command (AAF)	CM2B	Post 2014
Medical Command (MEDCOM)	CM2A	4Q, 13
LOO #2: Personnel Management		
AMoD Personnel	CM2A	3Q, 13
AMoD Education	CM2B	3Q, 14
(CFA) Gender Integration	CM4	Post 2014
(CFA) Civilianization	CM2B	1Q, 14
GS G1 Personnel	CM2B	4Q, 13
Chf, Religious & Cultural Affairs (RCA)	CM2B	4Q, 13
ANA Training Command (ANATC)	CM1B	Achieved
ANA Recruiting Command (ANAREC)	CM1B	Achieved
Sergeant Major of the Army (SMA)	CM3	3Q, 14
LOO #3 National Logistics		
AMOD Acquisition Tech & Logistics	CM2B	3Q, 14
Acquisition Agency	CM2B	1Q, 14
Logistics Command (LOGCOM)	CM1A	Achieved
GS G4 Logistics	CM3	3Q, 14
Army Support Command	CM2A	2Q, 14
LOO #4: Exec Leadership & Def Policy		
Minister of Defense	CM1B	Achieved
1st Deputy Minister of Defense	CM2A	3Q, 13
AMoD Strategy & Policy	CM2A	4Q, 13
MoD Chief, Parl., Soc. & Public Affairs	CM1B	Achieved
MoD Chief of Legal Department	CM3	Post 2014
MoD Inspector General	CM2B	2Q, 14
Dir Strategic Communications	CM2B	1Q, 14
(CFA) Transparency & Accountability	CM3	Post 2014
Chief of the General Staff (CoGS)	CM2A	3Q, 13
Vice Chief of the General Staff (VCoGS)	CM2A	3Q, 13
Vice Chief of General Staff-Air (VCoGS-Air)	CM3	Post 2014
Director of GS	CM2A	4Q, 13
LOO #5: Resource Management		
MoD Chief, Finance	CM2B	Post 2014
AMoD S&P (Prog. & Analysis )	CM3	Post 2014
GS G8 Finance	CM2A	3Q, 13

The NTM-A Ministerial Development Board (MDB) assesses the Ministry of Defense & General Staff quarterly. Data current as of 31 July 2013.

All dates are CY

## Assessment of the Ministry of Interior

The MOI continued to demonstrate progress toward self-reliance during the reporting period, but still requires coalition assistance to achieve its mission. On September 1, 2013, interim Minister of the Interior Patang was replaced by acting Minister Daudzai. In addition, several deputy ministers were replaced. Acting Minister Daudzai will be the tenth Minister of the Interior in recent years. In contrast, the MOD has had three ministers during a similar period. These frequent changes in MOI leadership are indicative of the political pressures directed at the MOI, and the resulting turmoil is disruptive to the pace of ministerial development.

On a strategic level, the March 2013 release of the Minister's 10-Year Vision was the catalyst for working groups and departments to develop nested 2-Year Plans. MOI also published its National Police Strategy (NPS) and National Police Plan (NPP). These represent a first for the MOI, in that Afghan planners and staff developed and produced both documents with coalition force advisors only providing guidance and oversight. However, Minister Patang has just been

replaced with Minister Daudzai, and it remains unclear if the 10-year vision will be re-written. Several MOI departments made significant strides toward autonomy during the reporting period. All the security pillars are deemed effective and require, at most, minimal coalition assistance.

The strength of the security pillars is counterbalanced by weaknesses in critical support functions. The Logistics, Facilities, Information, Communication, and Technology Departments still require coalition assistance and are not expected to be fully capable by December, 2014. The shift in advisory focus from developing MOI operational capacity to sustainment capacity has been a challenging one. Progress is being made, but Afghanistan must develop additional capabilities in order to ensure the long-term sustainability of the entire police force.

ANP logistics is a major focus area for ISAF. Currently, the MOI is not prepared to sustain its security operations without coalition assistance. The MOI has made substantial progress in providing its forces with a contracted maintenance and supply capability, albeit one that is centrally-focused. The National Logistics Center (NLC) in Wardak is the hub for all MOI supply and maintenance activities. It provides significant capacity and capability to perform all levels of maintenance, as well as distribution of almost every class of supply. The Procurement Department, although making positive strides in transitioning service sustainment contracts, continues to face significant issues that hamstring its advancement. Three primary issues include the inability to sustain procurement operations at the local level, differing contract requirements between Afghan national and current coalition standards, and the lack of a procurement certification process. ISAF's plans to address these challenges include the implementation of a plan of action to identify all national-level Afghan requirements and the development of a central process to meet contract awards.

Advisors continue to work with ANP General Recruiting Command (GRC) leadership in order to recruit and screen enough qualified patrolmen and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) to produce a sustainable and enduring professional force. A key ISAF goal is to develop the ability of the MOI human resources staff to provide the RGC with accurate recruiting needs, which would enable recruiting based on true *tashkil* requirements and prevent the misalignment of *tashkil* personnel (i.e., patrolmen occupying NCO positions). The Senior Recruiting Advisor is working with the General Director of Personnel, *Tashkil* Directorate and GRC advisors to address this issue.

MOI's political transition has impacted some counter corruption programs. However, soon after taking office, Minister Daudzai fired a number of commanders he perceived to be corrupt, particularly in the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF).

The IG and Recruiting Department have regressed significantly during the reporting period. Both offices experienced a cut in personnel, with the latter losing a significant number of staff. As the IG's office is the main focus of MOI counter-corruption activities, staff cuts may significantly retard MOI counter-corruption activities. The Recruiting Department assumed ALP in-processing responsibilities. This increased responsibility, coupled with reduced capacity, has threatened the department's overall effectiveness. Significant efforts are underway to streamline the recruit, train, and assignment process.

**Figure 8: MOI Capability Milestone Ratings (as of July 31, 2013)\***

<b>Ministry of Interior Overall Rating CM2B</b>	<b>Current CM</b>	<b>CM 1B Date</b>
<b>Chief of Staff / Special Staff</b>		
Public Affairs	1A	Achieved
Inspector General	3	1Q, 15
Legal Advisor	1B	Achieved
Legal Affairs	2A	3Q, 13
Intelligence	2A	1Q, 14
Democratic Policing	3	TBD
Gender & Human Rights	3	1Q, 15
<b>Deputy Minister of Counter Narcotics</b>		
Counter Narcotics	2B	2Q, 14
<b>Deputy Minister of Strategy and Policy</b>		
Strategic Planning	2A	1Q, 14
Policy Development	1B	Achieved
Force Management	1B	Achieved
<b>Deputy Minister of Support</b>		
Logistics	2B	1Q, 15
Finance and Budget	2B	3Q, 14
Facilities and Installation	3	4Q, 14
Surgeon Medical	2A	2Q, 14
Info, Coms and Tech	2B	4Q, 14
Acquisition and Procurement	2B	2Q, 14
<b>Deputy Minister of Admin</b>		
Personnel Management	2B	3Q, 14
Civil Service	2A	1Q, 14
Training Management	2B	4Q, 14
Recruiting Command	2B	4Q, 14
<b>Deputy Minister of Security</b>		
Afghan Uniform Police	2A	1Q, 14
Afghan Fire Services	3	2Q, 14
Afghan Border Police	2A	4Q, 13
GDPSU	2A	3Q, 13
Anti-Crime Police	2A	4Q, 13
ANCOP-(G)	1A	Achieved
ALP	2A	1Q, 14
Plans & Operations	2A	3Q, 13
Force Readiness	1B	Achieved
C-IED	3	2Q, 14
<b>Deputy Minister, APPF</b>		
APPF	3	3Q, 14



## 2.4: INSTITUTIONAL TRAINER AND MENTOR STATUS

According to the NATO CJSOR version 12.5, there is a requirement for 1,822 trainers, of which 1,653 are in place. Despite the current shortage of 169 required trainers, NTM-A assesses that it can fully accomplish its mission with the current number of trainers. As specific capability milestones are reached for a particular training mission, personnel are reduced at those training sites and, in some cases; the mission is transitioned to the ANSF. This reduction in the requirement is reflected in the CJSOR version 12.5 that took effect in July 2013.

**Figure 9: NTM-A Trainer Requirement (CJSOR version 12.5)**

<b>Forces/Skills to be Trained</b>	<b># of Trainers Required</b>
Army/Ground Forces	608
Police	76
DCG Ops/Medical	47
Air Force	435
Logistics	42
Infrastructure	23
Intelligence	3
Security	588

## 2.5: ANSF LITERACY TRAINING

Literacy is the foundation of professional military and police forces. As of August 31, 2013, 48,854 ANSF members were in some form of literacy training; of these, 17,316 were ANP and 31,538 were ANA.

From November 2009 to August 2013, a total of 220,530 ANSF recruits have passed level one of Dari or Pashto literacy and numeracy training while 70,350 ANSF personnel have achieved level three, or functional, literacy under the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) standard.<sup>15</sup>

NTM-A held a literacy conference with general officers and senior leaders of the ANA and ANP on May 1, 2013, to determine the way ahead for the program. The main goal of this conference was to help establish the MOD and MOI's capacity to conduct literacy instruction for the ANSF so that they may continue training after the ISAF mission ends in December, 2014. The ANP intends to add eight more weeks of literacy training to the Initial Police Training Course, bringing the total course to 16 weeks and allowing all graduates to complete level three

<sup>15</sup> The UNESCO standard is defined as "being able to identify, understand, interpret, create, communicate, compute, and use printed written materials associated with varying contexts."

training. The ANA intends to test recruits prior to Basic Warrior Training (BWT) and send illiterate recruits to literacy training before the course begins. This will ensure that all ANA recruits are functionally literate before starting BWT.

Literacy in the institutional training centers focuses on the attainment of level one literacy. Currently, basic trainees receive a 64-hour course that allows the student to achieve level one literacy. As of August 2013, the BWT expanded from 8 to 12 weeks, which includes up to level one literacy.

Those ANA identified as NCOs or slated for technical career fields, such as Signals and Logistics, attend Pre-Branch Literacy training. This program provides up to level three literacy training. This degree of literacy is essential for implementing many of the more advanced functions required in the enablers and technical fields. Although the ANA Darulaman Literacy Center offers levels one through three training, it can only train and house up to 800 students at one time, graduating approximately 200 students every two weeks. However, new construction at Darulaman will double this capacity. The ANP does not have a similar system in place, and relies on NTM-A and UNESCO to continue literacy training, predominantly for fielded units.

NTM-A will continue coordinating with the ANA and ANP to professionalize their force, to advance their literacy standards, and to increase literacy programs in training institutions. The long-term goal is for soldiers to achieve level three literacy prior to being assigned to the field. In light of the overall reduction of ISAF forces, NTM-A will commence a "Train the Trainer" program by November 2013 to provide up to 2,500 ANSF instructors (1,000 ANP and 1,500 ANA) to instruct levels one through three in field and/or training centers.

ANSF and NTM-A are cooperating to develop program and capabilities in training institutions and schools, and in pre-branch training, to allow security personnel to achieve level three literacy. Increased literacy will not only facilitate instruction and cost-effectiveness, but allow literate soldiers to benefit more from their subsequent training. The short-term impact of the NTM-A program is greater professionalism of the ANSF. Longer-term, these programs contribute to the development of Afghanistan's overall human capacity.

## **2.6: ANSF MEDICAL SYSTEM**

ISAF is working with the ANSF at the corps level and above to train, advise, and assist the senior leaders of the Afghan medical system to provide independent, sustainable, quality care to the ANSF and their beneficiaries. Although this effort has been on-going for several years, the increase in ANSF combat operations and casualties this year has underscored its importance. During the reporting period, several years of mentoring and advising have resulted in transitioning five of the six national and regional hospitals to Afghan control. The remaining hospital, Afghan National Police Hospital (ANPH), is scheduled to transition in December 2013.

The NTM-A Command Surgeon has to date procured 7,398 Combat Lifesaver (CLS) bags (trauma kits) for the ANA and 4,770 bags for the ANP, at a total cost of \$3.76 million. This equipment will provide much needed medical supplies for the ANSF to treat the wounded at the

point of injury. Medical Command (MEDCOM) graduated 47 Combat Physician Assistants in September 2013, bringing the total force manning to 99 percent of the target. The manning of combat medics within the ANA increased from 68 percent to 88 percent of the target during the reporting period. The current 28 percent fatality rate of ANA casualties, is significantly lower than it was last year (36.8 percent), indicating improvements in the ANA medical system.

Since the transition of the medical logistics system from ANA MEDCOM to the regular MOD logistics system, the lack of medical logistics supply chain communication has been the most significant issue plaguing the system. The ANA MEDCOM and logistics command (LOGCOM) inability to collaborate has created unnecessary challenges, including: missing customer usage reports to accurately identify future requirements, delays in replenishing the national warehouse due to a multi-step contracting requirement, and the ANA's desire to economize by purchasing potentially substandard products from.

The ANP medical system, which lags behind the ANA in a number of ways, saw improvements during the reporting period. The ANPH now has 162 beds (previously 74) after the opening of the Coalition-funded expansion in September, 2013. The coalition purchased 600 Trauma Assistance Personnel (TAP) medic bags to ensure first aid supplies are at the point of injury, and evaluated the number of fully mission capable ambulances and stocked them with medical equipment. The MOI has command and control of medical staffing within Kabul, but still has limited control outside the city. Many of the 136 MOI clinics are under-staffed; the ministry has problems filling physician positions in the regions. While higher than the ANA fatality rate, the 37.7 percent fatality rate for ANP casualties is down from the 2012 rate of 44.5 percent.

The new ANP medical logistics system has made strides, but challenges remain. The ANP is prioritizing its annual medical supply requirements and procuring them through the MOI. Considerable delays are the norm when requirements are submitted; however, the ANP has been awarding medical contracts. Currently, the ANP's national medical warehouse is a coalition-purchased facility, but the ANP has developed plans to move the medical warehouse to a MOI-owned facility. One of the greatest challenges for ANP medical logistics is the inconsistent distribution of ANP medical supplies throughout Afghanistan due to the lack of consistent, reliable processes and coordination procedures. ISAF advisors have been identifying the friction points and working with Afghans to overcome this hurdle. Despite the challenges, the ANP medical logistics system is on track for full transition by the end of 2014.

Patient evacuation is a challenge for the ANA and ANP. Due to limited air transportation assets, most patients are moved by ground transportation. Trained medics, fully stocked ambulances, security, communication, and coordination are necessary to provide appropriate evacuation, but the ANP in particular continue to struggle with trained medics and stocked ambulances. In response to the medical evacuation challenge, MEDCOM is reviewing and finalizing its Medical Evacuation Plan. MEDCOM is working with the Air Corps Surgeon General to synchronize efforts to improve Air MEDEVAC compliance.

## 2.7: AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY DEVELOPMENT

ANA strength had increased to 185,329 as of August 2013, including 6,616 personnel in the AAF. This represents 99 percent of the joint ANA/AAF end-strength objective of 195,000. Most ANA units are still on track to complete fielding of their equipment by December 2013.

All ANA units will be fielded by December 31, 2013, except for the last two of the seven planned MSFKs, which will be fielded in 2014. Major systems still at various stages of fielding to existing units include the 60mm mortar weapon systems, D30 howitzers, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) equipment, and the Up-Armored Medium Transport Vehicles which will be used to push mine rollers for the ANA and ABP Route Clearance Companies (RCCs). Fielding of this equipment will be complete by December 31, 2013. During the reporting period, the ANA fielded a Military Intelligence *kandak*, a Corps Signal *kandak*, and a MSFK.

The ANSF as a whole is increasingly capable and proactive in conducting security operations, and ANSF commanders are improving their integration of combined arms. They are leading 95 percent of conventional and 98 percent of special operations missions. Fifty-seven of 85 ANA *kandaks* are rated at “capable” or higher. Two major strengths of the ANA are infantry maneuver and small unit execution of operations (at the *kandak*-level and below) and human intelligence (HUMINT) collection. ANA development during the reporting period was focused on the following four areas:

*Combined Arms Integration.* The ANA is implementing indirect fire certification and training programs as well as fielding initiatives. These efforts are improving the professionalization of the Afghan fires community. ANSF C-IED patrol capability also improved during the reporting period. The ANA currently has 107 operational explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams. This represents 46 percent of the 230-team goal, a 29 percent increase over last quarter.

*Training.* Development and implementation of enduring and sustainable training systems continues to be a focus. This quarter 50 NCOs graduated from the 26-week ANA Sergeants Major Course (SMC) at the Afghan National Defense University (ANDU). This event accelerates the professionalization of the ANA’s NCO corps which is key to improving training and training management in the ANA. Literacy training is also occurring in most units, improving communication and supporting the professional growth of the ANA. At the operational level, IJC is partnering with the Afghan GFC, advising and mentoring on systems, planning efforts, and orders development. The ANA continues to make progress in integrating staff functions into the military decision-making process.

*Leadership.* IJC ratings of Afghan leadership continue to improve and are consistently positive. However, the number of vacant key positions remains a concern. Corrupt and incompetent leadership, while still a problem, is being addressed from the ministerial level, through corps commanders, down to the *kandak* level.

*Sustainment.* The ANSF have proven that they have the ability to win the tactical fight, but they currently do not have satisfactory systems in place to sustain their fighting force independently. For example, the operational and logistics chains for the ANA are not coordinated or synchronized below the strategic level with the General Staff. This division of authority is contributing to the lack of responsiveness to operational priorities at the corps and GFC levels. Both the ANP and the ANA have difficulty planning and executing logistics. It is common for warehouses to hoard supplies, and units often fail to keep vehicles and equipment mission capable. Improving ANSF sustainment capabilities is now one of ISAF's top priorities.

The number of ANA casualties and their limited ability to evacuate their wounded adversely affects morale, retention, and recruiting. MOD working groups are identifying ways to address root causes of attrition. Given the limited number of Mi-17s and the difficulty in training pilots and crew for existing aircraft, efforts to provide a substantially increased casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) capacity would require significantly more air resources.

Although the ANA as a whole has made significant progress, some units lag behind. Within the ANA corps, the 201, 203, 205, and 215 corps each have their respective strength and weakness but are roughly on par with each other. The remaining three corps (207, 209, and 111 Capital Division) are not as effective as the others, although some of this can be attributed to the level of violence in their respective areas of operations. The corps are all large units, and individual *kandaks* within the corps vary widely in capabilities. Most ANA operations are conducted at the *kandak*-level and below, although larger operations, and operations involving units from multiple corps or ANSF pillars, are increasing.

### **Additional Challenges for the ANA**

Despite improvements in performance, logistics and sustainment continue to be major challenges, with equipment shortages still of concern. In RC-Capital, 88 percent of ANA initial equipping authorizations have been filled; in RC-W, ANA equipping is currently at 75 percent; and in RC-SW, it is at 93 percent. These equipment shortages are due in large part to Afghan failure to push the equipment from warehouses or depots to the field. This is partially the result of the Afghans assuming greater responsibility for depots previously managed by US contractors. Attrition also remains high in the ANA, which experiences about twice the attrition rate as the ANP and averages about three percent per month and 30 percent annually.

The last twelve months' total attrition rate for the ANA was 34.4 percent. Reasons for this high rate of attrition include poor leadership; inadequate living and working conditions; absence of planned leave and an operational cycle<sup>16</sup>; the effect of seasonal attrition (harvesting, planting); lack of martyr care; and levels of pay and remuneration. Although the ANSF's attrition rates are high by the standards of ISAF nations, the pillars of the ANSF are currently able to maintain or increase force levels based on recruiting and retention rates.

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<sup>16</sup> Instead of cycling from combat to reset to training, many Afghan units remain in combat.

NTM-A and the MOD have maintained efforts to recruit southern Pashtuns, and to improve the overall ethnic balance of the ANA, but the ethnic balance of the ANA continues to be an issue of concern. In general, Tajiks are over-represented in the ANA officer corps and at MOD, while Pashtuns are under-represented. The ethnic makeup of the ANA is: 39.4 percent Pashtun; 32.8 percent Tajik; 10.6 percent Hazara; 10.1 percent Uzbek; and 7.1 percent other ethnicities. The ethnic makeup of the MOD is Pashtun: 38.5 percent; Tajik: 40.9 percent; Hazara: 10.46 percent; Uzbek: 4.61 percent; others: 5.54 percent.

Corruption within the MOD and fielded forces also remains a challenge. Corrupt activities range from extortion at check points to high level corruption in the MOD and MOI. The MOD held an anti-corruption conference that was attended by senior ANA commanders and staff which resulted in the formation of Transparency Accountability Committees at corps and divisional levels, however little progress has been seen thus far.

## **Manning**


In August 2013, ANA manning was at 185,329, or 99 percent of its 187,000 authorized end-strength. Fielding of authorized units and equipment is nearing completion, and will be complete by the end of 2013. The ANA now consists of six corps, one capital division HQ, one SOF division HQ, 24 infantry brigades, two Mobile Strike Force (MSF) brigades, two special operations brigades, and seven OCC-Rs. During the reporting period, the ANA fielded three infantry *kandaks*, three military intelligence companies, two engineer *kandaks*, one combat support *kandak*, and the second of two armored MSF brigade HQ.

ANSF casualties have increased significantly this year, as the ANSF have taken the lead for security across the country. There has been a 62 percent increase in total ANSF casualties in 2013 compared to 2012. ANA casualties increased by 49 percent and represented 40 percent of total ANSF casualties in 2013.

High ANSF casualties are a major concern, and ISAF has a number of on-going initiatives to lower them, including improved C-IED and improved ISR. ISAF has also embarked on an aggressive medical training campaign with a target to certify 12,168 personnel with CLS training, and equip them with CLS bags. This training program also aims to refresh the training of more than 2,500 Combat Medics and ANP TAP.

Although ANSF casualties have increased, the rate of ANSF casualties is similar to ISAF's casualty rates prior to the transition. Increased casualties account for only a small portion of overall attrition and have had no discernible effect on the recruitment rate. ANSF casualties, while clearly problematic, are not assessed to be a major contributory factor to attrition. Wages and the ability to take leave to look after the family are assessed to be much larger contributing factors.

Figure 10: ANA Strength, Recruiting, Retention, and Attrition



Source : CSTC-A/MAG MoD MAG.

## Force Development and Training

The ANSF as a whole made progress in training during the reporting period, although training standards and quality are still not uniform across the formations. Development and implementation of enduring and sustainable training systems continues to be a focus. Over this period 50 NCOs graduated from the 26-week ANA Sergeants Major Course (SMC) at the Afghan National Defense University (ANDU). This accelerates the professionalization of the ANA's NCO corps, which is key to improving training and training management in the ANA. ISAF's RC commanders report that personnel management remains a significant training challenge within the ANSF. Personnel who are trained and certified on specific systems and skill sets are often not utilized for those functions at the unit level, reducing the overall effectiveness of the unit. Some units are developing their training capacity internally through the implementation of train-the-trainer programs initiated at the *tolay* (company-sized) level. These efforts improve individual and small-unit capabilities, particularly in more mature units. This

training has consisted of route clearance/C-IED, radio communications, and vehicle maintenance instruction.

Literacy training is also occurring in most units, improving communication and supporting the professional growth of the ANA. At the operational level, IJC is partnering with the Afghan GFC, advising and mentoring on systems, planning efforts, and orders development. The ANA continues to make progress in integrating staff functions into the military decision-making process.

### Special Operations Forces

ANASOC continue to be the most capable element of the ANSF. Ninety-nine percent of all special operations in Afghanistan are now Afghan-led. In May 2013, NSOCC-A transitioned ANSF-related assessments from a Capability Milestone (CM) system, similar to the one previously used by NTM-A to assess ministerial institutions, to a rating definition levels methodology similar to the one used by IJC to assess tactical units.

**Figure 11: ANASOC Operational Effectiveness**

ANASOC RDLs (Rating Definition Levels)	HQs	Units		Total Units & HQs
	DIV/BDEs	KDKs	SPT Units	
<b>Fully Capable</b>	0	0	1	<b>1</b>
<b>Capable</b>	0	5	1	<b>6</b>
<b>Partially Capable</b>	2	4	3	<b>9</b>
<b>Developing</b>	0	0	2	<b>2</b>
<b>Not Assessed</b>	1	0	0	<b>1</b>
<b>Totals</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1</b>

*ANA Special Operations Command.* ANASOC is organized under a Division HQ and two subordinate brigade HQs. These HQs coordinate the operations of the nine special operations *kandaks*, which include both Special Forces and commando companies. These units are supported in the field by ANASOC's Military Intelligence *kandak*, the MSF staff, the Garrison Support Unit (GSU), the General Support *kandak*, the School of Excellence (SoE), and the SMW.

ANASOC forces are split between small units that are located throughout the contested areas of Afghanistan, known as Afghan National Army Special Force (ANASF) Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) teams, and commando companies, which are large units that are located on a small number of main bases. The ODA teams focus on gaining local intelligence, acting as a quick reaction force to support other ANSF units, conducting small raids, and supporting larger ANSF units during operations. The large commando companies carry out major (100 to 150-man)



kinetic operations. The commando companies conduct both independent missions and joint operations with other ANSF forces.

The ANASOC MSF is scheduled to be fully fielded by the fourth quarter of 2013, and will be made up of four companies. These companies will differ from the rest of ANASOC in that they will have armored vehicles and more ground mobility. These units will be distributed throughout the ANASOC to augment the capabilities of existing units.

ANASOC units have finished force generation and fielding, and have demonstrated a high level of tactical proficiency. The main challenge now facing ANASOC is developing its enabler capabilities such as logistics, C2, and intelligence. ANASOC recently fielded a General Support *kandak* and a Military Intelligence *kandak*, and improving both of these units is a major focus area for NSOCC-A. For its C2 system, ANASOC seeks to ensure that its operational and strategic level units better support the tactical-level units. The first cross-country transit of an ANASOC resupply convoy marked a major accomplishment during the reporting period. On September 3, 2013, the ANASOC resupply convoy reached Shindand, Herat, five days after departing Camp Commando, Kabul. This operation demonstrated the development of ANASOC's logistic systems and C2 capability.

ANASOC operates at a high tempo, affecting the campaign far more than their numbers would suggest. At present, many operations are dependent upon ISAF air transport and, in particular, helicopter lift. The SMW will be the sole means of ANASOC helicopter transport after 2014 and has started to provide the ANASOC with helicopter mobility on a limited number of missions. However, current projections indicate that the SMW will not be able to provide ANASOC with enough helicopter mobility to make up for the departure of most ISAF forces after 2014. As the availability of ISAF helicopter transport declines, ANASOC personnel will have to increase ground travel, which is difficult in many areas of Afghanistan, and slower than air transport. ANASOC also do not have an organic route-clearance or C-IED capability.

As seen in Figure 12, ANASOC are now leading the vast majority of operations.

**Figure 12: Special Operations Forces Operation**

Operational Category	Apr-13	May-13	Jun-13	Jul-13	Aug-13	Sep-13
<b>ISAF SOF Unilateral Ops (Total)</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>GDPSU &amp; ANASF/CDO Unilateral Ops (Total)</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>447</b>	<b>409</b>	<b>266</b>	<b>173</b>	<b>126</b>
ISAF - Advised Ops (with ANSF in lead)	52	48	74	49	163	163
ANSF-Led ISAF Enabled Ops	140	401	439	376	116	199
ISAF - Led Partnered Ops	0	0	0	1	9	3
<b>Total Partnered, Enabled, or Advised SOF Ops (Total)</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>449</b>	<b>513</b>	<b>426</b>	<b>288</b>	<b>365</b>
<b>Total Ops</b>	<b>263</b>	<b>905</b>	<b>932</b>	<b>702</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>496</b>
<b>Total ISAF Led Ops</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Total ANSF Led Ops</b>	<b>259</b>	<b>896</b>	<b>922</b>	<b>691</b>	<b>452</b>	<b>488</b>
<b>% of Total Ops Led by ISAF</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>1%</b>	<b>1%</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>2%</b>
<b>% of Total Ops Led by ANSF</b>	<b>98%</b>	<b>99%</b>	<b>99%</b>	<b>98%</b>	<b>98%</b>	<b>98%</b>
	Apr-13	May-13	Jun-13	Jul-13	Aug-13	Sep-13

Notes:

Source: NSOCC-A, August 2013.

Effective May 2013 ANA SF and ANA Commando ops were added to this table. Previously, only ISAF SOF and General Directorate of Police Special Units (GDPSU) ops were included.

Effective June 2013, National Directorate of Police Security (NDS) were added into this table. ANSF-Led ISAF SOF Enabled Ops was formerly called ANSF-Led Partnered Ops .

Color scheme: Combined is purple, ANSF is green, coalition is blue, summary statistics are orange.

The Ktah Khas Afghan (KKA) is an Afghan special operations battalion designed to carry out platoon-sized, high-intensity night missions enabled by U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF). The KKA is an MOD national mission unit directly under the authority of the Chief of the General Staff. It is unique in that it also has ANP and NDS personnel assigned, which give it unique law enforcement and intelligence capabilities. The KKA is enabled by an Afghan Operational Coordination Group that coordinates and deconflicts operations and ensures all KKA operations are conducted in accordance with Afghan laws. As of September 2013 there were 1,217 personnel in the KKA battalion, including a female platoon with 13 women.

Despite their small size, the KKA are a very capable force, and maintain a high operational tempo. Many of the most dangerous insurgents currently held in Afghan prisons were captured or detained by the KKA. KKA personnel have forensics and investigative training, and are able to exploit intelligence gained during their raids. The KKA also provide U.S. SOF with local knowledge and intelligence, increasing their effectiveness.

Although only assessed as “partially capable” overall, the KKA have made significant improvements in personnel and training functions. At the present time, the KKA do not carry out any unilateral missions, as they are dependent upon USSOF helicopters. The development of KKA C2 and logistics capabilities were areas of focus during the reporting period.

## Equipping and Enablers

ANASOC has received almost all of its authorized vehicles, but the largest remaining equipment program yet to be fully fielded is the Mobile Strike Force Vehicle (MSFV) program and its supporting elements. The first three of seven MSF *kandaks* are fielded and the two MSF Brigades should be fully fielded by November 2013. While these MSFV units have reached initial operating capability (IOC), they still lack much of the support to be fully operational capable (FOC). Other major systems at various stages of fielding include the 60mm mortar weapon systems, the call for fires trainer, the PIPPER (personal electronic counter-measures systems), and the Up-Armored Medium Transport Vehicles which will be used to push mine rollers for the ANA and ABP Route Clearance Companies. These systems will be fielded by the end of 2013.

## Logistics and Sustainment

The ANSF have the ability to win the tactical fight, but they do not have satisfactory systems in place to sustain their fighting force independently. Sustainment, due to poor logistics, is one of the biggest problems facing nearly every element of the ANSF. There is no institutional design for sustainment and it has yet to receive the level of attention it requires at the ministerial level. As the ANSF have nearly completed force generation and fielding, ISAF's focus has shifted to improving their capabilities in logistics and sustainment.

Reflecting this shift in focus, ISAF developed the ANSF Sustainability Framework. For ministerial development, the Framework articulates four strategic pillars essential to effective and self-sustaining ANSF, including Logistics, Acquisition, and Resource Management; Inspector General/Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight (IG/TAO); Strategy, Plans, and Policy (SP&P); and Human Resource Management (HRM). The strategic pillars are supported by the enabling functions of Strategic Communications; Medical; C4; and Intelligence.

Much of the logistics system has already transitioned to Afghan control. Commodities such as Class I, II, III and IV at the regional level have transitioned to the ANA, and their availability meets the operational tempo requirements. However, both the ANP and the ANA have difficulty planning and executing logistics. For example, it is common for warehouses to hoard supplies, and units often fail to keep vehicles and equipment mission capable. In response, a new order was signed at the MOD C2 Symposium which removes the direct reporting and C2 chain from the Regional Support Command (RSC) to the Army Support Command; the RSCs now fall directly under corps control.

The ANSF sustainment system is a framework of national, regional, and tactical elements through which logistic planning is coordinated and executed. The sustainment system has a separate C2 structure from the combat units. For example, the operational and logistics chains for the ANA are not coordinated or synchronized below the strategic level with the General Staff. This division of authority contributes to the lack of responsiveness to operational priorities at the corps and GFC levels.

A computer-based inventory management system has been established at the Logistics Command, but not all of the Regional Logistic Support Commands (RLSCs) have the capability yet. The consequence is a hybrid process of electronic and paper asset management for the ANA, which limits the ability to properly track requisition statuses. The full electronic end-to-end system will not be implemented until December 2014.

The full fuel requirement is expected to transition in March 2014. This fuel contract has enhanced the ANA's ability to utilize more flexible contract methods.

Vehicle maintenance is still considered an area for concern with problems in parts configuration management, parts availability, maintenance capability, and lack of preventative maintenance understanding and practice. A sustainment *shura* was conducted this summer to focus on the readiness of ANA tactical wheeled vehicles. This effort jointly identified the shortfalls in vehicle sustainment. The next steps will be to implement solutions to those problems.

The ANA sustainment system, like much of the ANSF and GIRoA, is based more on personalities and relationships than on institutional and legal systems. Thus combat unit commanders with personal connections or patronage networks within the ANA sustainment system will find their forces well supplied, while commanders without these connections and networks will find their forces ill-equipped. ISAF personnel often intervene to correct this situation, but as coalition forces draw down, their focus has shifted to reforming the sustainment system so that it functions without ISAF. This is a major challenge.

The challenges affecting ANA overall logistics capabilities revolve around training, maintenance of systems, personnel utilization and the resulting lack of confidence in ability of strategic ANA logistic organizations to meet the needs of tactical field units. The primary challenges are:

- The lack of operational equipment.
- The utilization of technically skilled personnel to conduct operations outside of their specialty areas, resulting in the misutilization of trained personnel. Momentum in developing and maintaining technical skills flounder as a result.
- A system of training that does not adequately identify qualified, educated personnel to become advanced-level trainers organic to the corps and *kandaks*. This skill deficit prevents an effective feedback mechanism to provide logistics trainers with direction on how the curriculum needs to be changed or adapted to meet the requirement of commanders in the field.
- Miscommunication or a lack of communication between the strategic and tactical level. Logistics are not synchronized which often contributes to the lack of responsiveness to operational priorities and a lack of confidence in national-level ANA logistics organization's ability to satisfy the needs of tactical field units.

Advisors continue to work with the ANA to bridge the gap that exists between the strategic and tactical level. At the tactical level, NTM-A and IJC are facilitating ANA-led Logistics and Maintenance Terrain Walks across each corps in order to reinforce command responsibility and

oversight of the logistics process. In addition, NTM-A has initiated the Sustainment Executive Council in order to address the challenges from the strategic, ministerial level, down to the fielded force.

Not surprisingly, the most technologically advanced systems are the ones that the ANA has the most trouble sustaining. The Mobile Strike Force Vehicle (MSFV), although providing important ground mobility and firepower, will be challenging for the ANSF to maintain. The MSFV initial maintenance contract of nine months for the MSF *kandaks* will assist in the short term, but in the longer term maintenance may decline as the maintenance contracts expire for the fielded units. C-IED capabilities are vital to maintaining ANSF freedom of movement, but some C-IED electronic equipment (e.g., SYMPHONY personal jammers, hand held metal detectors, and PIPPER) will be problematic to maintain.

ISR is another crucial ANSF capability, but one with major sustainment challenges. Aerostats, RAID towers and, their supporting networks are all areas where the ANSF is struggling to provide maintenance and sustainment. The ANSF are limited on their knowledge to install, operate, and maintain Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSATs) which provide limited satellite communications.

Finally, heavy engineer equipment (HEE) provides a crucial force multiplier to fielded ANA forces but has computerized components that the ANSF are unlikely to be able to repair. ISAF has engineer equipment maintenance mobile training teams in each of the ANA corps but their focus is on the mechanical portions of these HEE vehicles, not on the electronic or computerized parts. The computerized components of HEE will likely have to be maintained by contractors. ISAF is working to improve ANSF sustainment and maintenance capabilities on all of these systems and this will be a major area of focus in the coming year.

## **Afghan Air Force**

The AAF has of a mix of rotary wing and propeller aircraft. The AAF made significant progress during the reporting period, contributing to the success of the ANSF in the areas of intra-theater, airlift, transport, CASEVAC, ISR, limited fires delivery, and training. However, the AAF remains challenged to support ANA operations due to maintenance and logistics challenges, limited number of air assets, lack of trained pilots, and an inability to perform missions at night or in adverse weather conditions that require reliance on flight instruments.

The AAF is currently assessed to be at its IOC for the Mi-17, Mi-35, and the C-208, as those airframes are already in service. IOC for the C-130 and the A-29 is not anticipated until roughly 2016 as the first C-130 was just introduced to the AAF fleet and the A-29 is not scheduled for delivery until late 2014. Further, both are complex airframes that will require longer training times.

Maintenance continues to be a major challenge for the AAF. While the AAF clearly demonstrated its ability to execute operational missions and support disaster relief taskings, its ability to generate Mi-17s for missions and taskings was severely degraded because its Mi-17


fleet required intensive maintenance attention. Overuse of the AAF's Mi-17 fleet caused significant Mi-17 inspection backlogs. Advisors are assisting the AAF to develop staggered maintenance cycles and ease future backlogged maintenance in order for the AAF to maintain aircraft availability.

Despite these issues, air support missions were up 35 percent over the last half of the reporting period, including: a 172 percent increase in flying hours, a 139 percent increase in CASEVAC, a 52 percent increase in transported cargo, and a 51 percent increase in the number of troops moved.

However, AAF aircraft and equipment fielding will take longer than for other parts of the ANSF, and AAF capabilities will take several years to mature. The AAF is currently dependent on outside assistance and funding for its sustainment, which will continue after the complete fielding of new equipment in 2017.

AAF manning fell slightly to 6,616 in August, against a cap of 8,000. The average monthly AAF attrition rate was 0.6 percent this quarter, meeting the ISAF goal and is the lowest rate in a year.

**Figure 13: AAF Strength, Recruiting, Retention, and Attrition**



Source: NATC-A.

The Mi-17 is the workhorse of the AAF, used for resupply to deployed forces, CASEVAC, and human-remains transport in support of the ANA. Although the AAF effectively employs Mi-17s, increased operational tempo during the summer reduced Mi-17 helicopter mission availability due to required maintenance and inspections. At the end of the reporting period, only 11 to 17 Mi-17s were available for operations at any given time.

The C-208 has proven to be highly effective for moving light quantities of cargo and CASEVAC patients to and from diverse locations. The development of aerial delivered fires continued to lag behind other AAF capabilities.

The AAF's training programs showed increasing signs of maturity during this reporting period due in part to the long-term diligence of ISAF advisors to the AAF. The first C-130 aircrews started training in May 2013 in order to be ready to man the first two C-130s which were delivered to Afghanistan on October 9. The first two Afghan C-130 pilots attended Little Rock Air Force Base initial qualification training but did not receive qualification prior to departing the U.S. They arrived in Afghanistan for the C-130 delivery ceremony and were scheduled to receive in-country check ride (qualification) in late October. There is currently one flight engineer in training, scheduled to graduate in Dec 2013. Six additional pilots were in the U.S. for training as of the end of the reporting period. Currently, the total crew requirements for 4 x C-130Hs are 18 Pilots, six Flight Engineers, 12 Loadmasters and 85 Maintainers.

Recruitment of eligible young Afghan candidates for the AAF is a challenge. Efforts are ongoing to identify, evaluate, and recruit AAF candidates correctly. The AAF training pipeline continues to make gains in developing and filling key personnel requirements. The main focus and effort of the AAF training pipeline is on developing skilled aircraft maintainers and establishing English language proficiency. Current and future AAF fielding of forces requires a larger pool of pilot candidates and organic maintenance personnel proficient in the English language to build an independent and self-sustaining AAF. Unfortunately, due to the necessity of English language skills and the complexity of the training, the timeline for pilots is 29 months in comparison to the 60 months required to train a maintainer. Maintenance technical orders are written only in English and Russian, with no Dari translations. Further, the quality of maintenance recruits is lower than aircrew recruits, and they require additional time in the classroom.

In another first for the AAF, the Kabul Air Wing (KAW) achieved a major milestone in its Strategic Flight Plan by certifying their first two C-208 aircraft commanders. The AAF can now employ five all-Afghan C-208 crews for airlift, casualty evacuation, recovery of human remains, and non-traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (NTISR) missions.

Operation SEMORGH, carried out over two-weeks during the reporting period, serves as an example of the AAF's capabilities. The AAF organically planned and led this first-ever combined arms operation. One-hundred percent of the AAF times-on-target were met. The AAF inserted over 250 ANA and Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) personnel into the area of operations and transported 6,000 kilograms of cargo. Another first, AAF leadership coordinated

Mi-35s to act as air weapons teams for all legs in accordance with established rules of engagement.

Demonstrating operational flexibility, the AAF also scrambled two Mi-17s that had been placed on alert at Jalalabad for Operation SEMORGH. Their mission was to provide local flood relief for civilians stranded near the river on the north side of Jalalabad. As a result, the AAF executed 11 airlifts and to move 234 Afghan civilians after a sudden storm flooded area roadways and rivers. This successful mission demonstrated improved Afghan C2 capabilities which enable the AAF to re-task assets rapidly with increased effectiveness. Operation SEMORGH highlighted the AAF's capability to train, fight, sustain aircraft operations, and have the flexibility to respond to natural disasters when tasked simultaneously. Flood relief efforts provided a powerful public relations message by demonstrating the ability of the Afghan government to serve populations in remote areas.

### **Special Mission Wing**

The SMW is a major priority for ANSF resourcing and sustainment, and will fill a critical capability gap following the drawdown of ISAF enabler elements. The SMW provides GIROA critical CT and counternarcotics (CN) capabilities, and enables high-end ASSF operations. The SMW, though nascent, is the only air mobility asset in Afghanistan capable of projecting power at night with the required precision to support high-risk CN/CT missions critical to Afghan and U.S. security interests. ANSF special operations units, such as Commandos, ANA Special Forces, Ktah Khas, and GDPSU National Mission Units, must have the operational reach to target AQ and its enabling networks, and to operate at night and in geographically remote areas.

On August 24, 2013, an MOU known as the Air Charter was signed by the MOI and the MOD. The Air Charter clarifies the command relationships for assigning operational control of the SMW to ANASOC under joint MOI/MOD command with equitable allocation of assets to MOI and MOD. The Air Charter also facilitates the expansion of the SMW to the envisioned full strength of 806 personnel. Coalition mentoring teams will be working to ensure the effectiveness of the new C2 and mission tasking mechanisms. However, as of the end of the reporting period, this complex charter was still being implemented and much of the practical implementation issues had yet to be addressed. While the signing of the Air Charter was clearly a positive step, it remains to be seen whether or not it will be implemented to ensure the effective use of SMW.

Once fully operational, the SMW will operate with Mi-17 and PC-12 aircraft. These are a combination of aircraft donated from other countries, legacy aircraft and aircraft on loan from the AAF. Currently, the SMW has 12 Mi-17s available for day to day operations, with 17 Mi-17s in overhaul. The SMW is manned with most of its authorized Mi-17 pilots and less than half of its authorized crew chiefs; seven crews are night vision goggle (NVG)-qualified. The primary training focus for the SMW is currently the production of Afghan Mi-17 NVG aircrews and maintenance personnel. Currently, the SMW has a limited number of full Mi-17 NVG crews, and its training capacity is limited by the number of Mi-17s available for operations and training.



The SMW is tactically proficient and currently conducting missions at a high operations tempo, with all-Afghan crews and minimal mentor oversight.

Like most other components of the ANSF, the biggest challenge facing the SMW is in the areas of logistics and sustainment. Training adequate maintenance personnel is difficult, both due to the required English language skills, and other technologically complex skills. However, helicopters like such as the Mi-17 have been used by Afghan forces for decades and will alleviate some training challenges.

Among the many reasons for selecting the Mi-17 as the primary lift helicopter for the Afghans, previous Afghan experience and familiarity was the most practical and compelling. The Mi-17 has been a reliable lift platform in Afghanistan since the early 1980s. Thirty years of Mi-17 presence in Afghanistan has generated a cadre of pilots and maintainers familiar with this platform. Among the aviator leadership in the SMW, there exists an average of 24 years of experience flying the Mi-17 and, perhaps even more importantly, the senior SMW maintenance leadership has an average of 27 years of experience in servicing Mi-17s. The current capability of the SMW to fly at night and conduct squadron level maintenance is a direct result of this advantage and enables the SMW to achieve a projected Mi-17 FOC date of late 2015. However, long term contractor support at some level will likely be required to provide adequate maintenance support to the SMW fleet.

## **2.8: AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE DEVELOPMENT**

The ANP has nearly completed fielding both units and equipment across its three pillars: the AUP; the ABP; and the ANCOP, which acts as a national mobile constabulary force. Fielding will be complete by December 31, 2013. During the reporting period the MOI continued to reorganize Type-A AUP HQs to provide regional C2 across AUP units that also remain substantially aligned with ANA Corps areas.

### **Manning**

In August 2013 the ANP was at 97 percent of its authorized end-strength of 152,000. The ANP's average monthly attrition rate for ANP during the reporting period was 1.4 percent, meeting the ISAF goal (see Figure 14).


ANP casualties have increased significantly this year. The main driver of this increase in casualties is the ANSF taking the lead for security across Afghanistan and the concurrent increase in unilateral and ANSF-led operations.

Several other factors contributed to high ANP casualties. The ANP are not consistently supported by ANA regional hospitals and must sometimes rely on Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) Facilities that do not have advanced trauma capabilities. Additionally, TAP medic billets are currently filled at less than 50 percent across the ANP. Air MEDEVAC assets are controlled by the ANA; the ANP must coordinate for air support and do not always receive it.

Failure to use personal protective equipment (PPE) may also be a contributing factor to high casualty rates. Current efforts to reduce ANP casualties include: increased fielding of PPE, increased TAP medic training, and an aggressive CLS training program.

The ethnic balance of the ANP is also monitored by ISAF and MOI. In general, the ANP is a more locally recruited and based force, and an ANP unit's ethnicity customarily reflects the ethnicity of the local area. Figure 15 details the ethnicity levels of the ANP.

**Figure 14: ANP Strength, Recruitment, Retention, and Attrition**



Source: CSTC-A/MAG MoI MAG.

**Figure 15: ANP Ethnicity**

	<b>Pashtun</b>	<b>Tajik</b>	<b>Hazara</b>	<b>Uzbek</b>	<b>Others</b>
Ethnic Target	44.0%	25.0%	10.0%	8.0%	13.0%
<b>Officer</b>	13.2%	49.7%	14.9%	7.3%	3.3%
<b>NCO</b>	24.2%	53.5%	33.7%	20.8%	3.9%
<b>Patrolmen</b>	62.6%	35.9%	51.4%	71.8%	7.3%
Officer Delta*	-25.7%	24.7%	-4.9%	-4.9%	-9.7%
Total Force Delta*	-2.1%	18.5%	-4.2%	-2.1%	-7.3%

\*The Delta represents the difference between the ethnic target and the actual percentage

## **Command and Control (C2)**

MOI experienced major changes in its C2 structure during the reporting period. The recent change in AUP C2 structure from zone commanders to regional commanders organized under Type A Provincial Chief of Policy (PCoP) HQs has disrupted operations and sustainment from the national to subnational level. Type A, B, and C PCoPs are the senior police officers in Afghanistan's 34 provinces. The Type A PCoP is responsible for all policing within an assigned region, normally encompassing several provinces of Afghanistan. Within their region, responsibilities are further sub-divided, according to population, by Type B or C HQs to assist and facilitate the policing for that sub-divided region. There are various interpretations of the duties and responsibilities of Type A Commanders over Type B and Type C HQs within their region. In theory, the chain of command would see the Type B and C PCoPs report to the Type-A PCoP under his/her area of responsibility. By law, the Type A PCoPs report to the Deputy Minister of Security at the MOI and have responsibilities to the Provincial Governor. However, there remains a great deal of confusion related to the implementation of this new HQ structure, as well as on its purpose and functions. This is primarily because the MOI abandoned the previous police zone system but did not properly identify the roles and missions of the new HQ structures.

All Type A PCoPs have assumed their positions and are moving forward with help from their coalition security force advisors. ISAF is still behind on ensuring that Type A HQs can effectively assume all the duties previously performed by zone commanders.

There are on-going efforts to draft roles, missions, and C2 of the new Type A, B, and C HQs. These are currently in the early stages and the effect of these changes will not be clear for some time.

## **Force Development and Training**

ANP training lags behind that of the ANA. With more than 19,000 untrained patrolmen within the fielded force of 152,000, the ANP has lower quality patrolmen and less professional units. The police currently have some of the highest casualty rates in Afghanistan. More comprehensive and better quality training would not only improve the professionalism of the force as a whole, but it has the potential to contribute to a reduced ANP casualty rate.

Within the ANP, some units do not yet have commanders. Additionally, poor leaders that were previously removed from duty have been appointed to fill vacant positions. ISAF continues to engage key leaders to encourage MOI and ANP leaders to address cases of inadequate leadership. In general, subordinate empowerment, initiative, and delegation of authority need improvement in the police.

The transition from police zone to the Type A HQs has not been smooth. The new Type A HQs were not designated to perform the sustainment functions that some of the zones used to perform, and this has disrupted critical supply nodes. Some Type A Commanders have assumed sustainment oversight, while others have opted to have the Type B and C PCoPs assume responsibility. With the National Sustainment Center opening soon, this will provide one single node for ANP level III light and heavy vehicle maintenance, warehousing of equipment, weapons repair above level I, and eventually ammunition storage.<sup>17</sup> This is a major step forward from the previously unconsolidated agencies in Kabul.

ANA healthcare infrastructure is much more robust than that of the ANP because the ANP – like other police forces around the world – does not have its own medical facilities; it relies on local public and private medical care providers when it is unable to secure treatment at ANA facilities. The MOI and MOPH have established a MOU to provide cooperative care for the ANP. Recent discussion at an Inter-Ministerial Health Council identified the need for increased cooperation, which is a positive development.

## **Logistics and Sustainment Capabilities**

Both the ANP and the ANA have difficulty planning and executing logistics. The ability of the ANP to sustain itself long-term is at risk without significant improvements in their logistical capabilities. However, this is currently a main focus of ISAF effort.

There is little quality management and leadership process review across the sustainment directorates. Implementation of some form of quality management system with the essential processes, procedures, and metrics is required to monitor the performance of the Logistics, Procurement, and Finance directorates. Without this, the ANP will find it extremely difficult to operate in a resource-constrained environment.

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<sup>17</sup> Level I - operator level maintenance, level II - unit level maintenance, level III - depot level maintenance.

The development of acquisition, logistics, and finance professionals will require significantly more effort, as the MOI has yet to demonstrate the strong commitment to the training and education that will be necessary. This is compounded by low literacy at the basic recruit level. The problem is even more acute outside the capital region. The use of civilian personnel in non-security, technical, and professional positions is one option to mitigate this problem. To a limited extent, this has begun with the hiring of subject matter experts (SME) in the Logistics, Procurement, and Finance directorates.

ISAF continues to convert U.S.-owned contracts to MOI-awarded contracts, yet the ability of MOI to estimate resource requirements accurately remains a weakness. The MOI currently lacks visibility into the actual requirements for end users, and the limited use of electronic information systems inhibits the Finance and Procurement directorates from accurate planning. However, MOI capabilities in this area are improving.

The MOI has made substantial progress in providing their forces with a contracted maintenance and supply capability, albeit one that is centrally focused. At present, sustainment processes are nodal and point-to-point, lacking the end-to-end integration necessary to achieve enduring effects. Shortfalls at the ministerial level directly impact national and operational organizations. However, the ANSF has embraced sustainment reform and achieved some progress. It has identified the need for integrated functional processes and begun working towards that objective. From early July 2013 through August 2013 the Assistant Minister of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) in conjunction with CSTC-A held a series of sustainment *shuras* to assess issues and improve performance. Working groups were established to improve maintenance, supply, training and personnel management, readiness measurement and reporting, requirements and priorities, and the use of computers to support operations. Through strategic planning and program management efforts, senior Afghan officials with support from CSTC-A are building an ANSF education and training portfolio focused on institutionalization of policies and practices to properly execute force sustainment in logistics, acquisition, and resource management. Strategic initiatives are being developed on improved program management and effective sustainment logistics for equipment and weapon systems, including transition from contracted logistics support to ANSF organic sustainment support.

The National Logistics Center (NLC) is the hub for all supply and maintenance activities. It provides significant capacity and capability to perform all levels of maintenance, as well as distribute almost every class of supply. Supply and maintenance support is further pushed out to the provinces through the use of Regional Logistics Centers (RLC), MOI Supply Points (MSP), and contracted mobile maintenance contact teams. Despite these capabilities, most customers remain disconnected from the process, resulting in sub-optimization of the system. AUP equipping lags the ANA overall and is at 70 percent.

A logistical challenge for the ANP during this period was the Automotive Management Services maintenance contract, which is set to expire later this year with no replacement contract yet identified. The ANP has no organic maintenance ability apart from this contract. To mitigate risk, some ANP patrolmen are being cross-trained as mechanics for low-level maintenance.

## **Afghanistan National Civil Order Police**

The most capable pillar within the MOI is the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), which has consistently proven to be a viable and effective force during deployed operations. With approximately 15,000 personnel, the ANCOP are a regionally-based, nationally-deployable police pillar whose primary role is to maintain the rule of law and order utilizing armed capability. They are capable of rapid deployment in support of their own missions or the missions of other ANSF units. Because its units are nationally deployable, ANCOP are less susceptible to manipulation by local power-brokers than other branches of the ANP, which in part contributes to their effectiveness.

ANCOP National Headquarters reached a C/M rating of 1-A (autonomous operations) on approximately June 29, 2013. This rating is indicative of the strength of the C2 capabilities of the ANCOP leadership. However, the most significant area of concern for ANCOP is the incorrect utilization of their forces, which stretches resources and limits the mission performance of ANCOP units. Due to political influences, ANCOP conducts missions which should be conducted by other ANSF units or are deployed to locations where their capability is not needed. MOI-mandated missions constantly require a significant portion of ANCOP to conduct tasks where AUP or ALP should have relieved ANCOP from their assignment as the “hold” force, thus freeing up ANCOP *kandaks*. In others, the assignments are completely outside of from ANCOP key tasks; these include guarding Parliament and banks. Current requirements also result in the deployment of the ANCOP Special Support *kandaks* for combat missions, which removes medical, engineering and transport capabilities from the owning brigade. There are insufficient personnel remaining to act as a reserve *kandak* for quick-reaction forces or a civil unrest response force. The ANCOP also face challenges in coordination and joint operations with the ANA and NDS.

## **Afghan Border Police**

The ABP consists of 23,000 patrolmen, NCOs and officers. It is organized into six zones and one regional command in Kabul. The ABP is responsible for the security of the Afghan border, collection of fees and duties on imports and exports, and control all of the entry control points into and out of Afghanistan. This includes border crossings, railroad entry points, and airports. They are also responsible for protecting the interior of Afghanistan up to 50 kilometers (km) from the border. Operationally they report directly to the MOI, but also have reporting duties to the MOF because of the duties and fees they collect.

As a police force the ABP is struggling, but improving. Much of this struggle stems from growing pains in manpower, technology and training. The ABP as a force has grown significantly in the span of three years. While growing their manpower they have also implemented technological innovations to improve their management of people and supplies. These innovations, such as the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS) and the Personnel Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES), will lead to long-term benefits for the ABP. However, these growth areas face difficulties in implementation.

Logistics, personnel management, and fundamental police skills are in place but need to be better utilized. The ABP has been given the foundation for all of these skills, but these skills deteriorate when the ABP is misused as a more conventional security force, which often happens. Logistically, the ABP struggles to identify and fill supply gaps before they become a problem, but once they become a problem ABP still lags in fixing them. The ABP also operates in some of the most rugged and remote terrain in the world.

Patronage networks and corruption remain a major challenge. Both of these are still rampant in the ABP. While coalition forces have worked with the Afghans to reduce these challenges, most data indicates that corruption is still widespread and that patronage networks are one of the main ways to get promoted in the ABP. Another long-term concern is cross-pillar communication. There exist significant communication gaps when the ABP conducts operations that involve the ANA. Often these gaps lead to failed operations and in some cases the death of patrolmen.

Overall, there is reason to be cautiously optimistic about the future of the ABP. Despite the setbacks mentioned above, there are very capable leaders within the ABP command structure, who if allowed to flourish, will be a great benefit to the future of the organization. The Afghans have taken a lead in much of the training, which will allow for them to field their own personnel in the future. Recent events at MOI could also have a great effect on the future. The newly appointed Minister of the Interior and Deputy Minister of Security have recently fired several highly placed individual in the MOI due to their corrupt practices. In the short term this appears to be a positive step forward, but the long-term will determine whether this is an actual attempt to stop corruption or merely a move to make spaces for people from their own patronage network.

### **Afghan Uniformed Police**

The AUP, along with all other ANSF pillars, assumed the lead role for security in Afghanistan during June 2013, and is in the process of assuming the lead in the layered security concept. There are approximately 85,000 personnel currently assigned to the AUP. The AUP is making significant progress in addressing some of its capability gaps, such as C-IED and literacy, but corruption and lack of accountability among AUP leaders remains a problem.

One of the greatest challenges of the AUP within the last six months has been the implementation of its new C2 structure. There has been no apparent progress in addressing this problem. The presence of untrained policemen within the fielded force has also been a significant problem for the AUP; however, the MOI General Training Command, in conjunction with General Recruiting Command, is making significant progress toward rectifying this training challenge.

The AUP is effective in the performance of security-related functions. It has successfully executed the “hold” phase of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in some areas. The AUP remains ineffective in regard to traditional police functions such as evidence based operations

and community policing. It has detained insurgents based on accurate intelligence, but then released them because there was not enough evidence to prosecute them.

AUP strengths include leadership at the tactical level, personnel strength, and equipment fielding. AUP weaknesses include their inability to communicate and coordinate with other ANP and ANSF pillars, lack of accountability and maintenance of equipment, and lack of merit-based promotion and appointment system.

The AUP continues to face a shortage of officers and NCOs. To make up the NCO shortage, MOI Recruiting Command has focused on recruiting NCOs, and to date, they are averaging 1,046 NCO recruits per month. In general, however, suitable officer and NCO candidates take time to identify and train. ISAF expects this shortage to decrease in the coming year.

Major capability shortfalls include MEDEVAC and CASEVAC, literacy, logistics, coordination and execution of joint operations, effective C2 structure and guidance from MOI, professional development and merit-based promotions, and evidence-based operations training and execution. Of these, progress is most evident in literacy development.

### **Police Special Forces**

GDPSU provides the MOI CT, CN, and other specialized policing capability for high threat areas. It also provides a high-end crisis response capability for Kabul. Reporting to the Deputy Minister for Security, GDPSU consists of a two-star national HQ and the following units: three National Mission Units (NMUs), including the Crisis Response Unit (CRU) 222, the Commando Force (CF) 333, and the Afghan Territorial Force (ATF) 444; 19 Provincial Response Companies (PRCs); the Investigative Surveillance Unit (ISU); and two training centers, the Special Police Training Center (SPTC) in Wardak and the Special Police Training Wing (SPTW) in Logar. In May 2013, 14 out of the 19 PRCs and NMUs received one of the top two ratings (capable or fully capable). These units are the most capable units in the MOI, and are among the best units across the entirety of ANSF.

All GDPSU units are improving and are on track to achieve the ability to operate independently before NSOCC-A ends its partnering mission with these units. At the end of May 2013, the CRU was assessed as independent with advisors, indicating that this unit now is capable of independently planning and conducting operations. This was the first unit in the GDPSU to reach this status, but advising and mentoring of the unit will continue because of the importance of this national mission unit.

GDPSU manning is improving steadily and is now over 80 percent in the aggregate with only the SPTC and the GDPSU HQ below 75 percent of *tashkil*. These percentages fell somewhat as a result of a recent increase in *tashkil*, even though actual manning increased.

Notwithstanding positive progress, GDPSU units still confront a number of challenges. There is no intermediate HQ between GDPSU HQ and the PRCs, raising concerns about GDPSU C2, particularly for geographically dispersed units. The PRCs can be tasked by HQ GDPSU and



PCoPs, complicating C2 issues. As with many parts of GIRoA, these dynamics are heavily influenced by the relationships and personalities of those involved, rather than the official chain of command. These C2 problems were exacerbated during the reporting period by turnover of commanders. The commander of GDPSU left during the reporting period, and the force is now being led by the deputy commander. The GDPSU is a small organization, and finding competent officers for all positions has been a challenge. Bolstering the number of capable leaders in GDPSU is now a major focus for NSOCC-A.

Officially, GDPSU is supported by the MOI logistics system. Like many units in this system, they are faced with problems acquiring ammunition, spare parts, weapons, uniforms and other equipment in a timely manner. Often, GDPSU units depend upon ad-hoc and ISAF-facilitated arrangements to get equipment out to personnel in the field.

Attrition is also still an issue in GDPSU units operating in regions of Afghanistan where the situation is more unstable, but even these units are growing and developing in a positive direction. Reducing or eliminating the pay disparity between different elements of the ANP could increase retention; however, this problem requires an Afghan solution.

## **2.9: AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION FORCE<sup>18</sup>**

The APPF is an MOI-managed State Owned Enterprise (SOE) established by Presidential decree to conduct all non-diplomatic commercial, development fixed-site and convoy security services. The APPF is intended to replace Private Security Companies (PSCs). Within the last two years, the APPF has made significant progress, and has successfully demonstrated a growing capability to perform the security services formerly performed by PSCs. Specifically; they are currently carrying out successful convoy security, while also providing effective ISAF base security, and security for governmental, international and non-governmental organizations. The APPF face a number of challenges, however, and are a much less mature force than the other security forces in Afghanistan. The APPF requires fundamental legal, structural, and financial management reforms to ensure long-term viability.

As recently as 2011, the APPF demonstrated limited capacity to conduct sufficient security operations, and ISAF developed a bridging strategy which allowed PSCs to continue security operations on ISAF bases and escort functions for ISAF convoys. This bridging strategy expired on March 20, 2013. Since then, only verbal assurances have been given there will be no enforcement of Presidential Decree 62. The 2013 Bridging Strategy does not extend to convoy security functions. Renewing an official SOE Charter would remove many of the legal questions surrounding the APPF. The Minister of the Interior signed a memorandum on September 2, 2013, recommending a two-year extension of the SOE Charter and sent it to the Afghan National Security Council (NSC) for approval. As of the end of the reporting period, however, the charter had not been approved.

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<sup>18</sup> This section is submitted in accordance with section 1531(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.

## **APPF Size and Composition**

The APPF has more than 20,000 total employees, approximately 400 contracts presently in place, and has successfully escorted about 136,000 transport trucks to date. However, their ability to develop further capability has been strained over the reporting period. The APPF continues to refine their convoy operations and, after an internal review, they have consolidated to eight *kandaks* from nine. The United States is not providing any defense articles to the APPF.

## **APPF Recruiting and Training**

Current recruiting is able to meet the demands of the APPF's capacity to provide security. The limiting factor is not in the number of guards, but rather the equipment (particularly weapons and ammunition) and vehicles available to support the APPF security missions. Training production capacity was recently at 450 guards per month which meets current demands. However, as future requirements will grow with ISAF base transitions, increased convoy mission requirements, and government projects, and training requirements are expected to exceed today's training capabilities. To mitigate this shortfall, a new training facility has been constructed and is operational. This new facility will increase APPF capacity to 1,200 trainees per month. Additionally, APPF lacks an internal ability to develop instructors, who in turn train security guards. A master instructor program is under development with an anticipated completion date of December 2014. This program is scheduled to be fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining full spectrum security services at that time, and will need only occasional oversight visits.

## **APPF Assessment**

The APPF is an immature organization and faces a number of challenges. The PPBE functions are non-existent or nascent within the APPF Business Group. Many actions are completed in a once-only context and are not incorporated in a systematic process. Policy development and enforcement are not currently sustainable, and the APPF still require assistance on sustainability programs related to customer service, recurrent training of security guards, budgeting, and other business-related functions.

Corruption remains a major concern with the APPF. However, shortly after taking office, the new leadership team at the MOI removed several APPF personnel on allegations of corruption. As of the end of the reporting period, the effects of these actions were unclear, but indicated a renewed effort to reform the APPF.

The APPF remains postured to transition PSCs to APPF. In each instance, the majority of site PSC personnel transitioned directly to the site's APPF guard force. The APPF have been successful at performing international, governmental, and non-governmental fixed-site security.

The APPF has begun conducting some convoy security operations. However, the transition into full convoy security responsibility throughout Afghanistan continues to stress APPF operations,

and these operations are not currently sustainable without advisor assistance. The APPF lags in the leadership and managerial aspects of convoy security, but are minimally able to address immediate problems associated with convoy operations sustainability (i.e., replacing ammunition, personnel, and equipment). The APPF needs sustainment planning to replace lost vehicles, initial and recurrent training programs for convoy guards and leaders, *kandak* infrastructure, and fuel and ammunition consumption and replacement. Convoy scheduling and execution should be self-sustaining by January, 2014; however it is challenged in doing so effectively and efficiently. The convoy operation is also plagued by corruption largely involving pilferage of ISAF fuel shipments.

APPF C2 procedures are informal and ineffective at getting critical and routine information from the convoy or site commanders to the ANSF. An RMC previously ran national and regional operations centers for APPF convoys, but in line with anti-corruption and reform efforts, the APPF terminated its relationship with that RMC in September, 2013. Convoy and associated business functions may degrade in the near term during the transition period, and eventually recover after the APPF builds capability.

APPF internal processes are currently not sufficiently robust to execute ISAF base transitions without advisor assistance and oversight. Three ISAF sites have transitioned successfully on schedule, but a large number of bases are scheduled to transfer in the near future. Under the APPF security apparatus, there have been no gaps in security at these ISAF sites. As GIRoA improves transparency and incorporates merit-based personnel advancement practices, it will become better equipped to support the development and longer-term success of the APPF by facilitating much needed institutional development of sustainable financial programming and management practices.

The APPF continues to assume responsibility for all convoy security services in Afghanistan, although it continues to struggle in this area. The APPF has eight operational convoy *kandaks*. ISAF continues to work with the GIRoA to ensure that the APPF remains viable and is effective in its mission. In accordance with ISAF procedures, APPF personnel will be held accountable when they are suspected of human rights abuses.

### **APPF Measures of Effectiveness**

The APPF is presently assessed as CM-3, or partially capable of conducting full spectrum security services with coalition forces) and borders on CM-2B, or capable of planning, executing, and sustaining full spectrum security services with advisory support). The main factor affecting the APPF's CM rating is its immature headquarters.

## **2.10: LOCAL DEFENSE INITIATIVES**

Village Stability Operations (VSO) and the ALP are complementary components of both the ISAF and Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) COIN strategy. The VSO is an umbrella term for a collection of governance and development programs at the village

level that are linked to the ALP. The VSO/ALP programs aim to promote progress along three lines of operation: governance, development, and security. VSO and the ALP have made substantial progress in protecting and mobilizing rural populations, preventing exploitation by the insurgency and expanding the influence of the Afghan government. Efforts to transition from the ISAF-led VSO/ALP program to an Afghan-led program continued during the reporting period.

### **Village Stability Operations<sup>19</sup>**

As of September 12, 2013, SOJTF-A has over 60 Special Operations Teams accounting for over 800 personnel directly engaged in VSO. Additionally, there are enabler teams including Civil Affairs, Military Information Support Teams, and others accounting for an additional 170 personnel.

### **Afghan Local Police**

The ALP, a village-based security force administered by the MOI, is the principal component of the VSO initiative. The program utilizes U.S. SOF, coalition forces, and other ANSF to train Afghans in rural areas to defend their communities against threats from insurgents and militant groups. The ALP is a defensive police force; members do not go on offensive patrols and are not heavily armed. ALP units primarily man checkpoints in the vicinity of their village. When a checkpoint is attacked, the ALP defend themselves and their village until more capable ANA or ANP arrive to conduct offensive operations.


ALP expansion is on its projected course and expected to reach 28,500 by February, 2014 and 30,000 by December, 2014. The ALP appears to be one of the most resilient institutions in the ANSF. It is heavily targeted by EIAs resulting in the highest casualty rate, while recording one of the lowest monthly attrition rates of all ANSF. As of October 1, 2013, the total number of ALP Guardians stands at about 24,000.

VSO-validated ALP are currently serving in 119 districts in 29 provinces. When the ALP reaches their currently projected end strength of 30,000, there will be ALP in 136 total districts. The locations of ALP units are shown in Figure 16.

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<sup>19</sup> For a basic description of the VSO program, please see the volume of this report published in December 2012.

Figure 16: ALP Locations and Development Status



ALP WEEKLY DISPOSITION		
District Categorization	Districts	ALP On Hand
District Overwatch (Tier 1)	25	4,466
Provincial Overwatch (Tier 2)	17	2,629
Completed Transition to GIRoA (Tier 3)	77	17,112
Unendorsed	0	0
Unvalidated	51	79 *
Totals	170	24,286
* - Category Pending		

## Impact of Transition

All ALP Districts are on track to transition to complete GIRoA control by October 2014. NSOCC-A is focused on a comprehensive plan to responsibly transition these districts. A component of this planning also includes advisor and ministerial engagement at the headquarters level with the ALP Special Operations Advisory Group. The intent of this engagement is to enhance comprehensive oversight and effective employment of the program by Afghan leadership.

VSO is a bottom-up program that is built around the premise of improving local governance, development, and security. When VSO is correctly administered, village leadership is tied into district, provincial, and national governance to provide a self-sustaining system where village concerns, personnel, and logistics issues can be addressed once ALP are fielded. When a district has met certain established benchmarks, the district convenes a *shura* to codify commitment to GIRoA and support for the ALP. This *shura* is typically attended by district and provincial leadership (PGOV/DGOV, PCOP/DCOP), village elders, as well as representation from the MOI. This *shura* concludes by officially validating the district and ALP *tashkil*, and signals the start of the ALP fielding process.

Village elders in the validated district vet individuals (men) of their village to serve as ALP. Under the control and supervision of the MOI, as codified in ALP policy and establishment procedures, candidates are screened and biometrically registered prior to the three-week formal training course at the nearest regional or provincial training center. The training includes core classes on the Afghan Constitution, policies, ethics, rule of law, use of force, and human rights. Additionally, candidates undergo marksmanship, medical, battle drills, checkpoint procedures, and other training relevant to their operational employment. An effort is currently underway to expand and accredit the training course as a four-week program, to allow for expanded instruction on rule of law, fourteen hours of human rights education, and supplemental administrative and logistics classes.

Following graduation from training, the candidate takes his place in his village as an ALP Guardian. SOF teams responsible for ALP mentorship in the district work with leadership to ensure the ALP are part of an integrated security plan with ANP and ANA. The teams assist district leadership with logistic, pay, and personnel issues until systems are sufficiently mature to begin transition to district or provincial over watch. At this point, SOF teams maintain contact with district or provincial leadership, but encourage and assist by advising Afghan leadership to identify and solve problems unilaterally by leveraging their ties to provincial and national governance systems.

The final stage of VSO/ALP development is CTTG. At this stage, the district has theoretically demonstrated sustainable operational, intelligence, logistics, recruiting, training, and pay systems. The ALP is an integrated part of the layered security apparatus in the district and province, and SOF teams maintain only passive interaction via relationships with ANSF officials, interactions at regional and provincial training facilities, and other reporting mechanisms. However, in some limited areas, districts transition to CTTG because of a lack of

available ISAF forces to continue over watch. In these cases, NSOCC-A continues to monitor the districts through indirect means.

As a likely result of the evolving security transition, ANSF casualties are higher than at any other point in this campaign, and ALP are suffering a disproportionately high share of these casualties. Taking into account force strength, in August, 2013, ALP suffered a monthly casualty rate of 124 per 10,000 Guardians in August 2013, nearly five times higher than the ANA (27/10,000) and more than four times higher than the ANP (32/10,000). Most attacks on ALP are direct fire incidents at checkpoint location, suggesting active targeting by insurgents, and also likely indicating that the ALP is having a positive effect in blunting insurgent successes.

Although efforts have been made to reinforce checkpoints, SOF teams have also been training the ALP to conduct mounted and dismounted defensive patrols, to increase coordination with ANA and ALP for a layered security apparatus, and to improve survivability by utilizing recently acquired C-IED training and equipment.

Team assessments and survey data suggest that gains along the three lines of operation – security, governance, and development – remained steady once districts transitioned from validated to District/Provincial over watch, and even when they Completely Transition to GIROA (CTTG).

## **Insider Threat**

When the VSO methodology is followed properly, the insider threat to ALP has historically been very low. The combination of ALP serving in the villages where they live, village elder vetting, and district and provincial oversight, allow for identification and mitigation of most insider threats. When the VSO methodology is short-cut, the insider threat to ALP is significantly higher. If ALP lack oversight (by village elders, provincial or district leadership) or do not have familial ties to the area, the insurgency has a “head start” towards co-opting ALP for insider attacks.

## **Ongoing Challenges**

Challenges for the ALP reside in two broad areas: administrative and operational effectiveness. Administrative challenges include C2, logistics, training, and pay processes. NSOCC-A is presently focusing its advisory efforts on effecting positive change in these areas. With regard to C2, the ALP does not currently have representation at the National Police Coordination Center (NPCC) or at any of their regional/provincial/district Operational Control Centers. Currently, NSOCC-A is assessing ALP regional and provincial operational, intelligence, and communications architecture. The objective of this initiative is to support MOI efforts to bolster ALP connectivity to and representation at the provincial and regional level.

In terms of logistics, training and pay, the MOI and ALP have made incremental progress, but processes remain somewhat cumbersome bureaucratically. MOI and U.S. advisors are

attempting to address are training of logistics personnel and accurate supply chain record keeping from Kabul to the provinces.

ALP pay processes have experienced steady improvement, primarily due to enhanced efforts to enroll ALP training graduates in the MOI pay system and expand the use of electronic funds transfer for salary payments. This appears to be decreasing graft and improving accuracy and timeliness of the ALP salary payments. However, this remains a serious issue, as reports of delayed or stolen pay continue.

The operational effectiveness of the ALP varies across the provinces, and is a function of many factors including competence, commitment, and integrity of leadership, capability and capacity of the layered ANSF supporting the ALP, and the extent to which the VSO methodology has been employed.

As the community-based component of the layered security apparatus, ALP rely on district and provincial leaders for sustainment, direction, and support. Poor or weak leaders are subject to co-opting by powerbrokers, in some cases delegitimizing the program and undermining its effectiveness. In most districts, the ALP has other ANSF that can serve as both a quick reaction force and as a partnered force. The level at which these layered security forces interact varies widely depending on the region. More emphasis from MOI, deliberate collaboration at the ministerial level with MOD, and emplacement of ALP representatives at key district, provincial and regional C2 nodes could reinforce the ALP ability to provide security at the district and village level.

For a variety of reasons, there are some areas where the current ALP force consists of personnel from outside the village, district, or, in some cases, from outside the province. This is a challenging situation that NSOCC-A is striving to help the Afghans correct, while being mindful of second-order effects such as destabilization that could occur with the removal of “out-of-area” ALP. An Afghan presidential decree directs that all ALP must be from the village or district where they work. Afghan strategic planners recently reinforced this decree by including language in their “ALP Two-Year Plan” prohibiting any “out-of-area ALP.” Out-of-area ALP refers to those Guardians who work in a district or province that is not their home, and have not been approved by the local elders and village leadership. Because local approval and endorsement processes are a fundamental tenet and are critical to the credibility of the ALP program, out-of-area ALP can negatively affect the program’s legitimacy.

The ALP record on human rights and the ALP HQ ability to respond promptly and effectively to accusations of human rights violations are ongoing challenges. NSOCC-A and their ALP Special Operations Advisory Group (SOAG) collaborate regularly with the Human Rights Unit at UNAMA and the ALP HQ Directorate to discuss human rights issues. The most recent UNAMA on the protection of civilians in Afghanistan cited allegations of ALP violations in a few areas of Afghanistan. The ALP HQ Directorate is noted in the UNAMA report as consistently following up on allegations of abuse, resulting in quick dispatching of investigative delegations and field visits. However, UNAMA also notes that local accountability mechanisms still lack an independent capacity to follow-up on allegations, implement recommendations by the ALP



Monitoring and Investigations Unit, and hold perpetrators accountable in a transparent legal investigatory process.

Through focused key leader engagements and enhanced professionalization and education of the ALP force, NSOCC-A and the ALP HQ are committed to eliminating human rights violations within the ALP formation.

## 2.11: ANSF PARTNERING

As seen in Figure 17, the ANSF continue to conduct the vast majority of operations unilaterally. The only unilateral operations that ISAF now conducts are for ISAF security, route clearance to maintain freedom of movement, and redeployment.

**Figure 17: Partnering Status of ANSF Operations**

Operational Category	Apr-13	May-13	Jun-13	Jul-13	Aug-13	Sep-13
ISAF Unilateral Military Ops	2,345	2,494	2,632	2,192	1,303	1,458
ISAF Unilateral Police Ops	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>ISAF Led Unilateral Ops (Total)</b>	<b>2,345</b>	<b>2,494</b>	<b>2,632</b>	<b>2,192</b>	<b>1,303</b>	<b>1,458</b>
ANA Unilateral	13,492	23,601	16,798	13,059	23,432	28,006
ANP Unilateral	16,391	25,025	22,275	18,440	25,565	20,496
<b>ANSF Led Unilateral (Total)</b>	<b>29,883</b>	<b>48,626</b>	<b>39,073</b>	<b>31,499</b>	<b>48,997</b>	<b>48,502</b>
ISAF Led Combined (ANA)	394	198	254	232	177	75
ISAF Led Combined (ANP)	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>ISAF Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total)</b>	<b>394</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>254</b>	<b>232</b>	<b>177</b>	<b>75</b>
ANA Led Combined	624	565	641	591	248	189
ANA Led Enabled	382	226	245	340	279	274
<b>ANA Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total)</b>	<b>1,006</b>	<b>791</b>	<b>886</b>	<b>931</b>	<b>527</b>	<b>463</b>
ANP Led Combined	0	0	0	0	0	0
ANP Led Enabled	427	442	384	272	251	67
<b>ANP Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total)</b>	<b>427</b>	<b>442</b>	<b>384</b>	<b>272</b>	<b>251</b>	<b>67</b>
<b>ANSF Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total)</b>	<b>1,433</b>	<b>1,233</b>	<b>1,270</b>	<b>1,203</b>	<b>778</b>	<b>530</b>
<b>Total Ops</b>	<b>34,055</b>	<b>52,551</b>	<b>43,229</b>	<b>35,126</b>	<b>51,255</b>	<b>50,565</b>
<b>Total ISAF Led Ops</b>	<b>2,739</b>	<b>2,692</b>	<b>2,886</b>	<b>2,424</b>	<b>1,480</b>	<b>1,533</b>
<b>Total ANSF Led Ops</b>	<b>31,316</b>	<b>49,859</b>	<b>40,343</b>	<b>32,702</b>	<b>49,775</b>	<b>49,032</b>
<b>% of Total Ops that are ISAF Led</b>	<b>8%</b>	<b>5%</b>	<b>7%</b>	<b>7%</b>	<b>3%</b>	<b>3%</b>
<b>% of Total Ops that are ANSF Led</b>	<b>92%</b>	<b>95%</b>	<b>93%</b>	<b>93%</b>	<b>97%</b>	<b>97%</b>
	<b>Apr-13</b>	<b>May-13</b>	<b>Jun-13</b>	<b>Jul-13</b>	<b>Aug-13</b>	<b>Sep-13</b>

## 2.12: ANSF ASSESSMENT AND 1221 BENCHMARK REQUIREMENT<sup>20</sup>

GIRoA and ISAF made a deliberate decision several years ago to focus on rapid ANSF growth, followed by the development of enablers and the professionalization of the force. This decision was made with a full understanding that the ANSF, once built to size, would need to develop the

<sup>20</sup> This section, along with the RDLs provided in Annex A, are submitted consistent with section 1221 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.

more complex institutional capabilities necessary to make the force self-sustainable. The ANSF is now near most of its force growth goals. In light of this, ISAF has shifted the focus of its assistance to the ANSF to the five operational pillars deemed key to long-term sustainability: leadership, command and control (C2), sustainment and logistics, combined arms integration, and training. As part of this shift, ISAF has changed the focus of its ANSF assessments to focus more on capability, rather than force growth. As such, many of the benchmarks previously provided in this report to meet the 1221 requirement have been modified. Appendix A is submitted in fulfillment of Section 1221 (cite the statute).


The Command Unit Assessment Tools (CUAT) system of operational assessments was replaced in September 2013 by the RC ANSF Status Report (RASR) in order to adapt to SFAT resource constraints and to better assess the varying branches of the ANSF. The RASR system improves upon the CUAT in a number of ways. It provides a systems approach to analyzing the friction points in manning, equipping and training the ANA; is simpler to use; it is more focused on sustainment; more closely tracks the five pillars of ANSF sustainability; better tracks “cradle to grave” (fielding through successful employment in combat) data; tracks garrison/infrastructure issues; and uses distinct rating criteria for each of the major ANSF components. The RASR assesses 85 ANA and ANP headquarters and units that were deemed most vital to the mission. The July RASR assessed 54 of these 85 key headquarters and units as either fully capable or capable, the two highest of seven rating definition levels. In August the number of key headquarters and units rated as either fully capable or capable rose to 57, and the number of units waiting fielding decreased from eight to seven.

ISAF uses a large number of assessment systems to analyze virtually every aspect of the conflict in Afghanistan, and these systems are constantly being reformed to better reflect the dynamics of a rapidly changing situation. Creation of the RASR system represents the fifth ISAF reform of its ANSF assessment system rating definition levels since 2010. These reforms have been made in response to changing conditions on the ground, changing ANSF capabilities and size, and changing ISAF force levels and security assistance systems. ISAF will continue to analyze its ANSF assessment systems regularly, and will continue to reform these systems as necessary.

**Figure 18: ANA RASR Ratings**

Rating Definition Levels (RDLs)	Corps/ Div HQ	IN Bde	Corps ENG KDK	Corps SIG KDK	Corps/ DIV MI KDK	OCC-R	AUP Type-A HQ	ABP Zone HQ	ANCOP Bde HQ	MSF KDK	Total RASR Assessed Units
Fully Capable	1	10	0	0	0	2	3	2	4	1	23
Capable	6	14	1	0	2	4	2	4	1	1	35
Partially Capable	0	0	2	3	2	1	2	1	0	0	11
Developing	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Established	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Not Assessed	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	2	2	7
Awaiting Fielding	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	3	7
Total	7	24	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	85

Figure 19: ANA RASR Ratings Map



## ANA Summary

The RASR system assessed the ANA in the following areas:

**Combined Arms Operations.** Twenty of 24 brigades are capable or fully capable of planning and conducting joint and combined arms operations with minimal to no coalition assistance. Contributing factors limiting the remaining brigades continue to revolve around the inability to plan and ineffective coordination with the ANP.

**Leadership.** Twenty-two of 24 brigades report positive to very positive command environments within the organizations. This remains steady from the last reporting period. 2/203 Corps is assessed as having a neutral command environment.


**Command and Control.** Ninety-two percent of brigades are reported as being capable or fully capable of conducting effective command and control. Two brigades, 2/203 and 4/215, continue to be assessed as only partly capable. Inability to battle track and poor staff planning are the two primary issues still facing the brigades' ability to improve their command and control.

**Sustainment.** Nineteen brigades are capable of sustaining themselves in combat for 48 hours or more. Of these, six are capable of 96 hours or more. Brigade-level issues impacting unit sustainment operations continue to revolve around the inability to incorporate logistics into the planning process, unavailability of logistics personnel, and lack of understanding of logistics forecasting.

**Training.** SFAT reporting indicates that training remains the primary weakness at the brigade level and below. Seventy-three percent of the brigades are assessed as being capable or fully capable of conducting training. Many of the units are reliant on corps-, contractor-, or SFAT-provided training. The force as a whole continues to struggle with implementation of an operational cycle.

The ANA continues to advance toward achieving a fully capable rating. Ninety-six percent of the ANA Brigades are at capable or fully capable.

Figure 20: ANP RASR Ratings Map



## ANP Summary

The RASR system assessed the ANP in the following areas:

**Law Enforcement Operations.** Security Force Assistance Advisor Team (SFAAT) reporting continues to paint a positive picture of the ANP, with 90 percent of units assessed as capable to fully capable of conducting law enforcement operations. The ABP remains the ANP Pillar needing the most assistance. SFAAT continue to report inability of basic combat skills, low manning numbers and marginal leadership in the ABP. This combination of problems hampers the ABP's ability to secure the borders and border crossing points. SFAAT reporting indicates that the ANCOP may be over-tasked in supporting both the ANP and the ANA and only have limited opportunities to conduct law enforcement operations.

**Leadership.** Seventeen of 19 units are assessed as having positive or very positive command climates. Leadership continues to be a strong characteristic across two of the three assessed ANP pillars. In the ABP, there continue to be leadership personality issues, marginal performance and weakness in the areas of current analysis and future planning.

**Command and Control.** Seventeen of 19 units assessed are rated as capable or fully capable in execution of C2. Cell phones continue to be the preferred means of communication.

**Sustainment.** Seventeen of 19 units are reported as capable or fully capable of self-sustainment for periods between 48 and 72 hours. It is reported that the ABP is unable to sustain themselves in high threat locations for longer than 48 hours. The complex sustainment system, an unwillingness to be proactive, and lack of record keeping are the issues preventing units from developing past their current levels.

**Training.** Training continues to be a shortfall across the three assessed ANP pillars. Although 18 of 19 assessed units are capable or fully capable in training, SFAAT reporting indicates insufficient training space, lack of training records, lack of initiative, and for ABP, lack of training aides, to be the major issues.

The ANP continue to advance toward achieving a fully capable rating. Eighty-nine percent of the ANP brigade-level units are at capable or fully capable. Two ANP units remain in the “developing” stage in at least one of the five pillars. Correctly assigning critical specialist personnel continues to be a major issue with the ANP.

### **ANSF Self-assessment**

There are two distinct on-going efforts to assist the ANSF in developing or improving their internal readiness reporting systems. Both the ANA and ANP recognized that their current systems were not functional and asked ISAF for assistance finding a solution built on ANA and ANP policies and procedures, respectively.

The ANA have started a combined operational planning team (C-OPT) with the NTM-A and IJC Campaign and Transition Assessments Group (CATG) to improve their current readiness reporting system (RRS). The General Staff Chief Operations (GSG3) RRS section is in the lead and has made good progress with the project. Having completed a review of their entire system and identified the areas that need improving, the C-OPT is working to overcome or mitigate these gaps and seams. Additionally, at the request of the C-OPT, General Sher Mohammed Karimi has authorized an additional 168 readiness officers to the GSG3 RRS section for placement at all brigade and separate *kandak* and higher headquarters. The GSG3 is in the process of identifying these officers who will then attend a two to three week training course run by the GSG3 RRS section. These readiness officers will assist unit commanders with preparation of the report, bridge the literacy gap at the *kandak* and lower levels, and serve as a verification team for the subordinate unit reports. The improved readiness reporting system is scheduled for initial implementation by November 2013 with full implementation by the beginning of SY 1393, or March 2014.

The ANP assessment system is not as advanced as the ANA's system, and is more of a logistical reporting than a readiness report. In addition, the current plan focuses more on capabilities and capacity to conduct law enforcement activities and does not fully assess the ANP role in COIN and regional layered security. The actual use of these reports by ANP commanders is inconsistent. The ANP is being assisted by the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB). The IPCB has initiated a ground-up approach that involves sending five groups of 20 police officers abroad for a three-to-four week training course on the fundamentals of readiness reporting and the development and execution of a readiness system. These officers will develop the ANP readiness system during the course. By the conclusion of the fifth course, the system is projected to be complete and ready for initial implementation. Full implementation is projected for early SY 1393

## **2.13: ANSF BUDGET**

### **Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)**

The ASFF provides the resources to train, equip, and sustain up to 352,000 ANSF and 30,000 ALP. For FY2013, Congress appropriated \$5.1 billion for ASFF, a decrease of \$0.6 billion from the President's budget request of \$5.7 billion. This reduction followed the COMISAF review of ANSF requirements as well as realized efficiencies and cost avoidance opportunities.

### **International Community Funding**

The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CTSC-A) executes the NATO ANA Trust Fund, which is crucial for support and sustainment of the ANA. Twenty-three nations have contributed more than \$761 million over the life of the fund. The United States, as well as CSTC-A, continues to work through diplomatic channels and international organizations to encourage Allies and partners to continue providing assistance for the sustainment of ANSF. At the May 2012 Chicago NATO Summit, NATO and ISAF partner nations made a political commitment to provide funding for ANSF sustainment after ISAF's mandate ends in 2014. An enduring ANSF, as envisaged by the international community, requires a force of about 230,000 personnel with an estimated annual budget of approximately \$4.1 billion. Given Afghanistan's current economic and fiscal constraints, the international community pledged about \$1 billion per year for three years for the ANSF, beginning in 2015. The Afghan government will provide \$500 million a year during the same period and will progressively increase its contribution over time. The U.S. pledged to seek \$2.5B per year.

### **Direct Contributions to the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior**

During the reporting period, CSTC-A allocated \$1.26 billion in direct contributions to the MOD to procure items in their operations and acquisition accounts. The MOD executed \$487 million of direct contributions over eight months to pay for salaries, goods and services, and

procurement solely through Afghan financial systems, procurement systems, and the requirements process.

During the reporting period, CSTC-A also allocated \$453 million in direct contributions to the MOI to expand the ability to procure items in the MOI operations and acquisitions accounts. The MOI executed \$84 million in direct contributions over eight months for payment of ALP salaries, good and services, and procurements solely through Afghan financial systems, procurement systems, and the requirements process. ANP salaries and food are executed through Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).

CSTC-A cooperates with its Afghan partners to closely monitor these systems with liaison personnel embedded in Afghan ministries to help build enduring sustainment capabilities in planning, budgeting, and acquisition. Further improvement of key ministerial processes will help mitigate risks to the development and sustainment of self-sufficient Afghan security institutions and capabilities.

## International Donations

**Figure 21: NATO ANA Trust Fund Donations (March 6, 2013 to August 1, 2013)**

<b>Donor Country</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Donation (\$US)</b>
Luxembourg	March 6, 2013	\$4,916,160
Australia	April 29, 2013	\$40,000,000
Italy	April 26, 2013	\$682,500
Italy	May 28, 2013	\$682,500

## 2.14: INFRASTRUCTURE

ISAF continues to transfer safe, securable, and sustainable infrastructure to the ANSF. When transferring infrastructure coalition forces are conscious of the long term capacity of GIRoA to sustain this infrastructure. To assist sustainability, aging or unsafe infrastructure is de-scoped prior to transfer, leaving the ANSF with infrastructure to be used as temporary bases while new buildings are completed or. Alternately, permanent infrastructure is offsets the building of new infrastructure in order to deliver facilities earlier and save coalition funds. ISAF is currently responsible for managing the maintenance of facilities constructed for GIRoA use, but not for infrastructure transferred to GIRoA.

Great care and consideration is being taken when deciding to transfer a base to ensure GIRoA has the capacity to maintain each transferred base in a safe, secure, and sustainable manner for the expected duration of its operation. ISAF has commenced transferring the responsibility of maintaining facilities from the U.S. Army Corps Engineers (USACE)-run "National Operation and Maintenance (O&M) contract" to Afghan management. Effective December 1, 2013, ISAF will only be adding the most critical infrastructure to the National O&M Contract.



## 2.15: PROCUREMENT

CSTC-A continued to focus its procurement priorities on obtaining equipment and services that increase the capabilities of the ANSF. During this critical period of transition to Afghan-led combat operations, CSTC-A prioritized the improvement of ANSF capability in the following areas: airlift capability, C-IED, and general military sustainment/training. The emphasis has shifted from fielding and equipping the ANSF to enabling a sustainable force. Previous coalition investments to field and equip an effective fighting force will be at risk if the ANSF is unable to develop enabling capabilities such as sustainment.

During this period, CSTC-A helped the ANSF increase its aviation capability for the SMW by finalizing the contract for 30 Mi-17s purchased last year. Delivery of these airframes in the coming months will enable the SMW to train night vision goggle-qualified crews faster, maintain and increase support to ASSF operations, and field four geographically dispersed squadrons. Additionally, CSTC-A delivered the first of four C-130s that will be provided to the Afghans to fulfill a critical medium lift capacity as IASF draws down.

IEDs are a leading cause of ANSF casualties. Providing additional C-IED capabilities increases ANSF force protection and is intended to save lives. A variety of equipment has been procured this reporting period including frequency jammers, bomb suits, and robots for ANSF Route Clearance Companies.

As the ANSF assumed the security lead across the country, they have been provided general military items in order to enable, preserve, and sustain operations. These items include ballistic guard shacks, small arms and crew-served weapons, ammunition, and equipment sustainment parts. In addition to providing end items to equip the ANSF, training contracts were leveraged to enhance the capabilities of the ANSF.

## 2.16: WOMEN IN THE ANSF<sup>21</sup>

DoD maintains a robust program dedicated to improving the recruitment, retention, and treatment of women in the ANSF, and to improving the status of Afghan women in general. This program is centered on Gender Advisors, who educate personnel, ensure that women's rights and security are factored into decisions throughout ISAF, and coordinate the efforts of their subcommands and external international organizations, NGOs, and governmental organizations. Other components of this program are run through NTM-A and CSTC-A's ANSF development programs. Senior leader engagements also regularly focus on this issue, including a meeting in September 2103 between COMIASF, the NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR), the Afghan Minister of Women's Affairs, and several female Wolesi Jirga members. However, the implementation of a gender policy within Afghanistan's armed forces and police is a complex and long-term project. A major focus of DoD and others working to improve the

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<sup>21</sup> This section, along with the *Women in Afghanistan* section, is submitted consistent with section 1223 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.

conditions of women in Afghanistan is now to maintain the gains made in the last twelve years after the ISAF mission ends.

The ANA and AAF staffing goal for women is 10 percent of their combined *tashkil*. At the end of the reporting period, there were 502 female soldiers in the ANA and 34 female airmen in the AAF, a small increase over the last report. MOD leadership states that institutional barriers to the recruitment of women stems from traditional and cultural biases and that ethnic balancing goals have also impeded ANA gender integration. Additionally, they claim many families do not want their daughters to join the ANA because of concerns for their security, and for cultural reasons. In spite of this, women continue to show an interest in joining the ANA. Unfortunately, the MOD has failed to capitalize on this interest and organize the necessary initial training, such as Female Officer Candidate and NCO courses. ISAF advisors continue to mentor the MOD to reduce their emphasis on ethnic balancing in order to accelerate ANA gender integration.

MOD advisors continually work with senior MOD leadership to develop a strategy that will meet the Afghan Constitution's intentions for full female participation in society and address local conservative cultural norms. This policy reaffirms the Afghans commitment to meet the female recruitment and retention goal. The policy seeks to reinforce the Afghan Constitution while addressing practical cultural concerns, to identify non-combat Military Occupational Specialties for women, and to provide females the opportunity to select a geographical location so that they may live with their families.

Reaching the goal of 10 percent females in the force has been a challenge. During this reporting period 25 women were recruited for basic training. In addition, 13 more women have started the four-year officer program at the National Military Academy-Afghanistan (NMAA), with an expected graduation in 2017. There are 16 women currently studying at the NMAA, and they are expected to graduate in 2016. On Afghan Independence Day, 55 female officers and six female NCOs were promoted. As of August 2013, there were 12 female sophomores and 11 female freshmen at the Afghan National Defense University.

Gender integration is slowly beginning to gain momentum, as indicated by the signing of the Female Accession Management Policy by the Minister of Defense. This policy, along with other revisions to some general recruiting policies, better take women's specific needs into account. For example, the Female Accession Management Policy eliminates the isolation of females by requiring no fewer than three women per duty location, and emphasizes the role of training for females in the ANA. The policy further addresses women's issues by requiring the investigation and prosecution of all who commit offenses against female military personnel. The MOD is hoping to recruit females in major Afghan cities into specific officer and NCO billets. This approach will allow females to select a specialty and geographic location at the time they are in-processed. Females who need to live near their home can select a geographic location that allows that option, while women who need to live away from their relatives due to any family resistance also have the option to select a geographic location in a safer region. This pinpoint recruiting also affords the training community time to schedule career management field courses for females, and allows them the opportunity to bring training assets to the females, rather than

have them attend schools away from their homes. Additionally, the female training battalion is seeking permission to allow cadets the ability to return to their homes in the evenings.

The SY 1392 *tashkil* authorizes 3,163 female ANP billets, an increase of 663 from last year. At the end of this reporting period, the number of women in the ANP totals 1,557 with 847 officers and NCOs and 710 patrolmen, an increase of 36 women over last reporting period. Low female recruitment is due in part to the MOI's passive female recruitment efforts, which has no specific female recruitment strategy or plan. The promotion of female recruitment efforts has been restricted by limited media exposure and occasional *shuras*, working groups, and conferences.

While the ANP has more female members than the ANA, many PCoPs do not allow females to fill authorized AUP billets. There are many reasons: a preference for male recruits, lack of adequate facilities, cultural influences, inability of women to work night shifts, lack of day-care facilities, etc. However, literate women are often assigned positions at the NCO and officer positions commensurate with their education levels. ISAF advisors continue to work with their Afghan principals to identify provinces amenable to receiving more females and to encourage ANP General Recruiting Command to recruit females to fill vacant billets.

ANP recruitment of females has fallen short of expected levels. However, there has been a growing shift toward more areas of recruitment providing necessary facilities and security to support females in the police force. Furthermore, a number of the gender positions have been realigned and there are efforts being made to place females in these positions. For example, the 119 call centers are placing female police in charge of cadres of female civil servants.<sup>22</sup> Under the support of the Chief of Staff, female police were recruited to oversee female civil servants, which provide 24-hour access to female callers. Despite these improvements, cultural and political challenges to gender integration remain an obstacle to expected advancement, and require on-going attention from higher administrative levels. The lack of female facilities also remains a problem.

The ANSF need to improve recruitment, training, utilization, and treatment of female ANSF members in order to interact with female suspects, victims, and witnesses in a manner consistent with Afghan custom and law. There will be approximately 22,000 polling centers and stations in Afghanistan during the April 2014 Afghan elections, but the ANSF currently has only 2,017 women members. The lack of female ANSF members for both routine security operations and the 2014 Afghan elections makes the ANSF gender gap an operational and political risk for GIRoA. Failure to recruit more women could deter female voter turnout, harming the legitimacy of the ANSF and those elected to office in 2014. ISAF advisors continue to work with the ANSF in this sensitive but important matter.

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<sup>22</sup> The Afghan emergency phone number is 119, analogous to 911 used in the United States.

## **SECTION 3 – GOVERNANCE**

### **3.1: ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL GOVERNANCE**

Afghanistan's national institutions continue to improve their ability to provide constitutional, stable, effective, and responsive governance, but still face sizeable challenges. The significant gains in education, health, access to electricity and rural development made over the past decade have continued during this reporting period. The Afghan government is slowly increasing its technical capacity to govern through civil service reforms and the entry of a more educated population into the workforce.

Corruption, ineffective program monitoring, budget shortfalls at all levels, inability to generate revenue, and limited public financial management capacity continue to plague the national government. Weak cooperation between national and sub-national levels of the government hampers significant long-term sustainability and limits people's access to public goods. At the sub-national level, official government services are largely restricted to provincial and district centers despite efforts to improve capacity and extend government services to rural areas.

Among the three branches of the Afghan government, the executive branch continues to wield the most power and frequently directs legislative and judicial action. Despite this, national institutions increasingly collaborate across the branches to address important governance issues. For example, the passage of the IEC Structure Law and the Electoral Law demonstrated cooperation between the executive and legislative branches to work toward a common goal. Meanwhile, the judicial branch, with the assistance of the international community, is making incremental progress with regard to training and staffing sub-national judicial positions. Constrained freedom of movement due to security concerns, however, impedes the expansion of rule of law, especially at the district level. Lengthy periods required for formal dispute resolution through the government feeds perceptions that the government is ineffective and inaccessible to many rural Afghans.

### **3.2: ASSESSMENT OF SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE**

The Afghan government structure remains highly centralized, with the MOF and other central ministries in Kabul controlling budgeting and spending authority. Line directorates implement service delivery in the provinces, sometimes with little input from provincial councils or governors. Lack of human capacity to fill key sub-national government positions, marginalization of civil society, and poor communication between Kabul and local authorities further constrain the execution of sub-national governance objectives. Although sub-national authorities assume coordination, planning, and service-monitoring roles, their effectiveness varies significantly across Afghanistan.

At the national level, a homogenous legal and institutional framework regulates local governance. The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) and Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) set administrative and legal guidance for sub-national

governance activities. Members of Parliament represent their districts in Kabul, while governors, appointed by the central government, are chief administrators of the provinces. Members of local councils, including provincial councils, are elected at the sub-national level and serve their terms among their constituents, but have ill-defined responsibilities and powers. The full discretion of the executive branch to appoint provincial and district governors from Kabul adversely affect local governance.

Parliament is considering several draft laws for improving local governance, including a local government law, a municipality law, and a provincial councils' law, but has not yet voted on them. The cabinet has approved and submitted to Parliament the bill for the provincial councils' law, after stripping it of provisions that assigned supervisory duties to the provincial councils, and limited their role to an advisory body. However, senior legislators have reportedly agreed to revise the bill after the provincial councils lobbied both houses of Parliament.

Sub-national authorities differ widely in their ability to deliver services for their constituents. Some lack reliable mechanisms for learning constituents' needs, and occasional struggles over influence further undermine cooperative engagements among local authorities and coordination with Kabul. The effectiveness of governors, parliamentary representatives, and provincial council members often depends on their access to key decision-makers in Kabul and their ability to illustrate their efforts to secure funding and attention for local areas.

Despite occasional struggles over influence at local levels, sub-national and national authorities have successfully worked together constructively to address crises and national disasters. For example, when floods threatened to submerge parts of Balkh province, the district governor, a delegation of parliamentarians, provincial council members, and the provincial police chief worked together to urge residents to evacuate. The provincial government created several committees to organize distribution of relief supplies. The army took on the role of first responder and rescued residents by moving them with trucks to higher ground.

Most budgetary decisions remain at the national level, with the provinces playing a marginal role in the financial decision-making process. The United States and the greater international community have urged the development of provincial budgeting plans to replace the work of closing provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). In July, the IDLG told international donors that the MOF was developing a provincial budgeting policy that should be finalized by the end of 2013.

### **3.3: REVENUE GENERATION AND BUDGET EXECUTION**

The government of Afghanistan is actively searching for ways to increase revenue generation to maintain critical services as international assistance declines and as military forces withdraw and spend less in the Afghan economy. The need for increased revenue is illustrated by statistics from the World Bank, which shows that civilian and security-related assistance was roughly equivalent to 98 percent of the Afghan GDP in 2010-11. According to the MOF, the total Afghan national core budget for 2013 is \$7.04 billion, including \$3.27 billion operating budget and \$3.77 billion development budget, but the target for revenue is only around \$2.15 billion.

With political, security, and economic transitions underway, assistance will begin to decline. Afghanistan will have to rely more on domestic revenue generation to meet its budgetary needs.

Afghanistan confronts two problems in addressing financial shortfalls: insufficient revenue generation and poor budget execution. By 2021, domestic revenues are expected to cover only 35 percent of projected expenditures. Revenue shortfalls will force Afghanistan to make difficult choices between the public services it provides, balancing costs for security, health and education services, infrastructure projects, and maintenance.

According to recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) reporting, Afghan revenue generation is up, and Afghanistan may be able to reach its IMF-mandated revenue generation target of 114 billion Afghanis. New taxes and corresponding administrative implementation are now underway. Implementation of these taxes, which include property taxes, customs tariffs, business taxes, and agriculture surplus taxes, are showing positive results, producing 82 percent of domestic revenues. Corruption, however, severely limits the government's ability to maximize these revenue streams. Customs duties, which according to the MOF account for roughly half of government tax revenues, are notoriously underreported and are often siphoned off to patronage networks. The MOF plans to introduce a Value-Added Tax (VAT) designed to increase government revenues by 1-2 percent of GDP as early as 2021. As infrastructure development and an improved business environment enable all manner of private sector industries to grow, a stable tax base will provide an opportunity for the Afghan government to become increasingly self-supporting.

Budget execution continues to present a challenge for the Afghan government. Under the TMAF, the Afghan government committed to increasing budget execution to 75 percent by 2017. According to the World Bank, in 2010-11, the Afghan government executed 96 percent of its operating budget but only 46 percent of its development budget. The MOF claims that the government executed 86 and 50 percent respectively in 2012. Capacity constraints at the national and sub-national levels, weak planning and budget formulation, donor earmarks and funding delays, and communication challenges across ministries, donors, and sub-national entities remain challenges for public-sector program implementation and public service delivery.

### **3.4: RULE OF LAW**

The Department of State (State) serves as the lead coordinator for U.S. RoL efforts in Afghanistan, working with several U.S. government stakeholders, including USAID and the Department of Justice (DoJ). State RoL programs continue to support the informal and formal justice sector at national and sub-national levels. State continues to fund projects focused on six lines of effort: 1) formal justice sector capacity building; 2) corrections reform; 3) major crimes; 4) legal education; 5) civil society and access to justice; and 6) gender justice. Related projects are designed to train and build the capacity of Afghan justice officials, including judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, criminal investigators, and prison staff. State funding also assists juvenile justice, anti-corruption efforts, and the case management system.

During this reporting period there have been significant developments with regard to the NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission- Afghanistan (NROLFSM-A) and the Rule of Law Field Force-Afghanistan (ROLFF-A). NROLFSM-A and ROLFF-A are no longer engaged in the field support missions. ROLFF-A ceased supporting the field support mission on August 31, 2013. Currently ROLFF-A's sole mission is the operation of the Justice Center in Parwan. NROLFSM-A deactivated on September 30, 2013.

Despite some improvements in building the capacity of justice officials, RoL continues to be one of GIRoA's weakest areas. Pervasive corruption remains a challenge, and more substantial progress is necessary to effect visible changes in establishing rule of law across the country.

Justice sector security remains a critical vulnerability, with many Afghan justice officials forced to rely upon ad-hoc security arrangements at the provincial and district levels. Judicial officials and prosecutors face continuing attacks, and insurgents now aggressively target justice sector employees, as demonstrated by the Farah provincial courthouse attack in April 2013, and the suicide bomb attack on the buses carrying Supreme Court employees in Kabul in June 2013. The lack of security affects the number of judges and prosecutors willing to work in more rural and less secure provinces and districts. The Judicial Security Unit (JSU) is one factor mitigating the security problem, but the JSU only operates in eight courts in Kabul, in the Parwan provincial court, and recently, within the courthouse in Jalalabad. The JSU is planning to expand its coverage into Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif at an undefined date in the future.

No appreciable change to Afghan popular preference for either the formal or informal justice systems occurred during the reporting period. The populace prefers either option to Taliban processes, but also falls back on the Taliban's system of justice when the courts are absent or perceived to be corrupt. Human rights concerns continue to arise in some informal justice cases. Targeted assassinations of justice sector personnel, general threats to physical safety, and the lack of personal security while traveling or while in courthouses also remain persistent problems. The protection of justice sector personnel appears to be dependent on temporary local solutions.

## **Detention Operations**

On March 25, 2013, the United States and Afghanistan signed an MOU transitioning all detainee operations involving Afghan nationals from the United States to GIRoA. The MOU between the United States and GIRoA was the most recent step in the transition from U.S. Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) detention to sovereign GIRoA authority over detained Afghan nationals. This transition from LOAC-based detention to detention based on Afghan criminal law meets the desires of the President of Afghanistan and supports the broader COIN campaign. The MOU also included the transfer of the majority of the Detention Facility in Parwan, now known as the Afghan National Detention Facility - Parwan (ANDF-P), to Afghanistan. All Afghan nationals in the ANDF-P are in the custody and control of GIRoA, although ISAF continues to advise Afghan forces at the facility.

The Afghan Review Board (ARB), established by the MOU and Afghan Presidential Decree, was envisioned as an administrative body to screen the cases of Afghans transferred to GIRoA

under the MOU. Per the MOU, it reviews each case to determine the disposition, under Afghan law, of all Afghan detainees, and recommends prosecution, detention, or release. The ARB refers appropriate cases to prosecution when the evidence warrants criminal prosecution and recommends release when insufficient evidence exists. It also has the option of recommending further investigation for those Afghans with investigable leads associated with a crime in their files. In addition, the MOU commits GIRoA to the continued detention of detainees designated as Enduring Security Threats (EST).

Thus far, the ARB has reviewed 461 cases out of 880 total; it has recommended prosecution in 77 cases and release in the remaining 384 cases. Although CJIATF-435 disagrees with some of the ARB's decisions, it supports the ARB as part of the transition to Afghan sovereignty and remains committed to helping the ARB adjudicate former LOAC detainees and render appropriate disposition decisions under Afghan law.

In order to protect coalition and Afghan forces and strengthen GIRoA's commitment to the rule of law, CJIATF-435 pursues all available means to inform, educate, and strengthen Afghanistan's ability to investigate and prosecute these threats. Specifically, CJIATF-435 has: 1) pursued key leader engagements (KLEs) with senior Afghan officials to express U.S. concerns with ARB release recommendations where investigable leads exist; 2) requested reconsideration for ARB release decisions where there is attributable evidence of a crime; and 3) insisted on engagement between USFOR-A and the Minister of Defense, in accordance with the MOU, before release for those cases where attributable evidence exists that the ARB rejected in its recommendation for release.

The United States continues to engage with its Afghan counterparts to ensure continued confidence in the safeguarding of U.S. force protection interests and the humane treatment of all detainees. CJIATF-435 works with the Afghan Detention Operations Command to develop Afghan capacity in detentions operations including secure and humane care, custody, and control of detainee populations. Although the Afghans have made progress in managing detainees since the transfer of detentions operations to their authority, they require continuing assistance with facility engineering, medical support, contracting, and other logistics to maintain the standards of security and humane treatment.

## **The Justice Sector**

ISAF continues to take substantial steps to assist the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), the Attorney General's Office (AGO), and the Supreme Court. ISAF provided support to the endorsement of GIRoA's National Priority Program 5, Law and Justice for All, which outlines GIRoA's justice sector priorities over the next three years, and will now work to support its implementation. The newly-proposed Afghan criminal procedure code sits with the upper house Meshrano Jirga awaiting approval and then presidential signature. The Criminal Law Reform Working Group continues its rewrite of the Afghan criminal penal code. Once these two codes are complete, the procedure code and penal code will support ANSF law enforcement efforts through a holistic approach with the judicial sector.



ISAF continues to promote a good working relationship between ANSF and AGO prosecutors to criminalize security threats. The ISAF team now chairs the Kabul Evidence Based Operations (EvBO) Working Group, which promotes ISAF security interests through the international community's efforts to implement EvBO. ISAF and the international community are using EvBO to criminalize the insurgency in accordance with Afghan law. Additionally, ISAF is supporting work to ensure judges and prosecutors are located in all districts throughout Afghanistan, so that a robust and reliable judicial system supports the ANSF's operations. Although provincial-level and some district-level law enforcement officers have the capacity to adequately perform site exploitation and evidence collection, challenges remain in forensics analysis, the logistics involved in maintaining a chain of custody, and the storage of evidence while awaiting trial. Without assistance from coalition forces or international community partners, rural districts will continue to rely upon confession-based, rather than evidence-based prosecutions. The progress made to date on EvBO and the use of forensic evidence in the judicial process will likely remain limited to major population centers.

TF-435 also advises the Justice Center in Parwan (JCIP). The JCIP is an Afghan court run by Afghan judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. To date, the JCIP has prosecuted over 3,100 detainees with a 71 percent conviction rate. In total, the JCIP has tried over 5,000 primary and appellate cases. While the JCIP has been operating successfully, it may only have temporary relevance, since the overwhelming majority of Afghan captures will be handled in provincial courts.

### **3.5: PARLIAMENT**

Afghanistan's Parliament has demonstrated slowly increasing capacity and political maturity during this reporting period. Although the Parliament is consistently fractious, it can be capable of protecting its legislative equities against incursions by the executive branch. Although the legislative branch remains weaker than the executive, members of Parliament appear to be trying to strengthen their position. Nevertheless, staffing issues, corruption, and inadequate education and experience among its members continue to be problematic for the body.

The Parliament continued to exercise its authority to summon ministers for question-and-answer sessions before both chambers' plenary sessions. On July 22, 2013 the lower house (Wolesi Jirga) exercised its authority to pass votes of no confidence on Cabinet ministers by voting out then-Minister of Interior Mustafa Patang. President Karzai kept Patang as Acting Minister of Interior until he nominated Omar Daudzai as Patang's replacement on September 1, 2013.

The most important bills passed into law by Parliament during this reporting period were the IEC Structure Law and the Electoral Law. Parliament passed the IEC Structure Law on July 13, 2013, and President Karzai endorsed it on July 17, 2013. The law outlines the procedures for appointing IEC commissioners and establishes a permanent Independent Electoral Complaints Commission. The Electoral Law, which was passed by the Parliament on July 15, 2013 and was endorsed by President Karzai on July 20, 2013, provides the legal framework for the elections.

Following a six-week summer recess, the Parliament reconvened on September 7, 2013. Immediate items on their agenda included the confirmations of Cabinet positions, including the Minister of Interior, and Supreme Court justices. The Parliament also focused on the status of electoral preparations and called in members of the IEC on September 10, 2013.

### **3.6: BANKING AND FINANCE**

Although there are ongoing concerns about the stability and integrity of the banking system, this reporting period has seen little volatility – neither progress or setbacks – in the banking and financial sectors. Afghanistan has made moderate progress on the country’s IMF program benchmarks.

Efforts to resolve the Kabul Bank crisis continue to move slowly in three major areas: asset recovery, prosecution of those responsible, and privatization of New Kabul Bank (NKB).

- Kabul Bank asset recoveries increased slightly during the reporting period. Cash recoveries were \$26.2 million between March 30, and June 30, 2013. As of June 30, 2013, total outstanding claims were \$745.3 million. Cash recoveries were \$150.5 million, non-cash assets held against claims were assessed at \$196.7 million, and other recoveries were \$17.9 million. There were \$97.4 million in approved reductions. Sale of non-cash assets held in Afghanistan has proven especially challenging for the Kabul Bank Receiver.
- The Afghan government has appealed the trial verdicts. The appellate panel first listened to arguments on September 16, 2013, but has yet to issue a verdict. The Afghan government and the international community have expressed concern that the verdicts against the former Chairman and former CEO of Kabul Bank are not sufficient to recover fraudulently-obtained assets held abroad, while former employees of the central bank and others received unduly harsh sentences for carrying out their official duties.
- Efforts to sell NKB failed earlier this year after only one bid was received from an unqualified bidder. The Central Bank announced a new round of bidding for NKB on September 3, 2013.

Concerns about the Afghan banking sector’s stability and integrity were also raised when a major international bank informed several Afghan banks that it intended to end its U.S. dollar-based correspondent banking relationships with them, unless they established a correspondent relationship with other major international banks, citing the reputational and legal risks of dealing with the Afghan banking system. Although the correspondent relationships have not been severed, this has forced several Afghan banks to begin taking steps to improve their compliance regimes. The Cabinet approved revised anti-money laundering and countering financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) laws, but the laws have not been submitted to Parliament – in part due to criticism from the international community that they do not meet international Financial Action Task Force standards.

There has not been a review of Afghanistan’s IMF Extended Credit Facility program during the reporting period, as the Afghan government has shown limited progress toward meeting its

quantitative targets and in its structural reforms. In particular, the Afghan government did not submit an internationally acceptable AML/CFT law to Parliament and it missed quantitative targets for revenue collection, central bank net international reserves, and central bank net credit to the government for December 2012 and March 2013. IMF staff have agreed with the Afghan authorities on a new set of quantitative targets for revenues and foreign exchange reserves, and additional structural reforms related to fiscal management and banking that, if met, will allow the authorities to establish an informal track record of improved macroeconomic performance through September 2013, paving the way for possible completion of an IMF Board review later this year.

### **3.7: COUNTER-CORRUPTION AND TRANSPARENCY**

Corruption within the ANSF ranges from AUP and ALP extortion at illegal checkpoints to higher-level corruption in the MOD and MOI (e.g., pay-for-position schemes, taking bribes from contractors, and “land grabbing”). All of these activities have hurt the reputation and efficiency of security ministries. Nonetheless, the MOD and MOI are genuinely concerned about the issue and have been vocal about addressing corruption challenges in the ANSF.

Generally speaking, GIRoA lacks the will to fight corruption directly. For example, GIRoA rarely uses wiretaps in corruption investigations, and its Attorney General has failed to pursue prosecutions against several politically connected officials implicated in corruption related to the National Military Hospital (NMH) and the AAF. Afghan workplace culture also appears to tolerate some levels of corruption as indicated by the fact that there have been few corruption allegations made to the MOD Inspector General (IG) in the last two years.

Recently, however, both the MOI and MOD have taken some proactive anti-corruption steps. For example, the MOI IG office was recently faced with a budget reduction of 50 percent, but once discovered; Minister Patang restored funding by about 30 percent. Minister Patang also garrisoned IG personnel at Type-A PCoP HQs to facilitate their work. Additionally the MOD held a high-level anti-corruption conference attended by corps and division commanders and senior staff, which resulted in the formation of Transparency Accountability Committees at Corps and Division units.

On June 26, 2013, CJIATF-*Shafafiyat* hosted the first ISAF anti-corruption conference, “Afghan Civil Society and the Security Ministries: A Dialogue on Anti-Corruption and Counter-Corruption Efforts.” Representatives from the MOI, MOD, the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC), as well as several prominent members of Afghan civil society attended. The relationship between the security ministries and Afghan civil society is still nascent, as civil society organizations are more heavily engaged in the non-security sector. This conference sought to begin to build a relationship between the security ministries and civil society representatives, affording each the opportunity to present their concerns about corruption as well as their current counter-anti-corruption efforts.

The MOI and the MOD presented their processes and mechanisms for countering corruption to both Afghan civil society and international community members; Afghan Civil Society

Organizations (CSOs) presented actionable counter/anti-corruption (CAC) expectations of the security sector, and highlighted their on-going CAC efforts, successes, and challenges with security-sector corruption. The conference also afforded the international community and CSOs an opportunity to learn about ANSF funding. Oversight of budget and contract management execution was assessed to have been partially met due to time constraints. Another conference was conducted on September 16, 2013, with the intent of furthering this relationship and strengthening transparency and accountability of the MOD and MOI.

The formation of the *Shafafiyat* Committees at the MOI Provincial Chief of Police Headquarters as well as the Transparency and Accountability Committees at the MOD ANA Corps and Division Headquarters, which are overseen by their respective IG departments, continue to help raise awareness, implement reform, and combat corruption issues across the country. The MOD has been particularly keen to show that corruption issues are being taken seriously and are now starting to prosecute cases without undue political interference. The MOI still has some way to go before successful prosecutions can occur, but they are making progress in the right direction. Food, fuel, and pay form a significant proportion of ANSF sustainment funding and are likely to be the target for corrupt actors; these three areas will therefore continue to be the focus for ISAF and ANSF (IG) staff efforts.

ISAF will continue to provide assistance, capacity building, and mentoring in the IG Offices of the MOD and MOI, to ensure continued implementation of the various Afghan Transparency Committee initiatives to combat corruption and improve accountability. Assistance will also be provided to the security ministries' procurement departments to establish oversight and vendor vetting mechanisms, as required by the Chicago Conference, and to ensure continued international funding for the ANSF post-2014. CJATF-*Shafafiyat* will also encourage Afghan security ministries to connect with elements of civil society in a long-term effort to generate social pressure for reform and to contribute to the Afghan narrative on corruption reform.

Outside of the security ministries, few significant efforts are being made towards wider counter-corruption reforms. Afghan leaders and GIRoA continue to be dissuaded by the short-term cost of taking action, and many institutions continue to lack the political will to take action against capture of their assets by criminal patronage networks and power-brokers. The *realpolitik* of accepting corruption as part of building and maintaining fragile alliances in an ethnically-fractured political landscape has left Afghanistan with a political elite that is widely regarded as the greatest contributor to the corruption problem. The situation is exacerbated by a war economy and uncertainty about the future, which leads to increased acceptance of corruption by many Afghans.

The Attorney General's Office and the HOOAC continue to remain ineffective and subject to corruption and malign influence; they are frequently part of the problem of corruption and not part of the solution.

Although the ANSF are ahead of GIRoA in some counter-corruption efforts, the lack of political will to address these serious issues across the rest of GIRoA will continue to threaten the government's legitimacy and ultimately poses a significant risk to the ISAF mission. The

elimination of egregious corruption in Afghanistan cannot be achieved without coordinated action from the international community to enforce conditions placed on GIRoA. In short, the only weapon available to affect the situation on a national level is control of “purse strings” that finance GIRoA functionality.

### **3.8: COUNTER-NARCOTICS**

Narcotics play an integral role in financing the insurgency, and CN operations remain the best line of effort available to the coalition, at this time, to directly affect the Taliban’s tactical-level financing. As a result of bad weather, the 2012 poppy yield was lower than in previous years, leading to a decrease in narcotics-derived insurgent revenue. However, overall insurgent funding in 2012 remained largely unchanged from previous years. The 2013 poppy harvest is expected to expand considerably over 2012 due to improved weather conditions and the drawdown of ISAF. An April 2013 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report stated that “the findings of the 2013 Opium Risk Assessment in the Southern, Eastern, Western and Central regions points to a worrying situation.” The assessment suggests that poppy cultivation is not only expected to expand in areas where it already existed in 2012, but also in areas where poppy cultivation was stopped. The Taliban is also showing a greater propensity to protect the poppy harvest, and to regulate narcotics trafficking and production.

GIRoA regularly partners with U.S. and international organizations to target narcotics traffickers and facilities. As part of the ISAF CN campaign plan, ISAF coordinates with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and other U.S. government departments and agencies to support the overall CN strategy for Afghanistan.

The main goal the ISAF CN strategy is to reduce the ability of the insurgency to draw support from the narcotics industry. RC-S, RC-E, and RC-SW were priority areas for military and law enforcement CN efforts during the reporting period. These regions are the principal areas of Afghan poppy cultivation, and are major sources of revenue for the Taliban-led insurgency. The DoD role in supporting CN operations includes building the capacity of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNP-A), improving border security, promoting information sharing, and fostering regional and international cooperation.

Despite a number of large seizures and high-profile arrests during the reporting period, overall coalition and ANSF CN interdiction efforts have had a small, though significant, effect on overall insurgent profits from narcotics. The narcotics market in Afghanistan is large and insurgent penetration of that market is extensive and expanding. Successful CN interdiction operations in one area may be offset by insurgents increasing revenues by other means.

CN interdiction operations, when combined with other efforts, have the potential to significantly reduce insurgent financing from narcotics. However, none of these efforts individually will be able to have a major effect. The political will of the GIRoA and the transition of security to Afghan forces remain the greatest challenges to implementing a comprehensive CN program. Partnership between different elements is critical to success.

The United States published a new CN Strategy for Afghanistan in January 2013. This revision prioritizes CN assistance during the security transition and drawdown of U.S. and coalition combat forces. ISAF continues to assist GIRoA in developing its CN capacity and capability for transition to greater Afghan responsibility. Although the Afghan Counter-Narcotics Judicial Center (CNJC) continues to perform admirably, further progress is needed to reduce corruption in the justice sector and in state functions important to transition, including border checkpoints, airports, and inland customs depots.

## **Counter-narcotics Operations**

U.S., coalition, and GIRoA CN activities in Afghanistan directly affect the insurgency by denying funding to their operations. The success of GIRoA's efforts to combat the nexus of narcotics, insurgency, terrorists, and transnational organized crime depends on the continued coordination and cooperation of U.S. and coalition partner agencies' CN efforts. Efforts like the DEA-led Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell, which has DoD support, target the sources of insurgent and terrorist financing to reduce the enemy's ability to sustain operations. Similarly, ISAF activities support a number of U.S. government agencies' efforts to combat narcotics-fueled corruption within GIRoA. Finally, DoD's partnership with the DoJ to provide law enforcement subject matter expertise for development of the CNP-A has been critical in NTM-A's mission to create a specialized, CN law enforcement capability that will transition to GIRoA in 2014.

The current drawdown of U.S. and coalition military forces has affected the ability of U.S. and international law enforcement personnel to conduct operations throughout Afghanistan. With the shrinking ISAF military security umbrella, international law enforcement officers no longer have the same freedom of movement as in previous reports. Also, having fewer military enablers like rotary wing transportation, medical evacuation, and in-extremis support, affects targeting considerations for law enforcement planners. Finally, military operations, with fewer participating forces, are focusing on traditional military targets; drugs-nexus targets have a lower priority. The net result has been a drop in the amount of drugs interdicted inside Afghanistan during the period.

The DEA, the CNP-A National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and ISAF maintained a moderate CN operational tempo throughout the reporting period, conducting several major Afghan-led CN operations. ISAF targeting of high-value individuals and their support zones applied pressure on narcotics networks and caused temporary dislocations. However, with their ability to quickly adopt new tactics, narcotics networks are likely to continue to function. During the reporting period, CN operations were concentrated in northern Helmand and Nimroz Provinces. Vehicle interdictions were focused in central and southern Helmand, and along the RC-SW/RC-W boundary in northern Nimroz. A majority of the conducted operations were successful in disrupting narcotics activity, but the networks remain resilient. Disruptions to these networks result from capital losses, including drug processing equipment and drug seizures.

Occasionally, after strong cases have been established, high-value drug traffickers supporting the insurgency are arrested and sentenced. An example is the arrest and conviction of Haji Lal Jan Ishaqzai, a U.S. Treasury-designated “kingpin.” Haji Lal Jan was subsequently prosecuted at the CNJC and received a 20-year sentence. In June 2013, the Afghan Supreme Court upheld his conviction, but reduced his sentence to 15 years. Other examples include Haji Lawang, a major trafficker in Nangarhar province, and Haji Abdul Aqyum, a trafficker in Helmand Province. They were arrested in separate operations by Afghan law enforcement officials in August 2013 and are currently awaiting sentencing by the CNJC.

CN operations during the reporting period were facilitated by the continued progress of the DEA-mentored Judicial Wire Intercept Program (JWIP). During this reporting period, the JWIP lawfully intercepted more than seven million telephone conversations, including 772,326 pertinent calls.

The DoD partnership with the U.S. Embassy Kabul Border Management Task Force (BMTF) is an essential element in the professionalization of Afghan customs officials. At the Kabul International Airport (KIA), BMTF mentors taught a number of classes to improve airport security in the following areas:

- Customs authorities
- Search techniques
- Targeting
- Money laundering
- Fraud
- Incident response
- Narcotics enforcement equipment
- Arrests/Seizures
- Ethics/Internal conspiracies
- Hazardous materials/Pre-cursors
- Intelligence
- Passenger processing
- Team building

Governor Led Eradication (GLE) is a GIRoA program funded by the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. ISAF has only a limited role in supporting and helping to coordinate the GLE program. Following the 2012 GLE campaign, which eradicated 9,672 hectares of poppy, the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) began planning and coordinating the 2013 GLE Campaign, with a nationwide goal of eradicating 15,000 hectares of poppy. During the reporting period, 7,323 hectares were eradicated, completing eradication for the 2013 season.

The GLE program has yet to prove its utility in decreasing insurgent funding, and could in fact increase it in certain areas. Although increased eradication deters some farmers from planting poppy by increasing the involved risk, this often results in shifting cultivation outside the GLE areas. GLE is usually conducted in areas of GIRoA control, and does not concentrate on areas of insurgent control, often in more remote regions. GLE is not exclusively aimed at nor does it significantly affect insurgent funding. Furthermore, corruption in the program often results in only the poppy fields that do not pay bribes being eradicated. The MCN believes GLE is most effective when paired with an Alternative Livelihood (AL) campaign designed to give subsistence farmers viable alternatives to growing poppy. Evidence from the Helmand Food Zone Program and elsewhere suggests that targeted AL, in combination with GLE, is more likely to result in sustainable conversion from poppy to licit cultivation. Overall, it is not clear whether GLE by itself, or even coupled with an AL campaign, has an effect on the coalition's goal of reducing insurgent funding.

### **Counter-narcotics Police of Afghanistan Specialized Units**

The CNP-A is the ANP component responsible for CN operations throughout Afghanistan. CNP-A headquarters are located in Kabul, and the CNP-A has officers stationed in all 34 provinces including in four forward operation bases located throughout Afghanistan. DoD continues to support the CNP-A through capacity building in order to establish a capable Afghan institution that can counter the narcotics trade and resist corruption. The current CNP-A *tashkil* is authorized at 2,570 positions and includes CNP-A headquarters elements, specialized units, and provincial units.

DoD, in partnership with the Justice Department's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, is funding the CNP-A Development Unit (CDU). This unit is working toward the goal of transitioning CN responsibility to the GIRoA. In support of this, the CDU, with the NTM-A Senior Police Advisor for Counter-narcotics, aided the CNP-A in completing their Ministerial Development Plan. This plan serves as a roadmap for CNP-A development and the transition of greater security responsibility to CNP-A by 2014.

### **Afghan Special Mission Wing Support to Counter-narcotics**

In addition to its mission responsibilities to support CT and ASSF, the SMW continues to provide aviation support to the DEA and Afghan CN law enforcement organizations. DEA liaison officers with the SMW, and coalition SOF, ensure that DEA aviation requirements are considered and appropriately supported in the special operations allocation and tasking process.

The unit conducted several Afghan planned, led, and fully-executed tactical missions in support of CN and CT objectives. Since April 1, 2013, the SMW has flown almost nine NVG and day multi-aircraft tactical missions. Another major milestone was the execution of the first all-Afghan drug interdiction mission on July 16, 2013, in support of the NIU.



**Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell**

The U.S. National Security Staff requested the establishment of the Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC) in 2008 to identify and disrupt sources of insurgent and terrorist funding in Afghanistan. Led by the DEA, with deputies from DoD and the Department of Treasury, the cell consists of DoD service and combat support agency personnel, Treasury analysts, and law enforcement agents. During the reporting period, ATFC assisted with Treasury designations of key threat finance targets, and continued working with U.S. and Afghan law enforcement partners on vital investigations. On May 31, 2013, Haji Khotwal Noorzai, an ATFC threat finance target, was sanctioned under the U.S. Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. Additionally, ATFC continues to work with the DoJ to identify and possibly recover Kabul Bank assets that were embezzled by shareholders and transferred to banks and other financial institutions, including those that may be under U.S. jurisdiction. In a related effort, ATFC assembled an information paper for Treasury on the flow of suspicious transfers from Kabul Bank to both India and Russia, in support of a trilateral information exchange between the United States, Russia, and India. The exchange was focused on illicit financial networks tied to the narcotics trade in Afghanistan.

ATFC's law enforcement arm has also begun a training program focused on advising district and provincial Afghan police on how to disrupt illicit finance networks, such as those operated by unlicensed money service providers.

## SECTION 4 – RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

### 4.1: OVERVIEW

As Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) draws to a close, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul will continue to consolidate civilian programs under a normal diplomatic mission structure. As a result, previous civilian-military activities that had a significant role for coalition military forces will now come under the aegis of the Chief of Mission (COM). The development priorities will be balanced against the full range of diplomatic priorities, including economic development, technical assistance and other traditional Embassy and USAID programs. This will mean a reduction in the scale and scope of some military engagement in these areas.

In 2014, GIRoA will complete a shift from international-led to Afghan-led security. The period leading up to this is termed “Transition” and the ten years immediately following is known as the “Transformation Decade.” The TMAF will help to steer Afghanistan and the international donor community through transition and the transformation decade. Under the TMAF, the United States and other international partners have agreed to provide \$16 billion in assistance through 2015 and to sustain support at or near levels of the past decade through 2017. Furthermore, donors have pledged to move 50 percent of assistance on-budget. For its part, Afghanistan has committed to improve governance, to emphasize human development and sustainable growth, to ensure credible, transparent elections, to protect human rights and guarantee access to justice for all citizens, and to improve the integrity of public financial management and the banking sector.

During transition, Afghanistan will face significant challenges. Some challenges are related directly to security challenges presented by the handover of responsibility from the ISAF to the ANSF, ANP, and ALP. Other challenges result from the difficult development environment in Afghanistan. In some cases, the challenges of transition will be the result of moving from a conflict or post-conflict reconstruction environment to a traditional development footing. USAID will work closely with implementing partners, Embassy stakeholders, military colleagues, and GIRoA, while adapting internal processes to address these challenges.

The USAID strategy directly supports GIRoA’s Transformation Decade goal of reducing its dependence on international assistance to non-security sectors, to levels consistent with other least developed nations, and of consolidating peace and stability in Afghan communities through effective development, improved delivery of government services, and the promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights. Afghanistan is still too reliant on donor assistance to consolidate its peace and security gains effectively, and to take leadership and responsibility for development initiatives. The USAID strategy will support Afghanistan’s transformation by concentrating resources on three development objectives. First, USAID will support the creation of foundations for sustainable economic growth, targeting economic and agricultural programming in four Regional Economic Zones (REZs) that are the most likely to generate sustainable growth through Transition and into Transformation. Second, USAID will help maintain and make achievements permanent in the critical areas of education, health, and women’s rights. Third, USAID will support continued stability in Afghanistan by working to

improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of the government, in order to foster linkages between GIRoA and the Afghan people and reinforce systems of governance.

USAID acknowledges that supporting the Afghan vision requires a long-term commitment. After 12 years of assistance, Afghanistan is still dependent on donor support and will remain so through the Transformation Decade and beyond. Due to declining international assistance, increased focus will be given to strengthening the government's capacity to generate and collect revenue. USAID's assistance to Afghanistan will be conducted as part of a harmonized donor approach that is aligned with Afghan priorities and the TMAF, while still supporting U.S. national security objectives. Supporting GIRoA ownership and leadership of development processes is key to the USAID approach, and one that will increase the confidence Afghan people have in their government to address their needs.

## **4.2: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT<sup>23</sup>**

Afghanistan's GDP has grown rapidly since 2001, recording average GDP growth of 9-10 percent annually. In 2012, Afghanistan's GDP was approximately \$22.5 billion. This growth, however, is largely dependent on international assistance and the presence of coalition forces in the country, which generate substantial demand for goods and services. Approximately 80 percent of Afghanistan's workforce is employed in agriculture, a sector which makes up roughly 20 percent of Afghanistan's GDP. Due to minimal indigenous manufacturing, Afghanistan imports most consumer goods and nearly 75 percent of its fuel and electricity. Afghanistan primarily exports raw materials (cashmere, dried fruits and nuts, marble) and carpets. In 2011, according to WTO statistics, Afghanistan imported \$6.4 billion worth of goods as compared to only \$376 million in exports. With a literacy rate of only 28 percent, and with 36 percent of the population living on less than \$25 a month, there is a dearth of skilled labor required to sustain Afghanistan's remarkable growth rates.

Afghanistan remains a poor country with a growing youth population and increased public expectations for government delivery of services. With economic, political, and security transitions underway, economic growth will depend on a variety of factors, including the security environment, political stability, improvements in the business climate, and the trajectory of international assistance. The extractive industries, in particular, provide an opportunity to generate revenue for Afghans, but it remains to be seen if the mining sector can overcome the manifold challenges facing Afghanistan's economy. Geographic isolation and a lack of transport infrastructure make it difficult to get products to market. Uncooperative neighboring countries inhibit cross border transit. A limited banking sector also constrains growth. Private sector investment will be critical to Afghanistan's long-term economic potential, but current questions around security and political transition dampen investor interest.

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<sup>23</sup>Much of the data derived for this section is from the World Bank. They assert "...collecting reliable data on Afghanistan is extremely difficult. Moreover, much of the information that is available is subject to large margins of uncertainty, as well as often problems of incompleteness, incomparability, etc." *World Bank*, "Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014," May 2012.

The Afghan economy would be adversely affected by a precipitous decline in donor funding. To avoid this pitfall, the international community pledged at the July 2012 Tokyo Conference to provide Afghanistan \$16 billion in assistance through 2015 and to continue support at or near levels of the past decade through 2017. Donors have collectively provided funding and technical expertise in significant areas, advancing Afghanistan's overall level of capacity. Programs and projects in several fundamental areas include building governmental capacity, jump-starting and growing the economic base, developing infrastructure, building a self-sustaining security force, laying a foundation for the rule of law, and placing additional attention on local governance processes.

## **Agriculture**

Roughly 80 percent of Afghanistan's labor force is dependent upon agriculture, making the sector a significant target area for U.S. and international assistance and a priority for stabilization efforts. In order to promote economic growth and increase food security for a rapidly growing population, Afghanistan requires adequate and consistent agriculture production. The Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL), has been charged with formulating agriculture policy and ensuring its alignment with the country's overall economic strategy.

Afghanistan's agriculture policy was articulated in the Agriculture and Rural Development Cluster (ARD) of the National Priority Programs (NPPs) that were endorsed by the Joint Coordination Management Board in February 2013. The ARD NPPs focus on boosting licit agriculture production, increasing private sector agribusinesses, expanding irrigated land, and improving water management. The ARD NPPs also include program benchmarks.

The U.S. government's agricultural assistance strategy and program portfolio supports these NPP goals, mainly through USAID and Department of Agriculture (USDA) programs. The strategy is grounded in partnership with MAIL with an emphasis on self-reliance and building ministry capacity to deliver services to farmers and promoting private-sector agribusiness to further strengthen food security and economic growth.

The USAID portfolio is focused on building relationships between farmers, agribusinesses, and MAIL to increase the adoption of new technologies and practices to increase production and productivity. Investments are also focused on regional economic zones to maximize geographic impact. Alternative development remains a priority and is focused on promotion of licit agricultural value chains and the lessons of past program experience. Activities are implemented in coordination with USDA, which has programs designed to strengthen MAIL and also complement INL's counter-narcotic objectives. USAID programs include:

- The Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives in the North, East and West (IDEANEW) program was adjusted in 2012 to move away from short-term activities, such as infrastructure interventions, to focus on high-value crop development.
- The new Agricultural Research and Extension Development (AGRED) program, which is building MAIL's capacity to develop and deploy new technology and improved agricultural production practices.

- The USAID Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Project (CHAMP) invests in Afghanistan's acclaimed orchard and vine crops.
- The Agricultural Development Fund (ADF) and Agricultural Credit Enhancement (ACE) is a \$150 million project that provides essential credit to grow agribusinesses.
- The Irrigation and Watershed Management Program (IWMP), which began work with MAIL and related ministries to increase sustainable agricultural production through more-efficient and sustainable agricultural water resource management.
- The USAID Financial Access for Investing in Development of Afghanistan (FAIDA AG) projects supports a sustainable, commercially viable, agribusiness-based economy to achieve long-term stability, security and enduring peace in Southern Afghanistan.

The USDA has extended its multi-year Capacity Building and Change Management program (CBCMP) until June 2014. This program will continue to strengthen MAIL's organizational capacity to support sustainable agriculture sector development. The program employs approximately 250 change management advisors throughout the ministry, at the national and provincial levels, and teaches annual work planning, service delivery process improvement, and organizational structure analysis. The program is also improving MAIL's information and communication technology infrastructure by establishing reliable internet connections at the Kabul offices and the 34 provincial Directorates of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock.

USDA also continues to implement a project to strengthen MAIL's ability to deliver more effective, demand-driven extension services to producers and other rural clientele in targeted provinces, including Kabul, Herat, Balkh, and Nangarhar. Working with the USAID Afghan Agriculture Research and Extension Development project, the USDA extension project focuses on professional development and training for MAIL's extension staff, primarily at the province and district level, in order to demonstrate MAIL's ability to support farmers and promote water and natural resource management, and to build public confidence in MAIL's capacity to provide critical services. The USDA extension project has conducted workshops for female extension personnel, launched on-farm grain storage trials, and conducted training on agro-ecosystem observation and analysis. Upcoming training will focus on wheat and vegetable production, marketing, post-harvest storage, farm financial management, and participatory extension approaches.

USDA offers assistance to MAIL to build capacity in data collection and analysis, animal and plant health capabilities, and sanitary/phytosanitary measures (SPS). USDA's animal and plant health capacity building project is working to strengthen MAIL's SPS regulatory policy and methodologies to support trade and mitigate biological risks. The Agricultural Data Collection and Utilization System Project (ADCUS) is working with MAIL to identify critical data needs to develop and implement a provincial-level data collection system for prioritized crops. For example, in mid-2013, USDA's implementing partner worked with MAIL to conduct a pilot national survey. MAIL employees received on-the-job training while conducting a national farm-gate survey in all provinces as part of the ADCUS project. Roughly 200 farm-level interviews took place in each province. The survey provided opportunity for applied training through involvement in a large data collection effort from conception to conclusion and a tool for further refining the next national survey that will take place in late 2013.

USDA maintains approximately 20 technical field advisors embedded with military units across Afghanistan. Every reporting period, these advisors contribute to approximately 100 projects, partnering with the U.S. military, USAID, State Department, and non-U.S. donor partners across Afghanistan. These agricultural experts have trained hundreds of MAIL employees, who in turn train thousands of farmers each reporting period. The number of field personnel will draw down as the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan contracts.

The USDA Agricultural Development for Afghanistan Pre-deployment Training (ADAPT), designed to meet the needs of U.S. government and NGO personnel, including ADTs, held its final course on September 9, 2013. Through a combination of classroom curricula and hands-on exercises, over 700 ADAPT trainees received an extensive overview of the Afghan agricultural environment in technical subject areas such as U.S. government policy and strategy, animal husbandry, rangeland management, crop and horticulture production, orchard and vineyard management, post-harvest practices, water management, and soils. ADAPT has trained interagency students in 23 sessions since November 2011.

To complement hands-on training, USDA provides an online knowledge reach-back tool called e-Afghan Ag. The website is a growing, publically-accessible online resource that provides credible, relevant information to those helping farmers in Afghanistan. The site draws on expertise from more than 58 institutions and has extensive links to government, university, and NGOs. The e-Afghan Ag program is now working with MAIL to establish its own technical online resource in Dari, Pashtu and English languages that will be housed on the MAIL website. MAIL is collecting materials for this site and is being trained on the management of the content. The site will make use of infrastructure provided under the CBCMP.

Continued USDA capacity building efforts, along with USAID and ADT grassroots agricultural development programs, will be critical to the continued stabilization and growth of Afghanistan's agriculture sector. Most USDA capacity building projects are funded through the end of fiscal year 2014.

## **Mining**

The mining industry (both hydrocarbon and extraction) is projected to be a significant source of revenue for the Afghan government. Additionally, under the World Bank's "Natural Resource Corridor" model, the sector could contribute to local economic growth. Under this development model, the activity surrounding a cluster of extraction mines and/or hydrocarbon fields would jumpstart economic activity up and down the corridors where the extraction occurs, such as logistical support, food services, etc. Maximizing the economic potential of the sector in this way would provide two sources of income for GIRA: a revenue stream from the extractive industry, and business taxes from the growing private sector.

Afghanistan has an adequate hydrocarbon law in place, however political issues surrounding a new mining law will need to be overcome and the law passed with its key points intact if the revenues from the minerals extraction industry are to be realized. Significant investments in

infrastructure will also be needed to facilitate local economic activity and growth. Investments in the mining sector may be interrupted due to delayed passage of a new mining law. This law would link exploration and extraction rights, thus providing greater incentive for companies to invest in exploration by guaranteeing the right to extract.

In acknowledging the importance of the oil and gas sector, the Ministry of Mines changed its name to the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MoMP). The Afghan hydrocarbon industry continues to mature. Currently, CNPCIW, a consortium of China National Petroleum Corporation International and the Afghan company Watan Oil and Gas, is capable of producing oil in the Amu Darya Basin, but missed its production requirements for 2012 because it has not reached an agreement to sell or process the crude oil. In November 2012, the MoMP announced that a consortium of four companies consisting of Kuwait Energy, Dubai-based Dragon Oil, Turkey's state-owned oil company TPAO, and Afghanistan-based Ghazanfar Group submitted a bid for two blocks in the Afghan-Tajik oil tender. The Afghan-Tajik basin is estimated to contain 946 million barrels of oil, seven trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 85 million barrels of natural gas liquids.

MoMP has had successful tenders of four major mineral deposits. These deposits consisted of two gold and two copper deposits, and are located in Sar-e-Pul/Balkh Provinces, Herat Province, Ghazni Province, and Badakshan Province. Bidding opened for these tenders in August 2012, and after a selective and transparent process, the winners were selected and announced to the international community in December 2012. The MoMP has begun contract negotiations with the winners of these deposits, but the contracts are not expected to be signed until after the draft mining law is passed.

## **Trade and Exports**

Increased trade and regional economic integration will be important for sustaining Afghanistan's economic development beyond 2014. Over the last decade, Afghanistan has persistently run a large current-account deficit (about 40 percent of GDP) that has been offset by external funding. Afghanistan remains in a significant trade deficit position. Exports declined by five percent in 2012 while imports continued to increase; exports remain roughly one-tenth the size of imports.

Prospects for increased exports of traditional goods like carpets and dried fruit are only likely to be realized with greater facilitation of transit trade with its regional partners. Potential future export of petroleum, natural gas, and other extractives will be important for offsetting the deficit; however, progress in the near term will be limited as Afghanistan continues to build its capacity to monetize its natural resources.

Afghanistan has focused on rehabilitating and building new cross-border transportation facilities to connect with Central Asian countries, better harmonizing border systems, and bringing into line trade agreements with regional standards to take advantage of improved security. The Five Year Plan for improving and expanding custom facilities and practices at major border crossings for some \$200 million is at a mid-point. This expansion should facilitate and expand trade, and

encourage travel/transit through Afghanistan to other locations. Increased security at border crossing points and new equipment will produce an overall positive impact on trade.

At this time, Pakistan remains the single largest trading partner and most convenient source of goods and transit routes to markets for Afghanistan. The election of Nawaz Sharif, along with Karzai's recent visit to Islamabad, appears to have led to a thaw in relations, and there is genuine momentum to expedite implementation of the long-stalled Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade and Transit Agreement (APTTA), signed in 2011. USAID trade programs in Afghanistan and Pakistan have been working with both governments to overcome technical, administrative, and legal issues.

### **4.3: INFRASTRUCTURE**

Donor-funded development efforts continue to improve Afghanistan's infrastructure, including roads, rail, power, and border controls. However, while Afghanistan is slowly developing regulatory authorities and operations and maintenance mechanisms necessary for the long-term sustainability of this infrastructure, most are immature or have yet to be developed.

Afghanistan's strategic economic infrastructure continued to improve and is generally on schedule, although some projects have experienced delays. The contract award process for installation of the third turbine at Kajaki Dam has experienced further delays and consequently the project will now not be completed until after 2015. Progress expanding electrical distribution via the North East Power System (NEPS) and the Southern Electric Power Systems (SEPS) continued with contracts awarded in September, pushing the NEPS south to Ghazni and Gardez.

#### **Roads**

The expansion of the road network in Afghanistan has begun to slow, with many projects still unfunded and others experiencing significant security delays. To date, 5,430 km of provincial, regional, and national roads have been completed, while 2,266 km are under construction or partially completed. Of particular concern is the yet-to-be-completed section of the Ring Road in northeast Afghanistan.

For the East-West corridor, Italy will fund part of the road in Herat Province, from Herat City to Chest-e Sharif (155 km), and also from Maiden Shar (Wardak Province) to Bamyan (Bamyan Province). The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Japan have nearly completed the road from Bamyan City to Yakawlang in Bamyan Province. The remaining sections of the East-West corridor are unfunded.

Emergency repairs to the Salang Tunnel road surface are complete. The Salang Tunnel runs north of Kabul through the Parwan Province along Highway 1 and is viewed as a major component of the NDN. The more extensive CERP-funded Salang Tunnel reconstruction project, in partnership with the Ministry of Public Works (MoPW), is on-going and includes upgrades to lighting, ventilation, and drainage system. The project is expected to be completed



by December 2013. USAID has made significant progress on the third phase of the Gardez Khost road. This 13 km segment is scheduled to be completed by November 15, 2013. The final 25 km of the 101 km road is in procurement and expected to be completed in December 2015.

## **Rail**

Rail infrastructure remains limited in Afghanistan, despite a number of internationally-funded rail projects. The Afghan Rail Authority (ARA) has been approved and a budget was created in November 2012. The budget included staffing at 50 percent, as the other half will not be needed until the second year of operation. This budget was not included as a line item in the MOPW budget for this year, primarily because the Afghan government could not fund the ARA. ADB and the EU have come up with a way to fund the top five to seven positions for this year, provided that MOPW appoints and funds the director's position. This proposal was sent up in January 2013.

The ARA is urgently needed, as there are several governmental and non-governmental organizations considering the possibility of constructing and operating rail in and through Afghanistan. Without the ARA, no regulatory authority exists to set rail construction standards or a standardized rail gauge for the nation. Three to five different organizations have conducted rail feasibility studies for the Afghan government, which must make a decision soon to determine which study makes the most sense for the nation. The Afghan government must stand up the leadership of the ARA, and produce basic rail construction laws, policies, and regulations to prove to the international community that they are serious about the potential for railway operations within their borders. Failure to do so will result in billions of dollars being pulled from this project and reallocated to current projects that are making progress.

In addition to the budget, ADB has produced the legal and regulatory framework needed for the ARA, which must be approved by Parliament. The legal and regulatory framework has been reviewed by MoPW personnel, U.S. Department of Transportation personnel, and the U.S. Army Rail Advisory Team in theater. Suggestions have been made and changes have been accepted to the legal and regulatory framework. This comprehensive piece of legislation now only needs the review and approval of Parliament to be put into law. The legal and regulatory framework is an integral part of ensuring the ARA has the proper authority to execute its duties.

## **Power**

Improvements to energy transmission and distribution systems continue to be one of the top priorities for the current infrastructure development strategy, because of the foundational role they play in fostering economic development and growth. During the reporting period, Afghanistan achieved significant progress towards capacity development and strengthening of energy institutions. However, a major challenge continues to be effective commercialization and efficiency in the sector. Currently, power is only available to one-third of the population. Power imports, along with domestic generation, do not provide 24-hour supply to those connected. The sector requires extensive development in capacity and skills at every level.

Major weaknesses of Afghanistan's power sector are its lack of nationwide metering and pay mechanisms. This results in the overuse of low-cost and no-cost electricity, thereby limiting revenue potential and investment in the sector.

The major power initiative in Afghanistan is the USAID Power Transmission Expansion and Capacity (PTEC) project, whose aim is to strengthen the NEPS, expand it, and ultimately connect it to the SEPS. The NEPS brings in imported electricity from the Central Asian Republics to provide power to Kabul and the communities north of Kabul. The SEPS services the areas south of Kabul in the Kandahar and Helmand areas. It draws most of its power from the Kajaki Dam and also, currently, from diesel generators in Kandahar City. The NEPS and SEPS transmission lines will connect the north and south with the Gardez region into one unified system. USAID has decided to fund half of PTEC through the Afghan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF). The AITF is managed by the Asian Development Bank and will eventually serve as a multi-donor fund for future infrastructure projects. The Kajaki Dam and power plant requires structural and power generation refurbishments and upgrades. These projects will improve employment, manufacturing capabilities, and quality-of-life in the region. Estimated completion date for the majority of the project is December 2014, although the third turbine will not be installed until 2015.

The USAID Kandahar-Helmand Power Program (KHPP), which will improve distribution in the SEPS, has maintained activity on all project components, including the rehabilitation of two substations (partially complete) and improvements to the Kandahar medium-voltage network (early stages). Installation of unit two at Kajaki Dam was originally an off-budget project and is now being implemented as an on-budget program through Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), the national electric utility. The eight-month closure of the Pakistan GLOC created a significant backlog of electrical materials required for this project and resulted in delays of some project components of KHPP. Following the reopening of the Pakistan GLOC in July 2012, all electrical equipment arrived at the project site. The Durai Junction substation, one of the KHPP components, is nearing completion, and the Breshna Kot substation is now progressing, after earlier subcontractor delays.

DABS has executed all urgent transformer installation upgrades in the Kandahar City distribution system. DoD continues to implement several priority energy-sector projects with Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF). In July 2012, USACE awarded the contract for replacing and updating the 110 kV line from the Kajaki substation to Durai Junction and on to Lashkar Gah with AIF funding. The 110 kV line from Durai Junction to Kandahar was awarded in September 2012 also under the AIF. Additionally, USAID's PTEC project will also focus on significant technical and managerial capacity building activities with DABS, and on commercialization of the utility system. DABS has already issued tenders for commercialization and transmission line construction under the PTEC. USAID has received \$101 million in AIF funding for the first section of the connector from Kabul to Ghazni. USAID will fund the remaining segments with Economic Support Funds.

The Salma Dam in Herat Province has overcome persistent security and contractual issues and work is proceeding, although the dam, a 42-megawatt power plant and transmission line to

Herat, remains significantly behind schedule. This project is not likely to be completed until 2014.

#### **4.4: HEALTH**

USAID aims to improve the health of the general population by strengthening overall health systems. Specifically, USAID is focused on strengthening quality basic package of health services (BPHS) and essential package of hospital services (EPHS), the service delivery capacity of the hospital and private sectors, and the stewardship capacity of central MOPH to deliver quality health services.

USAID continues to work with the MOPH to explore innovative and sustainable health financing options such as hospital autonomy, social and community health insurance, public private partnerships, and progressive user fee schemes in the public sector that will support MOPH's ability to become financially sustainable in the long-term.

#### **4.5: EDUCATION**

Education continues to be one of the most vulnerable social development sectors but is an important foundation for progress for the people of Afghanistan. Since 2002, the Afghan populace has experienced a dramatic increase in access to basic education. The Ministry of Education (MOEd) is projecting that it will provide access to basic education to more than 77 percent of the school-age population by 2015. This is a positive aspirational goal for reducing the number of children exposed to radicalization, improving opportunities for women and girls, and increasing the literacy rate and life expectancy of the populace.

The MOEd has not yet released statistics for FY2012, but from the estimates that were shared with ISAF; the general education student enrollment at MOEd-registered schools is estimated at 7.8 million, with 4.8 million boys and 3.0 million girls in more than 13,500 government general education schools across the 34 provinces. However, the exact number of students who are enrolled, or who are actually attending school, is unknown because the MOEd does not have the infrastructure or organizational capacity to collect timely and reliable data. These schools are staffed by more than 180,000 teachers trained to Afghan government standards and more than 52,600 candidates enrolled in Afghan teacher training programs. Although the quality of instruction and facilities remains uneven, the education of girls and women in the southern and eastern segments of the country has increased. However, female attendance in these areas lags significantly behind Kabul and other regions.

A number of issues remain that impact access to and quality of basic education, including: the absence of textbooks and school supplies for multiple content areas; the lack of infrastructure in some locations; and the need for more trained educational staff. The Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE) continues to face a shortage of space (i.e., classrooms, laboratories, and dormitory facilities), qualified instructors, and student program options. Access to higher education remains limited, with only about 50 percent of secondary school graduates attaining

university seats. The number of secondary school graduates continues to increase annually and is projected to continue for the next ten years, exacerbating the shortage of university placements. Although progress has been made, the pace of material acquisition, recruitment of teachers, and support operations for schools must increase in order for MOHE to be at the necessary level of capacity and capability to improve and maintain an effective education system. Better alignment with employer requirements is also needed to increase relevance and employment.

The amount of focus on education by Afghan families varies throughout the country and by tribe. When families do not fully understand and accept education as a right, as outlined in Afghan law, males not enrolled in school become more vulnerable to illegal activities. The implications are even starker for females when they are marginalized and deprived of opportunities.

#### **4.6: WOMEN IN AFGHANISTAN<sup>24</sup>**

Overall, circumstances for Afghan women and girls have improved significantly since 2001; gains remain tenuous, however, and civil society organizations are concerned that progress will be reversed. Many Afghan women view a possible reconciliation process with the Taliban skeptically and have legitimate concerns as to what peace talks might mean for the progress they have made over the last 12 years. The U.S. government takes these concerns seriously and recognizes that promoting security for Afghan women and girls must remain a priority.

Women face entrenched societal discrimination and limits to their freedom. Violence against women is widespread but underreported. Recent ISAF efforts to get Afghan authorities to respond to complaints by women have resulted in an increase in reporting of such violence however large gaps remain in our understanding of this problem, and major challenges exist in Afghan attempts to address it.

GIRoA affirmed at the July 2012 Tokyo Conference that the human rights of its citizens, in particular the equality of men and women are guaranteed under the Afghan constitution and in international human rights obligations. During the conference, the U.S. government and key international community allies underscored that the protection of human rights of women and the gains women have made is a priority as the transition process moves forward. The TMAF includes several indicators pertaining to the rights of women, including the implementation of the EVAW law and the National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA).

The main U.S. Embassy body responsible for interagency coordination and monitoring of gender-related issues is the Interagency Gender Working Group (IGWG). The IGWG brings together representatives from the Embassy's Political, Political-Military, Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs, Rule of Law, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Section (INL), Public Affairs, Interagency Provincial Affairs, Refugees and

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<sup>24</sup> This section, along with the *Women in the ANSF* section, is submitted consistent with section 1223 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.

Economic sections, USAID, the U.S. military, and other interagency partners, as well as representatives from ISAF and NTM-A. In September 2012, the U.S. Ambassador approved the Embassy's Gender Strategy which serves as the basis for policy and programmatic engagement on gender issues. The Gender Strategy strongly supports the priorities of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security; among its five core goals are access to justice and security, and promoting economic development for women. The Gender Strategy also highlights the need for U.S. government agencies to continue to mainstream gender issues into all policies and programs, so that decreases in U.S. government funding and presence in Afghanistan do not disproportionately affect women as transition proceeds.

The political arena has been a sector in which women's opportunity to participate has been constitutionally protected, largely through quotas. Constitutionally, 68 seats, or 28 percent, are reserved for women in the Wolesi Jirga. In the Meshrano Jirga, one third of members are appointed by the President, of which 50 percent must be women. However, at the Provincial level, women's seats are not constitutionally protected. The Electoral Law decreased the number of seats reserved for women at the provincial level from 25 to 20 percent. The continued inclusion of a quota was thanks to advocacy by some women members of Parliament and Civil Society.

There are also only nine women serving on the High Peace Council (HPC). Such low numbers, as well as exclusion from some peace talks led by the HPC, marginalize them from full participation in the peace process. With strong support from the U.S. government and international community, Afghan women have been included in many countrywide political decision-making processes since the end of Taliban rule: the Bonn Conference in 2001; the Loya Jirga in 2002; the 2004 Constitutional Loya Jirga; the Consultative Peace Jirga of 2010; the Kabul Conference in 2010; Bonn Conference in 2011; and the Tokyo Conference of 2012. However, the HPC's female members have complained that while they attend peace workshops and meetings in the country and abroad, they are not involved in making major decisions.

Women have also increased their presence and visibility through the National Solidarity Program (NSP). NSP reports that Community Development Councils (CDCs) (village-level local governance) overall are comprised of 36 percent women. Notably, the NSP instituted a mandatory reservation of two seats for women in CDC executive bodies for office bearer positions (i.e.; Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, Secretary, and Treasurer). This has led to an increase in women members from four percent to 35 percent. Women make up 19 percent (down from 24 percent in 2004) of the GIRoA workforce. The TMAF commits the Afghan Government to achieving a rate of 30 percent female staff in the Afghan Civil Service.

Women's education in Afghanistan continues to improve. This year saw the first cohort of young women and men with access to uninterrupted education since 2002. As of the end of the reporting period, nearly 40 percent of school-aged girls—roughly three million—are enrolled in school, including 165,000 girls in secondary school. An additional 40,000 young women attend public and private universities, or technical and vocational training institutes, with more enrolling each year.

At the same time, poverty and lack of security remain major causes of low enrollment and poor attendance rates, and girls remain under-enrolled. About 3.5 million school-age children are out of school, 75 percent of which are girls. Progress has been made on problems of physical access through establishing and building new facilities in underserved areas. However, the level and quality of students' learning achievement remains low, especially in the early grades. The proportion of girls enrolled in each grade since 2003 shows that about 40 percent of the children in grade one are girls, but by grade 12 the proportion falls to a little more than 25 percent. The lack of female teachers is a primary reason for the dropout rate for girls. An estimated 207,000 teachers, of whom about 70,300 are female, are currently employed. USAID has addressed the critical need for qualified teachers and, to date has helped train more than 74,000 MOED teachers, of whom 31 percent were female. Support to strengthen quality basic education will continue throughout the Transformation Decade.

In 2009, the Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) law prohibiting violence against women was enacted through presidential decree. GIROA's Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) report was met with mixed reviews at the 55th session of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in July 2013.<sup>25</sup> The law criminalizes child marriage, forced marriage, the selling and buying of women for the purpose or under the pretext of marriage, *ba'ad* (giving away a woman or girl to settle a dispute), forced self-immolation, and 17 other acts of violence against women, including rape and beating. In May 2013, the EVAW law was presented to parliament – even though it did not require further parliamentary approval to retain full force of law. However, it was returned to committee after many of its provisions were challenged by conservative leaders in the Wolesi Jirga. In June 2013, the Wolesi Jirga passed a new criminal procedure code which forbids family members from testifying against one another. If passed by the upper house, the provision could have serious ramifications for the prosecution of domestic abuse. Implementation of the EVAW law remain slow, and violence against women and girls remains prevalent. State, primarily through INL, continues to play a key role in supporting access to justice for victims of gender-based violence. INL supports training and mentoring for the eight existing Violence Against Women prosecution units, in addition to thirteen women shelters throughout Afghanistan.

Key USAID engagements in this area support women's political and civic participation through: the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC); the Afghanistan Parliamentary Assistance Program (APAP); Support for Increased Electoral Participation in Afghanistan (CEPPS); Regional Afghan Municipalities Program for Urban Populations (RAMP-UP); Initiative to Promote Afghan Civil Society (I-PACS); PACE, the follow-on project from I-PACS, the Ministry of Women's Affairs Organizational Restructuring and Empowerment (MORE) program; the PROMOTE program; and the U.S. Embassy Kabul Public Affairs grants. MORE aims to strengthen the Ministry of Women's Affairs (MOWA) capacity to support women in Afghanistan, and will support the delivery of two key components of MOWA's National Priority Program: institutional reform and organizational capacity building,

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<sup>25</sup> UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), *Concluding observations on the combined initial and second periodic reports of Afghanistan*, July 23, 2013, CEDAW/C/AFG/CO/1-2, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/51ff5ac94.html> [accessed September 26, 2013]

and public awareness and education, outreach, and news-media relations. The project will strengthen ties between MOWA and other Afghan ministries to incorporate gender mainstreaming in their own policy development, in line with the National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan. Since April, two full-time Gender Advisors have been employed in the USAID Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs (OAPA). The PROMOTE program will focus on increasing women's access to leadership positions in social, economic, and political sectors as well as providing women with a specially designed Women's Leadership Development program.

The international community has concerns about the participation of women in the upcoming elections, as women voters are essential to the credibility of the electoral process. Female voters account for 30.3 percent of registered voters. The lower turnout of women at the Voter Registration Centers is linked to cultural norms that require women in most parts of Afghanistan to travel with a male escort and limit the distance from home that women will travel. In an effort to increase voter registration, including that of women, the IEC has extended the voter registration period and has deployed mobile voter registration offices to reach remote districts. In order to encourage female voter registration the IEC is employing radio and television advertisements, and talking to Afghan civil society groups and *Ulema*.

On August 5, 2013 the MOWA submitted a document concerning women's representation in elections to the IEC. This document calls for the registration of women voters, a door-to-door awareness campaign, distribution of voter cards in remote parts through mobile teams, and the opening of polling centers close to homes. It also requests that at least 30 percent of appointed elections officials be female. The IEC Gender Unit aimed for 50 percent and has been successful to a degree. To date, 40 out of 407 districts do not have female election staff because of security reasons. The distribution of *e-tazkera* electronic identification cards may help increase the number of female registered voters because the card can also be used as a VR card. Use of the *e-tazkera* card is likely to reduce electoral fraud. The law on the *e-tazkera*, however, has not yet been approved by the Meshrano Jirga and is not expected to until October 2013.

Ensuring women's civic and political participation, as well as enhancing women's status and equality, is dependent on effective rule of law. Effective rule of law allows women to rely on both the informal and formal sectors to provide security and access to justice, and will raise awareness of and help implement existing Afghan laws protecting their constitutional rights, such as the EVAW law. There are now approximately 150 female judges, up from 50 in 2003. The Afghan Association of Women Judges was re-launched in 2012. Achieving greater equality within Afghanistan relies on the meaningful inclusion of Afghan women in every phase of the justice system – as police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, civil and family law attorneys, as litigants, and as Islamic law scholars.

USAID plays a leading role in implementing the U.S. government's civilian strategy for assistance to women in Afghanistan in the areas of health, education, economic development, access to justice, and political empowerment, and plays a supporting role in implementing the U.S. government's strategy in the area of security. The USAID Gender Equality and Female Empowerment policy requires programs to undergo gender analysis to attribute primary and

secondary benefits to gender. USAID Afghanistan has completed more than 33 gender analyses thus far. These gender analyses provide the basis for the development of gender implementation plans, lead to greater and more meaningful participation of women throughout USAID's programming, and ultimately reduce gender inequality. This contributes to greater security and democratic participation for all Afghan citizens.

Although the Department of State and USAID administer the majority of women's initiatives, DoD also oversees several programs focusing on women. These programs include assistance to the Department of Women's Affairs in Kandahar and the District Development Assembly for Women's Affairs in Parwan District. Additionally, coalition forces continue to incorporate Female Engagement Teams with general purpose forces on patrol, in order to engage women and children of local communities in open communication. This will facilitate civil-military interaction and build trust, cooperation, and security. Similarly, U.S. SOF employs U.S. Cultural Support Teams (CSTs) that provide an enduring female engagement capability in support of special operations and VSO/ALP expansion.

The U.S. government is committed to removing constraints on women's potential, and views their contributions to Afghan society as essential. U.S. government policy supports the principles of equality for men and women as encapsulated in the Afghan constitution, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, and the NAPWA. Furthermore, the U.S. government supports GIRoA's implementation of the Bonn Agreement, UN Security Council Resolution 1325, and the EVAW law. Despite advances, the challenges of poverty, illiteracy, weak security and poor health care continue to affect women disproportionately, and solutions will require a long-term, sustained effort.



## SECTION 5 – REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT

### 5.1: PAKISTAN

The United States continues to seek a relationship with Pakistan that is constructive and mutually beneficial, and that advances both U.S. and Pakistani interests. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship has improved since 2012 and both countries have reaffirmed the importance of maintaining bilateral cooperation in areas of mutual concern. Sanctuaries in Pakistan from which the Taliban attack into Afghanistan remain a serious problem, particularly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

Pakistan has demonstrated a willingness to cooperate on some key U.S. goals, although challenges remain. Pakistan has publicly committed to playing a positive role in an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation process, and Pakistan's support has been essential to U.S. retrograde operations in preparation for the drawdown in Afghanistan. In addition, Pakistan continues to cooperate on some counterterrorism activities. The Pakistani military has made many sacrifices to achieve significant territorial gains against Tehrik-e Taliban (TTP) and other militant groups in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which have disrupted insurgent groups by reducing their safe havens. Most recently, Pakistan military operations in summer 2013 degraded TTP safe haven and facilitation routes in Khyber Agency of FATA.

Since July 2012, Pakistan has sought to increase engagement with Afghanistan. The relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan has improved since summer 2013, culminating in a successful visit by President Karzai to Islamabad in August. Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif, since assuming office in May, has sought to strengthen diplomatic and economic ties to Kabul. In an important sign of bilateral cooperation, in September 2013 Pakistan released a high-ranking Taliban prisoner, Mullah Beradar, at President Karzai's request. Pakistan continues to support international efforts to reach a political settlement in Afghanistan and views this as the best path to avoiding post-2014 regional instability.

Nevertheless, there are limits to Pakistan's cooperation. Afghan-focused insurgent groups that attack U.S. and coalition forces continue to operate from Pakistan. The IED threat emanating from Pakistan remains significant. Pakistan has taken some steps to disrupt the IED supply network, including several significant seizures of IED materials such as potassium chlorate and commercial grade explosives, but more remains to be done. Cross-border incidents remain points of friction in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, but have also prompted both countries to increase their engagement and coordination on border issues during this reporting period.

### 5.2: INDIA

The Indian government continues to strongly support Afghanistan, having pledged \$2 billion in developmental assistance since 2001. India views a secure and stable Afghanistan as vital to its regional security and economic interests. India and Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership agreement in 2011, which formalized cooperation on governance, economics, commerce,

education, public administration, and security/law enforcement. The U.S., India, and Afghanistan launched a trilateral dialogue in 2012 to consult on regional political and economic issues.

India supports a variety of high-visibility projects and initiatives in Afghanistan. Indian assistance is primarily focused on major infrastructure projects (Salma dam, Parliament building), power infrastructure, and road construction. In a broadening of its focus from development to investment, India's SAIL Consortium was awarded 75 percent of the rights at Bamyān Province's Hajigak iron ore mine in November 2011. India is also active in regional forums, such as the Istanbul process, and has organized private sector conferences to boost investment in Afghanistan.

India continues to support the development of Afghan human capital through scholarship programs to Indian universities (more than 1,000 scholarships per year), agricultural training programs, and other vocational training activities. Since 2010, the U.S. and India have been undertaking joint projects to provide Afghans agricultural training and vocational skills. Public opinion surveys continue to show that Afghans have a favorable view of Indian involvement in their country.

### **5.3: CENTRAL ASIAN STATES<sup>26</sup>**

The Central Asian states host the NDN, a cargo delivery network which provides multiple ground and air transportation routes into and out of Afghanistan for commercial carriers and U.S. military aircraft. Prior to the November 2011 closure of the GLOC to ISAF cargo, the air and ground routes of the NDN already functioned as the primary routes for sustainment goods into Afghanistan. Maintaining the NDN LOCs remains critical to ongoing operations in Afghanistan. Over the past couple of years, the NDN has diversified with new over-flight permissions and expanded ground transit agreements encompassing "reverse" transit and transport of wheeled armored vehicles.

Beyond the NDN, the Central Asian states have participated in infrastructure and economic development to Afghanistan. As Afghan infrastructure continues to develop, expanded road, rail, electrical power, and air networks should serve to facilitate increased commercial activity between Afghanistan and its northern neighbors.

The Kyrgyz Republic has legislated the closure of the Transit Center at Manas International Airport (TCM). In July 2014, the U.S. will complete its relocation from the TCM International Airport.

Narcotics, arms trafficking, and smuggling are transnational threats in the region. These activities threaten legitimate commerce and the flow of strategic resources, cause damage to societies, and often benefit terrorist networks. The Central Asian states' concerns in Afghanistan

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<sup>26</sup> The Central Asian states include Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan.

include the spread of violent extremism in the region and threats stemming from the narcotics trafficking and other related criminal activities. According to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Tajikistan remains the primary route for Afghan-produced narcotics to Russian markets, with conduits through other Central Asian states. Border security remains a top concern for the Central Asian states, which are closely attuned to the implications for their own countries of events in Afghanistan and developments in narcotics trafficking.

A lack of security relations between Afghanistan and Central Asian countries continues to hamper border security. Security relations with Central Asian states, including military-to-military and police-to-police relations are underdeveloped at both at the upper and middle levels. Exchanges and meetings between security officials are rare. Some progress was made in improving security relations between Kazakhstan and Afghanistan when the Kazakh defense minister visited Kabul in April 2013.

#### **5.4: CHINA**

The People's Republic of China's (PRC) primary interests in Afghanistan are security and economic development. It continues to seek improved relations with, and stability for, Afghanistan, in addition to developing a deeper economic relationship. China has given no indication of plans to commit security personnel to Afghanistan, although it does have a program to help train Afghan police.

Since 2002, China has committed more than \$200 million in aid to the Afghan government. In 2009, China announced it would provide an additional \$75 million over the next five years. Chinese companies will likely continue to invest in Afghanistan, most notably in the development of Afghanistan's mines and infrastructure. The PRC has begun development of a section of the Amu Darya oilfield, and is currently conducting a feasibility study for a rail system to support extraction efforts at the Aynak copper mine. Despite such investments, Beijing has expressed concerns regarding the security situation in Afghanistan, especially on issues such as alleged Uighur "separatists" who seek haven in lawless border areas, the safety of PRC workers in Afghanistan, and narcotics trafficking into western China. The PRC and Afghanistan exchange regular official visits and seek cooperative bilateral approaches to counterterrorism and counter-narcotics issues. Beijing also voiced its support for reconciliation efforts between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

Although China has refrained from engaging in security operations, Beijing has provided ANSF personnel a variety of non-lethal, PRC-based training to bolster Afghanistan's security and stability since 2006. Training for the ANP, conducted at People's Armed Police municipal training facilities in China, has covered policing skills, crowd and riot control, criminal investigations, and internal security duties. The PRC has also offered basic, advanced, and senior military courses for ANSF officers at Peoples' Liberation Army military training colleges and universities.

Beijing has continued to support regional diplomacy, most notably by involving President Karzai in regional economic summits. Following years of informal involvement in the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization (SCO), Afghanistan was awarded observer status at the SCO in 2012. The PRC is also an active participant in the ongoing Istanbul Process, and will be hosting the fourth ministerial conference in 2014.

## **5.5: RUSSIA**

Russia is concerned about security problems emanating out of a post-ISAF Afghanistan. Russia seeks a stable Afghanistan to minimize the threat of terrorism and stem the flow of narcotics through Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus into Russia, feeding a high heroin addiction population. Russia has also supported Afghan-led reconciliation and reintegration efforts. Based on a commitment made at a NATO-Russia Council (NRC) meeting during the November 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, Russia has expanded the types of cargo shipped by rail and air via the NDN and also permits the reverse transit of goods back through the NDN. Moscow has stated that a new UN Security Council Resolution authorizing continued NATO operations in Afghanistan will be required to continue cooperation with NATO on transit route agreements.

Russia recognizes terrorism as being closely intertwined with narcotics trafficking, and sees direct benefits in Afghanistan from the NRC's CN training project, which trains CN personnel from Central Asia, Afghanistan, and now Pakistan, in Russia, Turkey, and via mobile training teams. Russia is interested in expanding CN cooperation and has continued with its participation in multilateral meetings and UNODC programs, and continues to call for greater international support for CN efforts in Afghanistan. Moscow believes that more cooperation on CN is within ISAF's counterterrorism mandate and would help reduce both narcotics trafficking and insurgent activity. Russia also encourages cooperation with the Collective Security Treaty Organization

Russia supported Afghanistan's bid for observer status within the SCO and has welcomed that designation. This has highlighted the increasing emphasis Russia places on regional cooperation mechanisms for economic, development, and security in Afghanistan as ISAF draws down.

## **5.6: IRAN**

Iranian determination to have a long-term role in Afghanistan is consistent with its aspirations for regional influence. Iran continues to call for the permanent withdrawal of all foreign forces from regional nation-states. Iran's attempts to influence events in Afghanistan include overt support for the Afghan government; economic and cultural outreach to the Afghan population, particularly to the Shi'a minority populations; and covert activities, including the provision of weapons and training for various insurgent and political opposition groups.

Politically, Iran seeks to maintain positive relations within the highest levels of GIRoA while attempting to steer Afghanistan away from an enduring BSA with the United States. In August 2013, Tehran and Kabul signed an MOU to expand security and economic interests, likely Iran's attempt to counter the U.S.-Afghan BSA. In addition to maintaining a diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, Tehran often uses high-level visits and key leadership engagements to criticize the presence of international forces in Afghanistan and to call for the withdrawal of ISAF publicly.

Various Afghan officials continue to solicit further Iranian support, despite evidence of Tehran's covert support to insurgents.

Since 2001, Iran has pledged more than \$1 billion in aid to Afghanistan and given more than \$500 million. Iran's reconstruction and development efforts have been largely concentrated in western Afghanistan. Iran's intent is to increase its influence among the local population in order to foster pro-Iranian sentiment. Iran also wants to expand its sphere of influence beyond border regions into other parts of Afghanistan, particularly Kabul. Iran currently maintains consulates in Herat, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif and is considering opening additional consulates in Bamiyan and Nimroz Provinces.

Iran also participates in the regional Istanbul Process. Iran continues to provide lethal assistance, including light weapons and training, to elements of the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Since 2007, coalition and Afghan forces have interdicted several shipments of Iranian weapons. Tehran's relationship with the insurgency, though not ideologically based, is consistent with Iran's short- to mid-term goal of undermining coalition efforts and opposing the international military presence in Afghanistan.

Beyond economic and security issues, the protracted Afghan refugee situation continues to be a contentious issue between Iran and Afghanistan. Approximately 1 million registered Afghan refugees and about 1.4 million undocumented Afghan migrants (non-refugees) currently reside in Iran.

Economic pressures and the Iranian government's discontinuation of subsidies on basic goods and services has led to a rise in the repatriation of Afghan refugees since 2011, but during this reporting period, Iran has not forcibly expelled or returned registered refugees. The deportation of undocumented Afghans (non-refugees) continues, though at a reduced pace compared to previous years.

## **5.7: GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATES<sup>27</sup>**

The members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) continue to provide support to OEF and have worked to provide financial support in the interest of a stable Afghanistan. Private Gulf citizens, however, are also a source of considerable funding for the Taliban and other terrorist groups that operate in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

GCC states provide the United States key basing facilities and access in support of the mission. Many of the GCC countries provide important air bases and over-flight and transit rights for operations in Afghanistan as well as logistical support of these operations. GCC countries host U.S. Central Command's forward headquarters, the Combined Air Operations Center, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Headquarters, and U.S. Army Central Command Headquarters.

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<sup>27</sup> GCC members are: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

GCC countries host key air and naval facilities and provide staging capability for combat, ISR, and logistics operations in support of U.S. and coalition operations in Afghanistan. On the ground, the United Arab Emirates has contributed combat forces, with about 250 Emiratis serving alongside coalition forces, and Bahrain has deployed a small contingent primarily tasked with guarding Camp Leatherneck.

GCC nations have also supported humanitarian operations in Afghanistan, including the establishment of refugee camps in Pakistan, and provision of financial assistance and aid for Afghan refugees. GCC countries are likely to continue provide support to Afghanistan after U.S. and coalition combat operations end.

Ongoing large-scale construction projects in Gulf countries provide opportunities for migrant labor. Afghan participation in this labor force has been large and could continue to be a major source of remittances, further contributing to the economic development of Afghanistan. A number of wealthy Afghan expatriates choose to live in the GCC states, deepening the economic, political, and familial ties between the countries.

## **5.8: JORDAN**

Jordan continues to be a key supporter of the OEF mission. To this end, Jordan contributes forces to train the ANSF and provides specialized capabilities such as SOF, aviation, medical, and religious and cultural engagement. Jordan provides more than half of the advisors to the female training battalion at the Kabul Military Training Center and maintains female engagement and cultural advisory teams. Additionally, a Jordanian Engagement Team conducts training for ANA Corps leaders, ANA soldiers, religious and cultural affairs officers, and local religious leaders, to counter the insurgency's narrative.

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## ANNEX A: SECURITY METRICS AND ASSESSMENTS<sup>28</sup>

### ANA Assessment and RDL Matrix (Infantry)

	Fully Capable	Capable	Partially Capable	Developing
Combined Arms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Close w/ &amp; Destroy EF</li> <li>• Fire and MAN; synch enablers</li> <li>• Operate as CA Team</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can close with and destroy enemy but can only synch some enablers or function independently</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Marginally effective at combined arms operations; cannot effectively synch enablers or operate in a team</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unit is untrained or in training</li> </ul>
Command and Control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Controls Forces on the battlefield</li> <li>• Establishes and Maintains Situational Awareness/ Battle Tracking; COORD w/ ADJ units</li> <li>• Can Communicate and issue orders to and receive reports from subordinate units</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can perform C2 functions reasonably well; lacks ability for 1 or more Fully Capable Criteria</li> <li>• Can perform with minimal CF assistance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can perform C2 functions marginally; lacks ability to establish or maintain C2 consistently</li> <li>• Can perform only with CF assistance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unit is untrained or in training</li> </ul>
Leadership	<u>RDL: Very Positive</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Purpose, Direction Motivation</li> <li>• Competent / Character</li> <li>• Loyal to GIROA, CF</li> <li>• Enforces Standards</li> <li>• Instills the will to fight</li> </ul>	<u>RDL: Positive</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capable leader lacking in experience or one of the Very Positive traits</li> <li>• Still requires CF assistance with some core functions of leadership</li> </ul>	<u>RDL: Neutral</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incompetent /Marginally capable/ disruptive leader</li> <li>• Corrupt or of Questionable Loyalty</li> <li>• Lacking in basic leadership potential</li> </ul>	<u>RDL: Negative</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incompetent /Toxic Leader</li> <li>• Corrupt or Disloyal</li> <li>• Lacking in basic leadership potential</li> <li>• Replace immediately</li> </ul>
Sustainment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can sustain itself in combat for 96 hours</li> <li>• "35 MM +1" (CL III, V, XIII, IX) and CL I</li> <li>• Establish/ maintain accountability of equipment / supply discipline</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can sustain itself in combat for 48-72 hours</li> <li>• Can provide bare minimum of critical supplies</li> <li>• Has minimally functional Accountability or Supply Discipline</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can sustain itself in combat for &gt;48 hours</li> <li>• Requires CF assistance for Sustainment</li> <li>• Requires CF assistance to establish and maintain accountability or discipline</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cannot sustain itself, or has significant accountability or corruption issues</li> <li>• Cannot function without CF sustainment support</li> </ul>
Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mission Focused / "METL" Focused/ Standards Based</li> <li>• Scheduled/ Resourced/ Rehearsed</li> <li>• Has literacy program</li> <li>• Exercises Operational Cycles (RED/AMBER/GREEN/GO)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lacks one or more of the IWA criteria</li> <li>• Has a literacy program</li> <li>• Lacks Operational Cycle</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requires significant CF assistance / guidance to devise and conduct training</li> <li>• Lacks literacy program</li> <li>• Lacks Operational Cycle</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requires significant CF training to establish a training program; has no literacy program</li> </ul>

<sup>28</sup> Appendix A, along with section 2.12 are submitted in fulfillment of Section 1221 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. Previous reports used metrics that focused on ANSF force generation. With the build-out of the forces largely complete, ISAF has shifted to developing ANSF sustainment and institutional capacity and has therefore revised the metrics it uses to reflect this shift.



## ANA Assessment and RDL Matrix (CSS)

	Fully Capable	Capable	Partially Capable	Developing	Established
Combined Arms Integration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enable combat forces to sustain operations</li> <li>• Understand commanders intent in order to direct CSS operations</li> <li>• Synchronize logistical support with operations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has minor trouble enabling combat forces to sustain operations</li> <li>• Has minor trouble understanding the commanders intent in order to direct CSS operations</li> <li>• Has minor trouble synchronizing logistical support with operations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has difficulty enabling combat forces to sustain operations</li> <li>• Has difficulty understanding the commanders intent in order to direct CSS operations</li> <li>• Has difficulty synchronizing logistical support with operations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cannot enable combat forces to sustain operations</li> <li>• Does not understand the commanders intent in order to direct CSS operations</li> <li>• Cannot synchronize logistical support with operations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unit is standing up, conducting initial fielding / training</li> </ul>
Command and Control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maintains support during all phases of operations</li> <li>• Can communicate with/ issue orders to/ receive reports from sub-units</li> <li>• Process and Analyze reports from sub-units</li> <li>• Can communicate with and action orders from higher command</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has minor trouble maintaining support during all phases of operations</li> <li>• Can usually communicate with/issue orders to/ receive reports from sub-units</li> <li>• Can usually process and Analyze reports from sub-units</li> <li>• Can usually communicate with and action orders from higher command</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has difficulty maintaining support during all phases of operations</li> <li>• Has difficulty communicating with/issue orders to/ receive reports from sub-units</li> <li>• Has difficulty processing and analyzing reports from sub-units</li> <li>• Has difficulty communicating with and actioning orders from higher command</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Must be trained by CF on task</li> <li>• Cannot maintain support during all phases of operations</li> <li>• Cannot communicate with/issue orders to/ receive reports from sub-units</li> <li>• Cannot process and analyze reports from sub-units</li> <li>• Cannot communicate with and action orders from higher command</li> </ul>	
Leadership	<u>RDL: Very Positive</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Purpose, Direction, Motivation,</li> <li>• Competent / Character; Loyal to GRCOA, CF</li> <li>• Enforces Materiel Accountability, Policies and Procedures</li> <li>• Plans, Forecasts and Executes support of Operations</li> <li>• Establishes priorities based on mission requirements</li> <li>• Willingly works with all customers</li> </ul>	<u>RDL: Positive</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capable leader lacking in experience or one of the very positive traits</li> <li>• Still requires CF assistance with some core functions of leadership</li> <li>• Usually enforces materiel accountability, policies and procedures</li> <li>• Willingly works with most customers</li> </ul>	<u>RDL: Neutral</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Marginally capable</li> <li>• Corrupt or questionable loyalty</li> <li>• Lacking basic leadership potential</li> <li>• Lacks initiative to enforce materiel accountability, policies and procedures</li> </ul>	<u>RDL: Negative</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incompetent / Marginally capable/ disruptive leader</li> <li>• Corrupt, willfully dishonest leader</li> <li>• Unwilling to work with people that cannot help him</li> <li>• Does not enforce materiel accountability, policies and procedures</li> <li>• Lacking in basic leadership potential</li> <li>• Replace immediately</li> </ul>	
Sustainment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Request, receipt, issue, store and manage all supplies</li> <li>• Schedule/conduct cyclic inventory management</li> <li>• Schedule/conduct maintenance operations</li> <li>• Schedule/conduct distribution operations</li> <li>• Establish/conduct accountability of equipment / supply discipline</li> <li>• Establish/conduct demand history and reconciliation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maintains stockage records</li> <li>• Has minor trouble forecasting requirements</li> <li>• Establishment of basic maintenance program</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Marginally maintains stockage records</li> <li>• Has basic understanding of forecasting requirements</li> <li>• Lacks initiative to develop basic maintenance program</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Loss of accountability of supplies and equipment</li> <li>• Does not understand the purpose of forecasting and planning</li> <li>• No maintenance program</li> </ul>	
Collective Training		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establishment of continuation training</li> <li>• Has a literacy program</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No institutional training</li> <li>• Requires significant CF assistance / guidance to devise and conduct training</li> <li>• Lacks literacy program</li> </ul>	

## ANA Assessment and RDL Matrix (Corps)

	Fully Capable	Capable	Partially Capable	Developing	Established
Combined Arms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Plans, Coordinates, and Synchronizes all Combat Operations and ANSF activities within the Corps Battlespace</li> <li>Integrates all available enabler support into Brigade Operations</li> <li>Provides security and freedom of movement to Afghan Civilians and GIROA within the Corps Battlespace</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Can Plan and Coordinate Operations, but lacks ability to fully integrate all War Fighting Functions or ANSF Pillars into a cohesive, singular effort</li> <li>Deficient in at least 1 Fully Capable Criteria</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Marginally effective at combined arms operations; cannot effectively synch enablers or all Pillars of ANSF within the Corps Battlespace</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Unit is untrained or in training</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Unit is standing up; conducting initial fielding / training</li> </ul>
Command and Control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>EST SA win the Corps Battlespace</li> <li>Controls and coords all ANSF activity win BS ; synchronizes and integrates all available assets</li> <li>Coordinates, Issues orders and receives reports from subordinate, adjacent, higher and other Pillars of the ANSF, GSG, MOD</li> <li>Develops Campaign Plans and Operations in support of GIROA / MOD directives</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Can perform C2 functions reasonably well</li> <li>Lacks ability for 1 or more Fully Capable Criteria</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Can perform C2 functions marginally; lacks ability to establish or maintain C2 consistently</li> <li>Can perform only with CF assistance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Unit is untrained or in training</li> </ul>	
Leadership	<u>RDL: Very Positive</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Purpose, Direction Motivation</li> <li>Competent/ Character</li> <li>Loyal to GIROA, CF</li> <li>Enforces Standards</li> <li>Instills the will to fight</li> </ul>	<u>RDL: Positive</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Capable leader lacking in experience or one of the Very Positive traits</li> <li>Still requires CF assistance with some core functions of leadership</li> </ul>	<u>RDL: Neutral</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Incompetent/Marginally capable/disruptive leader</li> <li>Corrupt or of Questionable Loyalty</li> <li>Lacking in basic leadership potential</li> </ul>	<u>RDL: Negative</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Incompetent/Toxic Leader</li> <li>Corrupt or Disloyal</li> <li>Lacking in basic leadership potential</li> <li>Replace immediately</li> </ul>	
Sustainment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Directs and prioritizes logistic assets and support throughout the Corps Battlespace</li> <li>Coordinates directly with Regional Logistic Support Commands for fulfillment of supply requests</li> <li>Ensures timely distribution of all classes of supply to the Brigades</li> <li>Manages and distributes budgetary resources as required</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reallocates assets across the Corps as required</li> <li>Places command emphasis on resolving Sustainment issues</li> <li>Lacks ability for 1 or more Fully Capable Criteria</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cannot resolve Sustainment issues within the ANSF system</li> <li>Requires CF assistance for Sustainment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cannot sustain itself, or has significant accountability or corruption issues</li> <li>Cannot function without CF sustainment support</li> </ul>	
Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provides Training Guidance to Brigade Commanders</li> <li>Establishes and maintains a professional development training program for Officers and NCOs</li> <li>Has a literacy program</li> <li>Exercises Operational Cycles (RED/AMBER/GREEN)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lacks one or more of the Fully Capable criteria</li> <li>Has a literacy program</li> <li>Lacks Operational Cycle</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Requires significant CF assistance / guidance to devise and conduct training</li> <li>Lacks literacy program</li> <li>Lacks Operational Cycle</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Requires significant CF training to establish a training program; has no literacy program</li> </ul>	

## AUP Assessment Matrix

	Fully Capable	Capable	Partially Capable	Developing	Established
Complete Assigned Mission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide public services</li> <li>• Respond to emergencies</li> <li>• Secure &amp; process evidence</li> <li>• Complete inv leading to arrest</li> <li>• Ensure pop &amp; infra security</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can provide public services</li> <li>• Can respond to emergencies</li> <li>• Can ensure road safety</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can provide public services</li> <li>• Can respond to emergencies</li> </ul>	Must be trained	Unit is standing up; conducting initial fielding / training
Command and Control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish &amp; operate CP</li> <li>• Establish &amp; maintain Situational Awareness &amp; analyzes crime statistics</li> <li>• Communicate &amp; issue orders and receive reports from subordinate units</li> <li>• Provide constructive feedback and orders to sub units</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can operate Command Post, Controlling operations</li> <li>• Can Communicate and issue orders and receive reports from subordinate units</li> </ul>	Can Communicate and issue orders and receive reports from subordinate units	Can only focus on a single task at a time	
Leadership	<u>RDL: Very Positive</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Purpose, Direction Motivation</li> <li>• Competent / Character</li> <li>• Loyal to Afghan people</li> <li>• Enforces Standards</li> <li>• Instills the will to fight</li> </ul>	<u>RDL: Positive</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capable leader lacking in experience or one of the Very Positive traits</li> <li>• Still requires CF assistance with some core functions of leadership</li> </ul>	<u>RDL: Neutral</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incompetent /Marginally capable/ disruptive leader</li> <li>• Corrupt or of Questionable Loyalty</li> <li>• Lacking in basic leadership potential</li> </ul>	<u>RDL: Negative</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incompetent /Toxic Leader</li> <li>• Corrupt or Disloyalty</li> <li>• Lacking in basic leadership potential</li> <li>• Replace immediately</li> </ul>	
Sustainment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can sustain itself for 48+ hours</li> <li>• Establish/ maintain/ issue accountability of equipment/ supply discipline</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can sustain itself for 24-48 hours</li> <li>• Can provide bare minimum of critical supplies</li> <li>• Has minimally functional Accountability or Supply Discipline</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can sustain itself in operation for &gt; 24 hours</li> <li>• Requires assistance for Sustainment</li> <li>• Requires assistance to establish and maintain accountability or discipline</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cannot sustain itself, or has significant accountability or corruption issues</li> <li>• Cannot function without sustainment support</li> </ul>	
Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct operations training / in service trng ("METL" Focused/ Standards Based)</li> <li>• Scheduled/ Resourced/ Rehearsed (GO/No-Go)</li> <li>• Exercises Operational Cycles (leave, training and duty cycle)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requires assistant in training</li> <li>• Scheduled/ Rehearsed (GO/ No-Go) training</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requires significant assistance/ guidance to devise and conduct training</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requires significant training</li> <li>• Needs to establish a training program</li> </ul>	

## ABP Assessment Matrix

	Fully Capable	Capable	Partially Capable	Developing	Established
Complete Assigned Mission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stop criminal activity along rat lines and BXPs</li> <li>• Collect revenue at entry points</li> <li>• Prevent prohibited materials/PAX from entering/ exiting the country</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stop criminal activity along rat lines and BXPs</li> <li>• Collect revenue at entry points</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Collect revenue at entry points</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Must be trained</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unit is standing up; conducting initial fielding/ training</li> </ul>
Command and Control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish &amp; operate CP</li> <li>• Establish &amp; maintain SA &amp; analyze criminal activities</li> <li>• Communicate, issue orders &amp; receive reports from sub units</li> <li>• Provide constructive feedback and orders to sub units</li> <li>• Coordinate between ANSF for joint operations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can Communicate and issue orders to and receive reports from subordinate/ supporting units</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can Communicate and issue orders to and receive reports from subordinate/ supporting units</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can only focus on a single task at a time</li> </ul>	
Leadership	<u>RDL: Very Positive</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Purpose, Direction Motivation</li> <li>• Competent / Character</li> <li>• Loyal to afghan people</li> <li>• Enforces Standards</li> <li>• Instills the will to fight</li> </ul>	<u>RDL: Positive</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capable leader lacking in experience or one of the Very Positive traits</li> <li>• Still requires CF assistance with some core functions of leadership</li> </ul>	<u>RDL: Neutral</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incompetent /Marginally capable/ disruptive leader</li> <li>• Corrupt or of Questionable Loyalty</li> <li>• Lacking in basic leadership potential</li> </ul>	<u>RDL: Negative</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incompetent /Toxic Leader</li> <li>• Corrupt or Disloyalty</li> <li>• Lacking in basic leadership potential</li> <li>• Replace immediately</li> </ul>	
Sustainment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can sustain itself for 72+ hours</li> <li>• Establish/ maintain /issue accountability of equipment/ supply discipline</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can sustain itself for 48-72 hours</li> <li>• Can provide bare minimum of critical supplies</li> <li>• Has minimally functional Accountability or Supply Discipline</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can sustain itself in operation for &gt; 48 hours</li> <li>• Requires assistance for Sustainment</li> <li>• Requires assistance to establish and maintain accountability or discipline</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cannot sustain itself, or has significant accountability or corruption issues</li> <li>• Cannot function without sustainment support</li> </ul>	
Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct operations training / in service training ("METL" Focused/ Standards Based)</li> <li>• Scheduled/ Resourced/ Rehearsed (GO/ No-Go)</li> <li>• Exercises Operational Cycles (leave, training and duty cycle)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requires assistance in training</li> <li>• Scheduled/ Rehearsed (GO/ No-Go) training</li> <li>• Exercises Operational Cycles (leave, training and duty cycle)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requires significant assistance/ guidance to devise and conduct training</li> <li>• Lacks Operational Cycle</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requires significant training</li> <li>• Needs to establish a training program</li> </ul>	

## ANCOP Assessment Matrix

	Fully Capable	Capable	Partially Capable	Developing	Established
Complete Assigned Mission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide intelligence information and police support to the ANA</li> <li>• Conduct hostage rescues and counter-terrorism operations</li> <li>• Checkpoint operations and mounted/ dismounted patrolling</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can provide intelligence information and police support to the ANA</li> <li>• Can conduct checkpoint operations and mounted/ dismounted patrolling</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can conduct checkpoint operations and mounted/ dismounted patrolling</li> <li>• Can conduct check points</li> <li>• Can be a mobile police presence in high-threat areas</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can conduct check points</li> <li>• Can be a mobile police presence in high-threat areas</li> </ul>	Unit is standing up; conducting initial fielding / training
Command and Control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• OPCON/TACON relationship establish between deployed units &amp; regionally based Bde HQ</li> <li>• Operate CP, control ops</li> <li>• Establish &amp; maintains SA/Battle Tracking</li> <li>• Can issue orders, receive reports from sub units</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can operate Command Post and control the operation</li> <li>• Can communicate and issue orders and receive reports from subordinate units</li> </ul>	Can communicate and issue orders and receive reports from subordinate units	Can only focus on a single task at a time	
Leadership	<u>RDL: Very Positive</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Purpose, Direction Motivation</li> <li>• Competent / Character</li> <li>• Loyal to Afghan people</li> <li>• Enforces Standards</li> <li>• Instills the will to fight</li> </ul>	<u>RDL: Positive</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capable leader lacking in experience or one of the Very Positive traits</li> <li>• Still requires CF assistance with some core functions of leadership</li> </ul>	<u>RDL: Neutral</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incompetent /Marginally capable/ disruptive leader</li> <li>• Corrupt or of Questionable Loyalty</li> <li>• Lacking in basic leadership potential</li> </ul>	<u>RDL: Negative</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incompetent /Toxic Leader</li> <li>• Corrupt or Disloyal</li> <li>• Lacking in basic leadership potential</li> <li>• Replace immediately</li> </ul>	
Sustainment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can sustain itself for 72+ hours</li> <li>• "35 MM +1" (CL III, V, XIII, IX) and CL I</li> <li>• Establish/ maintain accountability of equipment/ supply discipline</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can sustain itself for 48-72 hours</li> <li>• Can provide bare minimum of critical supplies</li> <li>• Has minimally functional Accountability or Supply Discipline</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can sustain itself in operation for &gt; 48 hours</li> <li>• Requires assistance for Sustainment</li> <li>• Requires assistance to establish and maintain accountability or discipline</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cannot sustain itself, or has significant accountability or corruption issues</li> <li>• Cannot function without sustainment support</li> </ul>	
Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assigned Mission Focused "METL" based training</li> <li>• Scheduled/ Resourced/ Rehearsed (GO/ No-Go)</li> <li>• Exercises Operational Cycles (RED/AMBER/GREEN)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requires CF to assist in training</li> <li>• Scheduled/ Rehearsed (GO/ No-Go) training</li> <li>• Early stages of Operational Cycle (RED/AMBER/GREEN)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requires significant assistance/ guidance to devise and conduct training</li> <li>• Lacks Operational Cycle</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requires significant training</li> <li>• Needs to establish a training program</li> </ul>	